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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CLOUD WORKLOAD ALLOCATION FOR QUALITY OF SERVICE GUARANTEE
AND CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT
by
Soamar Homsi
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Gang Quan, Major Professor
It has become a dominant trend in the industry to adopt the cloud computing technology
– thanks to its unique advantages in flexibility, scalability, elasticity and cost efficiency
– for providing online cloud services over the internet using large-scale data centers. In
the meantime, the relentless increase in demand for affordable and high-quality cloud
services, for individuals and businesses, has led to tremendously high power consumption and operating expense levels and, thus, has posed crucial challenges on cloud service providers in finding efficient resource allocation policies. Allowing several services
or Virtual Machines (VMs) to commonly share the cloud’s infrastructure enables cloud
providers to optimize resource usage, power consumption, and operating expense. However, servers sharing among users and VMs causes performance degradation and results
in cybersecurity risks. Consequently, how to develop efficient and effective resource management policies that can make the appropriate decisions to optimize the trade-off among
resource usage, service quality, and cybersecurity loss plays a vital role in the sustainable
future of cloud computing.
In this dissertation, we focus on cloud workload allocation problems for resource usage optimization subject to Quality of Service (QoS) guarantee and cybersecurity risk
constraints. To facilitate our research, we first develop a cloud computing prototype that
we utilize to empirically validate the performance of different proposed cloud resource

vii

management schemes under a close to practical, but also isolated and well-controlled,
environment. Second, we research the resource management policies for time-sensitive
cloud services with QoS guarantee. Based on the queuing model with reneging, we establish and formally prove a series of fundamental principles, between the timing characteristics of cloud services and their resource demands, and based on which we introduce
several novel resource management algorithms that statically guarantee the QoS requirements for cloud users.
Third, we study the problem of mitigating the cybersecurity risks and losses in cloud
data centers via proposing secure cloud resource management strategies. We employ the
Game theory to model the VM-to-VM interdependent cybersecurity risks in cloud clusters. We conduct a thorough analysis based on our game-theoretic model and establish
several algorithms for cybersecurity risk management. Specifically, we start our cybersecurity research from a simple case with only two types of VMs. We next extend it to a
more general case with an arbitrary number of VM types. Our intensive numerical and
experimental results show that our novel algorithms can significantly outperform the existing methodologies for large-scale cloud data centers in terms of optimizing resource
usage, cybersecurity loss, and computational effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Joining cloud computing market [8–16] has recently become the dominant trend for small
and large companies to continuously deliver affordable and high-quality business services
over the internet. Cloud computing notably minimizes the Information Technology (IT)
infrastructure expense by eliminating the necessity for any additional hardware and software purchases and maintenance cost [17]. Cloud computing supplies a commonly shared
pool of on-demand, scalable, and elastic IT resources and services using a pay-per-use
pricing model [18, 19]. In the meantime, the constant increase in desire for affordable
cloud services with stringent service qualities and high-security levels has posed critical
challenges on cloud service providers in finding efficient resource allocation policies capable of optimizing the trade-off among energy consumption, operating expense, quality
of service, and cybersecurity risks [20, 21]. One standard approach that cloud providers
adopt to maximize resource usage is Virtual Machine (VM) multiplexing in which they
pack several VMs on the same server. Allowing multiple applications and VMs, with
different resource and cybersecurity requirements, to share the same cloud infrastructure
components, notwithstanding, results in performance degradation of cloud services and
interdependent cybersecurity IC risks [20–23]. Cloud providers henceforth need efficient
resource allocation policies with multi-objective goals in order to thrive in such an everexpanding and competing cloud computing market [24].
In this chapter, we give a brief introduction about the cloud computing technology,
its unique characteristics, and its importance to each sector in our modern life. We then
discuss the urgent need of cloud service providers for efficient and effective resource management methods that can provide affordable and secure cloud services with guaranteed
Quality of Service (QoS) for cloud users. We define our research problem afterward and
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summarize our contributions. Finally, we describe the organization of this dissertation at
the end of this chapter.

1.1

Cloud computing

Cloud computing offers a commonly shared pool of on-demand, scalable, and elastic
IT resources and services (e.g., processing, network, software, information, and storage)
via a pay-per-use pricing model [18, 19]. Cloud service providers make their services
available to cloud consumers using web-based applications, and accessible through a web
browser, as if those applications were locally installed on their own computers [25]. Today, cloud computing has grown as one of the most prominent and influencing computing
paradigms for managing and delivering services over the internet.

1.1.1

What exactly is cloud computing?

After years of work and more than fifteen drafts, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology’s (NIST ) [18] eventually issued the sixteenth and final definition of the cloud
computing paradigm in 2011. The NIST defines cloud computing (e.g., NIST Special Publication 800-145)) as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of
five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.”
As Fig. 1.1 illustrates, the five unique characteristics of cloud computing, according
to NIST, are as follwos:
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Figure 1.1: The characteristics of cloud computing [1]. This figure lists the five major characteristics of cloud computing according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

• On-demand self-service
Cloud users can automatically provision as much computing resources as needed
without the service provider’s interaction [8, 26].
• Broad network access
Cloud services are made available over any network connected to the internet and
are accessible through any computing device, such as mobile devices, personal
computers, and servers [27].
• Resource pooling
Cloud service providers aggregate cloud computing physical and virtual resources
into resource pools. Providers subsequently assign or reassign each pool to a group
of cloud users, i.e., a multi-tenant model. Cloud users have no information about
the actual geographical location of their resource pools [28].
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• Rapid elasticity
Service providers can resiliently allocate and release computing resources to accommodate consumers’ fluctuating demands according to peak business hours. This
rapid provisioning process not only saves cloud users the need to invest in a private
IT infrastructure but also grants them access to a virtually unlimited amount of
computing resources anytime and anywhere [29].
• Measured service
Cloud providers implement online metering and pricing tools that are capable of
dynamically monitoring and measuring the usage of resources, i.e., a pay-per-use
pricing model. Such metering and pricing tools provide transparency for both service providers and users about resource utilization and billing information, respectively [30].
Cloud platforms can be classified according to its service model or according to its
deployment model. The major cloud service models, that are illustrated in Fig. 1.2, are:
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
Service providers offer businesses and individuals on-demand computing resources
(e.g., storage, processing, etc.) accessible over a network to optimize the IT costs
of cloud users [12].
• Platform as a Service (PaaS)
In the platform service model, cloud service providers grant cloud users access
to online development environments with powerful and capable supporting infrastructure. The PaaS services thus enable programmers and developers to affordably
produce and deliver quality software solutions, from their homes, without incurring
any powerful servers or costly software licenses [31].
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Figure 1.2: The cloud service models [2]. This figure illustrates the three cloud service models,
i.e., Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service
(SaaS).

• Software as a Service (SaaS)
End-users can leverage the on-demand cloud services that are available via web
pages or through Application Program Interfaces (APIs) and are accessible over
the Internet [32].
In this dissertation, we concentrate on designing efficient and effective cloud allocation strategies in order to optimize cloud resource usage while providing cloud services for cloud users with guaranteed quality levels, regardless of the cloud deployment
model in-use. The NIST definition lists the following four general cloud deployment
models [18]:
• Public Clouds
A public cloud is an openly available cloud platform that is owned and operated
by a third-party [33]. Examples of public clouds include Amazon Elastic Com-

5

Figure 1.3: Examples of public cloud service providers [3]

pute (EC2) [31], IBM’s Blue Cloud, Sun Cloud, Google AppEngine, and Windows
Azure Services Platform, i.e., Fig. 1.3.
• Community Clouds
A community cloud is a public cloud, but its access is limited to a particular collection of cloud consumers [8].
• Private Clouds
A private cloud is a cloud platform that is owned and managed by a single organization. Access to private cloud services is limited to the employees and clients of
the organization that runs and owns the private cloud platform [34].
• Hybrid Clouds
A hybrid cloud is a platform that combines two or more different deployment models. For instance, an organization can store its sensitive data on its own cloud
platform, while it can offer its business services to its client using public cloud
platforms [17].
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To understand the significant role of cloud computing in today’s IT-based market, we
should first examine the unique features of cloud computing as opposed to those from
other computing paradigms.

1.1.2

The uniqueness of cloud computing and its market potential

We have learned so far that cloud computing offers plenty of advantages for individuals
and organizations. Moreover, the unique features of cloud computing cause the annual
growth of the cloud computing market to continuously increase year after year compared
to the market of other computing paradigms [4].
Unlike the application-oriented-based supercomputing and cluster computing, cloud
computing is a service-oriented utility computing with virtualization technology [34].
Utility computing is a business model that attracts cloud customers using a pay-per-use
pricing model [35], [36]. Cloud computing, thus, supplies consumers with on-demand
computing resources similar to those services provided by public utilities, such as electricity [17, 19]. Cloud providers hence equip each cloud cluster with innovative metering,
monitoring, and billing tools. Amazon, Sun, and IBM are examples of companies that
utilize their cloud infrastructure to offer Utility computing services publicly [34]. For
instance, Amazon, i.e., AWS, offers pay-by-hour utility compute services using EC2 and
utility pay-by-usage storage services using the Simple Storage Service (S3) [37].
Cloud consumers can quickly provision as much computing resources as needed without the service provider’s direct intervention, knowledge about the infrastructure, or skills
to utilize cloud services [9, 34]. The process of allocating cloud resources to consumers
seems similar to hosting online applications using the service-oriented web hosting scheme
over distributed computing platforms [17]. However, distributed computing does not rely
on vastly scalable computing infrastructure that is spread across several countries or conti-
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nents, as the cloud computing infrastructure that is supported by several large-scale cloud
data centers [17].
Several scholars argue that cloud computing emerged out of grid computing as a result of the transfer from the focus on providing physical computing resources with high
performance to the emphasis on delivering economy-based abstracted resources and services [17]. Furthermore, grid computing is different from cloud computing in its foundation and structure, i.e., the grid technology relies on standard, well-documented protocols,
and accessible interfaces to deliver notable qualities of computing service [38].
Resource sharing in cloud data centers significantly reduces energy cost and operating
expense for cloud consumers [19]. Governments and businesses replace their private
data centers with the cloud’s remote infrastructure [17]. The U.S. Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) has issued guidance to reduce the number of federal, private data
centers starting in 2010, as reported in [39]. The goal is to shift most of the critical and
non-critical IT workload to cloud data centers to save energy costs via the adoption of
proficient cloud resource management policies. Unwise workload allocation practices in
traditional data centers result in low server utilization and high power consumption per
consumer, compared to (65%) cloud’s server utilization and (84%) power consumption
per cloud’s consumer as reported by the Data Center Efficiency Assessment from the
Natural Resources Defense Council in 2014. Traditional data centers are “duplicative,
costly and complex”, as reported in [40], causing the annual electricity cost to increase by
2.5% each year over the last 20 years [41]. The scalable and flexible cloud infrastructure
optimizes resource usage and server utilization by adopting adequate resource-sharing
policies, such as server consolidation.
The scalable and elastic cloud infrastructure likewise reliably and affordably fulfills
the increasing demands for cloud users. For example, cloud computing provides small
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Figure 1.4: Rapid growth of cloud computing [4]. This figure shows the average compound growth
of cloud computing between the years 2015 and 2020.

businesses with the tools required to compete with middle-sized and large-sized organizations via saving them the cost of investing in a private IT infrastructure [34].
The unique features of cloud computing, which we described earlier, have been attracting more and more businesses and organizations to make the transition to the cloudbased flourishing market.
It is unsurprising, thereupon, that several studies predict major growth in the adoption
of cloud computing in the next several years. According to a study done by Forbes [4],
the cloud computing market is expected to reach $162B in 2020 attaining a Compound
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 19% compared to the $67B in 2015 at 3% CARG, as
illustrated in Fig. 1.4.
On the other hand, the rapid growth of the cloud market calls for comparable expansion in the size and spending of the cloud infrastructure. Fig. 1.5 illustrates data center’s
IT spending according to deployment type [5]. The IT spending in cloud data centers has
been increasing by 15.3% each year, and the total IT spending of cloud data centers is
expected to reach $41.7B in 2021, according to IDC [5].
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Figure 1.5: Data center’s IT spending according to the deployment type [5]. This figure shows
that the IT spending in cloud data centers has been increasing by 15.3% each year and the total
IT spending of cloud data centers is expected to reach $41.7B in 2021 according to reports by
IDC [5].

Although cloud computing provides irresistible benefits, it raises many concerns including high power consumption, low resource utilization, performance degradation as a
result of resource sharing, and cybersecurity risks. Those challenges arise as a result of
the continuous expansion of cloud data centers and the limitations of the current cloud
resource management policies, as we discuss in the next section [42–44]. Specifically,
we first define cloud resource management. We then argue the critical role of efficient
cloud workload allocation strategies in providing cloud services with QoS guarantee and
minimized cybersecurity risks.

1.1.3

Cloud computing challenges

To continue offering compelling advantages and cost-saving options for cloud users, cloud
service providers have to face the following major cloud computing’s challenges:
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• Power consumption and energy cost
Excessive power consumption and energy cost are among the principal concerns
in cloud data centers. Cloud service providers endeavor to supply the markets with
more reliable, yet less costly, services to contribute to a modern world that demands
Everything as a Service (EaaS) [15]. Whereas the price of online services decreases
and the performance of computing systems increases at a fast rate, the performanceper-watt of computing components increases at a much slower rate [45]. As an
example, in 2013, the annual electricity consumption of data centers in the United
States was close to 91 billion KiloWatt Hour (KW H), which is larger than the
annual amount of electrical power required by most countries [46]. Thereupon, service providers are taxed by looming energy bills as they try to produce satisfactory
QoS guarantee. Such a consumption rate of electricity is not only a cost problem
but also a serious threat to the environment as a result of the large amounts of carbon dioxide emissions during powering and cooling cloud data centers [46]. It is
imperative thereupon for service cloud providers to adopt energy-aware resource
allocation strategies that minimize power consumption and electricity cost in cloud
data centers [47].
• IT-based operating expense
The provider’s IT operating spending in cloud data centers (e.g., servers, software,
licenses, network equipment, etc.) is expected to increase 15.3% each year, after
2017, to reach $41.7B in 2021, according to the Worldwide Cloud IT Infrastructure Market Forecast, as illustrated in Fig. 1.5. Server consolidation allows several
services or VMs to share the same server to optimize resource usage [48]. Sharing the same resource type, among several applications and users, unfortunately,
causes performance degradation which affects the quality levels of cloud services
and results in IC risks [33].
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• Service Level Agreement (SLA)
The cloud service provider and consumers negotiate preferred quality levels for
cloud services (i.e., QoS), under which their satisfaction is guaranteed. The negotiation eventually ends in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) [49]. Therefore, the
cloud service provider must guarantee QoS conditions for his/her consumers, i.e.,
provides a QoS guarantee. Maintaining redundant computing resources cannot always ensure the QoS conditions for cloud users since it cannot adaptively scale up
or down according to the abrupt changes in the cloud workload arrival and execution rates [32,47,49]. It can also lead to tremendously high power consumption and
energy cost due to the low resource utilization [24]. Cloud service providers consequently need sound resource management policies that can swiftly and judiciously
make allocation decisions while ensuring the QoS guarantee for cloud consumers.
• Low resource utilization
Low resource utilization [50] is a prevailing problem in cloud data centers, and is a
major leading factor to their high power consumption and increased operating cost
[45]. For example, the utilization of Google’s servers is less than 50% on average
[21]. Maximizing resource utilization becomes more critical when performance
must meet a defined satisfactory level of service given by QoS conditions. The
challenge is hence how to allocate the cloud’s workload in a way that maximizes
resource usage and guarantees the QoS requirements.
• Cybersecurity risks
Although cloud computing provides interesting solutions to individuals and organizations, cloud computing, like any other IT technology, is not completely safe
from cyber attacks. Precisely, the commonly shared infrastructure of the cloud
among VMs and users undeviatingly exposes cloud applications and VMs to sev-
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eral cybersecurity risks, such as side-channel attacks [51–53] and VM-to-VM IC
risks [39].
Consequently, how to develop efficient and effective resource management policies to
face those challenges and optimize the trade-off among resource utilization, QoS guarantee, and cybersecurity risks plays a vital role in the sustainable future of cloud computing.

1.2

Cloud resource management

The benefits of cloud computing enable businesses to compete and thrive by taking advantage of the scalable and agile cloud computing platforms. In the meantime, the constant
increase in desire for affordable and high-quality cloud services has led to several significant concerns that forced cloud service providers to find new efficient and effective
resource allocation policies.

1.2.1

What is cloud resource management?

Resource management is a fundamental process for any cloud platform. It is a core function which effectively and efficiently allocates and releases computing resource to meet
the demand of cloud users while providing them with satisfactory QoS [54]. Efficient resource management allows cloud service providers to share cloud resources among cloud
services and users with high availability and optimized utilization [20–22]. It is, yet, a
very complicated task for cloud service providers to provide all the required resources to
avoid SLA violations due to the limited capacities of available resources. On the contrary,
inefficient resource management drastically affects the performance and cost of a cloud
platform [23].
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Cloud service providers need effective resource management strategies that quickly
and intelligently make allocation decisions without violating the SLA conditions between
the cloud service provider and cloud users [24]. Maintaining excessive computing resources cannot adequately guarantee the QoS conditions for cloud users as it can lead to
tremendously high power consumption and low resource utilization [47]. Besides, allowing several applications, VMs, and users to commonly share a pool of cloud resources
brings about many cybersecurity risks, such as the side-channel attacks [51, 52], and the
VM-to-VM IC risks [33, 55].
Next, we emphasize the crucial role of efficient and effective resource allocation policies to provide QoS guarantee and to minimize cybersecurity risks.

1.2.2

The need for cloud resource management to provide QoS guarantee

Cloud service providers offer cloud services to the cloud consumers who expect the cloud
system to operate without service interruption and to perform according to an SLA in
a cloud Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [56]. However, It is difficult, for the cloud
service provider, to ensure the ideal satisfaction of all cloud consumers. The cloud service
provider, thus, negotiates a feasible balance with the consumers in the form of agreements.
These agreements are referred to as SLAs and evaluated based on QoS criteria. The term
QoS is a metric which measures the service performance, in terms of predefined criteria
that characterize specific attributes (e.g., processing rates [57], latency [58, 59], etc.) of
the cloud platform, to ensure the degree of cloud consumers’ satisfaction and to enforce
SLAs [60]. Providing QoS guarantees nonetheless is a challenging task when considering
the allocation of time-sensitive cloud services while aiming to optimize cloud resource
usage and to minimize the average response time to avoid SLA violations.
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Hard real-time schedulers must always provide guarantees on preventing requests
from missing deadlines. Therefore, real-time requests must have deterministic and welldefined parameters (e.g., arrival time, response time, etc.). On the other hand, the cloud
workload is random. Cloud interactive services [61], as online gaming [21] and multimedia streaming services [62], are described by soft-timely constraints [61]. Cloud service
providers must guarantee that a predefined percentage of them meet their deadlines, i.e.,
deadline miss ratio [63, 64]. The cloud service provider, otherwise, violates his/her SLA
with the cloud users [20]. Therefore, probabilistic or stochastic cloud allocation policies
are necessary to accommodate requests with random or statistical time parameters [65].
Furthermore, scheduling real-time requests in embedded system is either using a
single-core [66, 67] platform or multi-core platform [68–71]. On the other hand, a cloud
provider can schedule requests on a single server [72–74], on a cluster of servers [75, 76],
on a single data center [77,78], or on a set of geographically distributed data centers [79].
The cloud service provider consequently has to consider other interference related parameters, in addition to the timing constraints, before making a scheduling decision, such as
network delay, communication contention, etc, [80], [81].
Ensuring the QoS of cloud services yet becomes a more challenging process when
several cloud consumers can have different SLA with various QoS attributes [82]. The
cloud service provider’s common practice has been to host requests with the same QoS
on the same VM to optimize resource usage [83]. Although this method simplifies the
resource allocation process, it does not provide QoS guarantees and it increases energy
cost and operating expense [26, 84].
Cloud service providers not only need to provide a competing and guaranteed QoS for
their cloud consumers but also have to minimize the energy cost and operating expense
to increase their profit. Power-saving techniques (e.g., Server consolidation [85], VM
migration [86], and server dynamic configuration [87]) usually, if not always, cause a
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degraded computing performance and, as a result, SLA violations. Whereas resource overprovisioning is a common and simple solution to avoid SLA violations, resource overprovisioning is an expensive method by which resources are drastically underutilized,
and it cannot provide QoS guarantees under the fluctuating cloud workload [26, 84].
Cloud service providers, thus, need to develop efficient cloud resource management
policies with timing QoS guarantees that ensure the satisfaction of the cloud consumers
and optimize the energy cost and operating expense of cloud data centers.

1.2.3

The need for cloud resource management to minimize cybersecurity risks

Cybersecurity is the most crucial concern when adopting cloud computing [42, 44]. The
commonly shared infrastructure of the cloud among VMs and users, unfortunately, exposes cloud workload and users to several cybersecurity risks, such as side-channel attacks [51–53] and VM-to-VM IC risks [39].
The side-channel attacks are carried on using VM collocation. The successful collocation, of the attacker’s VM with a victim VM, allows the attacker to build different kinds
of side channels to extract private information about the victim’s VM (e.g., workload’s
traffic rate [52], cryptographic keys [51], etc.) that eventually enables him/her to launch
a successful attack. Several software-based and hardware-based methods were proposed
to address this type of attack [88, 89].
Software-level methods are usually limited in their capabilities to the boundaries of
the hosting VM or are unable to keep up with all the new attack techniques proposed by
hackers [90]. On the other hand, hardware-level methods proposed to countermeasure
side-channel attacks are costly and impractical, as they required modifying the architecture of the cloud infrastructure [88, 89]. Furthermore, dynamic VM allocation can
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significantly minimize the attacker chances of colocating his/her VM with the victim
VM [90, 91] and maximizes resource utilization [92] through live VM migrations. However, live migration comes with a migration overhead results in performance degradation
and SLA violations [49].
In the VM-to-VM IC attacks, an attacker can compromise the hypervisor after a successful attack on one of its vulnerable VMs [33, 55]. He/she consequently can compromise all other coexisted secure VMs on that hypervisor. VM multiplexing methods,
which are extensively used in cloud data centers, expose VMs with sensitive data or high
value to IC risks. Those risks allow the attackers to bypass any security measures applied
to those critical VMs and to indirectly compromise them using a less secured colocated
VMs [33, 52]. While allocating VMs with different security requirements to different
servers incurs lower security risks, it exacerbates resource usage and energy cost. Hence,
the challenging question is –how can the providers optimize the trade-off between minimizing the IC risks and improving the energy cost and operating expense? –.
In the next section, we introduce our research problem.

1.3

Research problem

In this dissertation, we study the research problem of developing efficient and effective
cloud resource management policies and techniques with the focus on optimizing the
trade-off among optimizing resource utilization, providing QoS assurance, and minimizing cybersecurity risks. Specifically, our research problem can be formulated as the following:
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Given
• The performance characteristic of a cloud cluster,
- number of servers, resource performance, cybersecurity performance, power consumption performance, etc.
• The specifications of a set of cloud services or a set of VMs,
- timing specifications, workload characteristics, QoS requirements, cybersecurity
specifications, etc.
• The design constraints,
- response time, deadline miss ratios, cybersecurity loss, power consumption, etc.
• The design objectives,
- optimize performance criteria, such as timing, cybersecurity, cost, etc.
Determine

where and how to allocate the requests or VMs so that the design objectives are optimized.

1.4

Our contributions

Towards this research problem, we make the following contributions:
1. To facilitate our experiment and validation work, we first develop a cloud computing prototype that closely mirrors industry-compatible cloud platforms. Our prototype can provide cloud services as any middle-sized cloud service provider does.
The prototype generates and runs several general and cloud-specific benchmarks
under an isolated and well-controlled environment. We further incorporate new
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workload scheduling, resource provisioning, and performance monitoring schemes
that we proposed in this dissertation into the platform.
2. Different from previous studies that employ separate VMs for hosting requests with
different QoS requirements, we develop a cloud service multiplexing method, based
on the queuing model with reneging, that enables requests of the same service type,
but with different QoS constraints, to share the same VM. To our best knowledge,
this is the first approach by which different requests with different QoS requirements can be hosted on a single node to increase resource utilization. We also devise a novel methodology that correctly discards potential failure requests as soon as
possible to minimize processing rate demands, and to reduce total power consumption with statistically guaranteed QoS. We introduce a packing and consolidation
algorithm that statistically ensures the QoS requirements of cloud requests in terms
of deadline miss ratios. In addition to the analytical validation of our proposed
methods, we experimentally verify them, under general and cloud-specific workloads, using our cloud platform. For example, we use the Data Caching benchmark
that emulates the behavior of a Twitter caching server and assumes strict quality
of service guarantees, such as, 95% of the request must finish within 200 ms. Extensive experimentation results show that our proposed methods widely outperform
existing approaches in terms of QoS satisfaction, power consumption efficiency,
resource demand minimization, and electricity cost saving.
3. A major limitation of consolidating VMs of different security requirements onto
a single server is that it can result in VM-to-VM interdependent cybersecurity IC
risks. For example, the odds of successfully compromising a secure critical VM
are high when an attacker compromises the hosting hypervisor after a successful
direct attack on one of its less secured, non-critical VMs. Therefore, we formulate
the allocation problem with cybersecurity awareness into a non-cooperative, zero-
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sum theoretical game model between an attacker and the service cloud provider.
We develop a set of new conditions to identify the existence of an equilibrium
allocation strategy quickly. We mean by an –equilibrium– allocation strategy that
the allocation policy in which neither the provider nor the attacker can benefit from
unitarily deviating from their allocation or attack decisions, respectively. We then
incorporate several resource usage parameters into a non-zero-sum game model.
We identify the cases under which several static and dynamic equilibrium allocation
strategies exist. We also derive the lower-bound and upper-bound of the IC risks.
4. Finally, we extend our game models to include VMs with more general cybersecurity and resource requirements. We focus on the static VM allocation problem to
study how to (1) minimize the provider’s worst potential cybersecurity loss under
constrained resource usage and how to (2) optimize cloud resource usage while ensuring that the worst potential cybersecurity loss is always less than a given cybersecurity threshold. We show later in this dissertation that a constrained-allocation
problem is a typical NP-hard problem, and, thus, we formulate the security-constrained
and resource-constrained VM allocation problems using the Mathematical Programming (MP) approach to obtain the optimal solutions, which will be used as
a comparison baseline against other proposed approaches in this dissertation and
when the problem size is small. We formally model the resource and securityconstrained allocation problems as a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game.
We conduct a thorough analysis of the characteristics of the pure Nash Equilibrium
(NE) strategy profiles in our game model, which we formulate as a series of lemmas
and theorems. Based on the insights of our analysis, we develop several effective
and computationally efficient algorithms to allocate VMs, of different resource and
security requirements, with resource usage and security loss optimized. We have
implemented our algorithms and studied their efficiency and effectiveness. Our ex-
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tensive simulation results show that our novel approaches are good trade-offs when
compared with the computational-intensive approaches, such as the ones based on
the MP approaches, the existing NE search methods, or the computationally efficient multi-dimensional bin-packing methods.

1.5

Organization

We organize the rest of this dissertation as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the related works
to our research. Chapter 3 introduces our cloud computing platform which is used to
empirically validate our proposed methods and algorithms in this dissertation. Chapter 4
presents our research on workload consolidation for cloud data centers to optimize their
resource usage and electricity cost while providing guaranteed QoS for cloud users via
the early reneging of failed requests. Chapter 5 studies how to collocate critical VMs and
non-critical VMs onto cloud clusters with or without resource and energy constraints to
minimize the IC risks. Chapter 6 extends our game models and studies how to mitigate the
provider’s worst potential cybersecurity loss under constrained resource usage and how
to optimize cloud resource usage while guaranteeing that the worst possible cybersecurity
loss is always less than a given cybersecurity threshold. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this
dissertation and discusses our future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We present the related works to our research in this chapter. We start by briefly describing
real-time scheduling and the differences between real-time request scheduling in embedded systems and time-sensitive request scheduling in cloud platforms. We further discuss
the current research on time-sensitive requests scheduling in cloud platforms. We additionally describe the related work to VM allocation in cloud data centers, with and without
security awareness. Finally, we summarize our discussion at the end of the chapter.

2.1

Real-time scheduling

Real-time systems are usually reactive systems that must comply with deadlines. In the
real-time systems, the correctness of the execution of a task does not only depend on the
computational results, but also on completing the task before its deadline [93, 94].
A real-time system is a finite collection of independent or dependent services, each of
which generates a potentially infinite sequence of requests [95]. Each request is characterized by a Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET ) requirement, an applicable deadline, and
a period. Each service generates a potentially infinite sequence of requests. Successive
requests arrive with a non-zero number of units of time apart.
Real-time scheduling is the process that decides where to allocate arriving requests
and when to start and/or stop the execution of every request so that the timing constraints
of all requests are met and other performance optimization criteria, if there exist any, are
also achieved.
Real-time system can be classified according the timing constraints into soft [96–98]
and hard real-time systems [63, 99]. Soft real-time systems allow requests to miss a few
deadlines. However, missing more than a certain number of request’s deadlines within
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a specific period (e.g., deadline miss ratio) degrades the performance of the soft realtime system. On the other hand, catastrophic effects may occur when violating a single
deadline in hard real-time systems, such as a nuclear reactor monitoring system or traffic
control software [63, 64].
Scholars also classify real-time scheduling, according to the time at which the scheduling decisions are made, into static [70,100] and dynamic [101–103] real-time scheduling.
Static real-time scheduling algorithms make the scheduling decisions offline, according
to the timing constraints of requests (e.g., arrival time, deadline, response time, etc.).
The static scheduling decisions never change until all requests complete their executions.
Rate Monotonic Scheduling (RMS) is an example of static real-time scheduling methods.
On the other hand, dynamic scheduling approaches make the scheduling decisions online according to changes in the request’s run-time information (e.g., earliest deadline,
most recent arrivals, etc.) An example of this type of real-time scheduling is the Earliest
Deadline First (EDF).
In the non-preemptive scheduling, high priority requests cannot interrupt lower priority requests until the last finishes its execution. Static real-time scheduling policies are,
thereupon, non-preemptive [74, 104]. Dynamic real-time scheduling, on the other hand,
can be non-preemptive [74, 104] or preemptive [105, 106].
Real-time schedulers can be a single-core [66, 67] or on a multi-core [68–71]. A
single-core scheduler has to decide the sequence of requests execution. On the other
hand, a multi-core scheduler has to decide where to allocate each request and when each
request is to be executed.
Regardless of the type of the real-time scheduler, It must always guarantee the timing
constraints of the real-time tasks to improve the predictability of the system, which could
result in performance degradation and a low throughput [107]. It is, thus, necessary to
ensure that sufficient resources are available for each real-time request all the time [108].
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2.2

Scheduling time-sensitive services in cloud platforms

Although cloud platforms are capable of delivering real-time services [109, 110], service
scheduling in cloud platforms is different from real-time scheduling in embedded systems
due to several factors, such as the nature of cloud workload, type of cloud platforms, and
the design objectives.
• Cloud workload
Real-time requests should have deterministic and well-defined parameters (e.g., arrival time, response time, etc.) so that hard real-time schedulers can assure that no
request will miss its deadline. On the contrary, cloud workload arrival and execution
times are often characterized by general distributions and hence cloud services need
probabilistic or stochastic schedulers to accommodate cloud requests with random
or statistical time requirements [65].
• Cloud platforms
Scheduling real-time requests in embedded systems occurs on a single core’s level
[66,67] or on a multi-core platform’s level [68–71]. On the other hand, cloud schedulers can schedule requests onto a single server [72–74], a cluster of servers [75,76],
a single data center [77, 78], or a set of geographically distributed data centers [79].
The cloud service provider accordingly has to consider other external parameters
before making a scheduling decision, such as network delay, communication cost,
power consumption, etc.
• Design objectives
Real-time scheduling relies on the worst-case analysis to avoid missing any deadline which could be catastrophic in several systems, e.g., missing a deadline in an
automatic braking system in modern cars. Contrarily, cloud scheduling aims to
provide statistical guarantees (e.g., 95% of cloud requests must complete before
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a deadline). Moreover, regardless of the type of scheduler adopted in a real-time
system, all schedulers must guarantee the timing constraints to improve the predictability of the system even if the scheduling decision results in performance
degradation [107]. On the contrary, the goal of cloud schedulers is to optimize
the utilization and other performance metrics of the whole system as the system
throughput and average response time [48, 111].
Next, we discuss the research on the power-aware scheduling of time-sensitive requests in the cloud. We categorize those types of research into power-aware cloud resource management and cloud resource allocation with QoS-awareness.

2.2.1

Power-aware cloud resource management

Countless efforts have been made to reduce power and energy consumption in serviceoriented computing systems [112]. We can categorize those researches into different
abstraction levels and/or according to different criteria. For example, according to the
scale/type of the computing systems, Cai et al. in [50] categorized the energy-aware
techniques applicable for servers [68, 113], clusters [57, 59, 114], data centers [45, 115]
and the cloud [116].
Power/energy aware approaches can also be classified according to the different resource types, such as CPUs [45, 117], memory [84], storage devices [118], and/or network [30]. Since CPUs usually acquire the highest power consumption among all resource types [115], we focus on reviewing the works that focus on improving power
consumption and energy cost of CPUs in cloud data centers using techniques including
Dynamic Voltage Scaling and Dynamic Frequency Scaling (DV S/DFS), virtualization,
and server consolidation [119].
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Dynamic Voltage Scaling and Dynamic Frequency Scaling (DVS/DFS)
Dynamic Voltage Scaling and Dynamic Frequency Scaling (DV S/DFS) has been a powerful conventional technique for adaptive performance and power dissipation adjustment
to achieve power efficiency [57, 114]. Hwang et al. showed that the maximum energy
savings in virtualized multi-core servers can be achieved when combining the DVS/DFS
methods and the consolidation algorithms [68]. Beloglazov et al. [116] introduced a
global-and-local layer approach to make virtualized servers more power-efficient by adjusting the frequency and voltage of processors according to VM’s utilization. Likewise,
Kim et al. [114] proposed DVFS-enabled, with both time-shared and space-shared, cluster scheduling policies for a bag of tasks to reduce power consumption and to meet the
deadline requirements of end-users.
Although many researchers and engineers acknowledge that DVFS scheduling algorithms are robust and energy-saving solutions on the server’s level, they cause many challenges in the current cloud data centers. For instance, DVFS are architecture-dependent
and they may not achieve their best power/energy-saving when applied to the current
heterogeneous cloud data centers.

Virtualization and VM migration
As virtualization technology evolved as a norm in today’s data centers to amplify resource
usage through running multiple VMs on a single server, VM migration has been widely
employed to optimize server utilization and to reduce power consumption [29]. In [120],
Mastroianni et al. statistically modeled and analyzed the effects of VMs allocation and
migration on minimizing the number of powered-on servers, and on reducing power consumption in data centers. Zhen et al. [29] introduced the concept of skewness to measure
the unevenness in the servers’ multidimensional-resource utilization.

26

VM live migration, nonetheless, requires a delay and service interruption that can
degrade the overall system performance and availability, and consequently leads to SLA
violations [121].

Server consolidation
In conjunction with VM migration, server consolidation is of a special interest among
efficient resource allocation policies [85]. Server consolidation, comparatively to DVFS,
improves resource utilization without demanding excessive hardware resources, and it is
easy to implement and to deploy [120].
Now that, server power consumption is not exactly proportional to its utilization, and
a server may waste a substantial amount of power even when it is idle [120], server consolidation methods pack running VMs on a smaller number of physical servers and/or
turn off the rest, to minimize the total power consumed by those servers [58, 113, 120].
In [113], Verma et al. presented a two-dimensional, i.e., memory-based and CPU-based,
consolidation strategy in which decisions are made based on the correlation among different workloads. In [113], Pinheiro presented an algorithm to dynamically turn servers on
and off according to the imposed load in computing clusters. Chase et al. [122] reduced
the energy consumption of server clusters by degrading services according to their SLA,
when power consumption or thermal dissipation exceeds a certain limit.
Next, we discuss the works related to cloud resource allocation with QoS-awareness.

2.2.2

Cloud resource allocation with QoS-awareness

Whereas saving power/energy is important, service providers must also ensure that their
services can satisfy the QoS requirements of cloud users, such as response time and/or
deadline miss ratios. For instance, a recent report has found that a 100ms extra delay
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costs Amazon 1% of sales revenue [123]. The problem becomes more challenging with
interactive workload types [61] like online gaming [21] and multimedia streaming services [62]. These online interactive services have soft-timely constraints [61], in that service providers must guarantee that a predefined percentage of them meet their deadlines.
Otherwise, service providers fail to keep up with their SLA [20].
VM placement methods with performance-interference awareness were introduced
in [124] to improve the performance of VMs and the utilization of servers. Resource overbooking, i.e., allocating more resources than the actual available capacity to raise service
provider profit, with different real-time constraints is presented in [61]. Energy-aware
resource allocations with response time and end-to-end time guarantees were introduced
in [58] and [59], respectively. Greenberg et al. [30] studied the costs of cloud data centers
and recommended developing new management systems within and across geographically distributed data centers with the focus on network agility to improve their efficiency
and end-to-end performance.
SLA-aware workload consolidation methods have been proposed to achieve higher
dynamic power efficiency and to overcome the under-utilization problems resulting from
applying the over-provisioning policies [86]. Lee et al. [125] developed a pricing model,
based on the queue model M/M/1/PS, and used it to establish profit-driven scheduling
algorithms with SLA for the cloud-dependent services.
To assure the QoS requirements of cloud services with requests from different classes
of QoS demands, it has been a common approach (e.g., [59]) to serve requests with the
same QoS requirements on the same VM. When all requests on the same machine have the
same QoS requirement, different types of QoS can be captured by a single variable, such
as provisioned resources (e.g., [113] [120] [116]), required processing speed (e.g., [57]),
or latency (e.g., [58] [59]). Although this approach simplifies the resource management
problem to guarantee one specified QoS criteria, it excludes requests that can share re-
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sources, and the overall resource usage can be rather inefficient, as illustrated later in this
dissertation.
Almost all previously mentioned works implicitly assumed that all accepted requests
must receive service, even if they do not meet their QoS conditions. We show in this
dissertation that if we can judiciously discard the requests that are likely to miss their
deadlines, we can significantly improve resource usage without compromising QoS conditions.
Next, we discuss the related works to VM allocation in cloud platforms with and
without security awareness.

2.3

VM allocation in cloud platforms

As cloud services entered in each sector of our personal and professional lives, maximizing resource usage and minimizing power consumption in cloud data centers using
efficient allocation policies became a necessity. Many allocation approaches, based either
on traditional optimization methods (e.g., Mathematical Programming (MP) [126], evolutionary programming method [127], and fuzzy control [128]) or on a variety of different
heuristics (e.g., [129]), have been proposed for resource allocation in cloud platforms for
applications with different characteristics, requirements, and optimization goals. For example, Beloglazov et al. [126] suggested several VM migration algorithms to improve
CPU utilization. When a server has a CPU usage below a predefined threshold, all VMs
hosted on that server must be migrated to other servers. They also introduced several more
algorithms to minimize the number of VM migrations using upper utilization thresholds
as the Minimization of Migrations (MM) policy, the Highest Potential Growth (HPG)
policy, and the Random Choice (RC) policy. Their experimental validation showed that
increasing the lower-utilization thresholds, increases the SLA violations, while reducing
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the server’s energy consumption. Proposing VM consolidating policies that optimize resource usage is vital for cloud providers, yet those allocation policies are hypothetical
because they ignore the cybersecurity effects of the consolidation decisions.
In this section, we review the research related to VM allocation methodologies in
cloud platforms. We can classify those related works into four major categories that
are directly related to our research focus in this dissertation: Vector Bin Packing (VBP)
based cloud resource allocation, game theory-based cloud resource management, cloud
cybersecurity countermeasures using the Game theory, and security-aware cloud resource
allocation approaches.

2.3.1

Vector Bin Packing (VBP) based cloud resource allocation

The VM allocation problem is a well-known NP-hard problem, as we show later on, and
hence heuristics, such as Vector Bin Packing (VBP), have been adopted heavily to solve
similar problems with multiple optimization goals [130]. In a VBP heuristic, there is a
weight function applied to the items so that each item is assigned a single scalar, based on
which, the standard bin packing can be used to sort those items. Wood et al. [92] introduced a multi-dimensional First Fit Decreasing (FFD) approach to lively migrate VMs
out of overloaded servers. Their approach considers multiple CPU, memory, and network resource demands of each VM. Panigrahy et al. [131] proposed several VBP-based
methods for VM allocation with different resource demands and optimization goals. Beloglazov et al. [126] suggested several VM migration algorithms to improve CPU utilization and demonstrated that increasing the lower-utilization threshold increases the Service Level Agreement (SLA) violations while reduces the server’s energy consumption.
In [128], the authors used combinatorial and multi-objective optimizations to optimize
resource usage in a two-level control system that allocates workloads from virtual to
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physical resources. Using a local and a global fuzzy controller, they tried to minimize
power consumption, thermal dissipation, and a peak temperature of the system. In [132],
the authors introduced an application placement controller that consolidates applications
according to the ratio of their CPU to memory demands. Microsoft’s Virtual Machine
Manager used in Azure applies the Dot-Product and Norm-based Greedy heuristics [133].
The authors in [133] proposed new geometric heuristics that run nearly as fast as FFD.
We are, however, not aware of any prior work that employs VBP to deal with security
requirements during a VM allocation process.

2.3.2

Game theory-based cloud resource management

Researchers use the Game theory to study and understand the interaction among economic, social, or military entities. The goal is to find a stable pair of static (e.g., pure)
or mixed (e.g., dynamic) strategies which are called a Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy
profile. We mean by –stable– is that none of the entities involved in the game has any incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy. According to Nash 1950 [134], any game
with a limited number of strategies must have at least one such equilibrium. The Game
theory thereupon can be used to formulate VM allocation problems into a non-cooperative
two-player game framework. Our rationale is that the Game theory offers “mathematical
models of conflict and cooperation between cooperative and noncooperative intelligent
rational decision-makers”, [135]. Although the Game theory is a theoretical approach in
the sense that it assumes the attacker has a comprehensive knowledge about all the information related to the infrastructure that helps him/her maximize his/her cyber gain (e.g.,
informative game), we can positively use it to model the scenarios in which the worst
potential cyber-attack occurs on the clusters of cloud providers.
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The three essential criteria to consider when designing an equilibrium-based VM consolidation algorithm are soundness, completeness, and computational efficiency [136].
First, the algorithm is sound if any solution it returns is, in fact, a solution. The algorithm
is complete if there exists only a single solution; the algorithm finds it [137]. The third
essential criteria for our VM consolidation problem is computational efficiency; that is
the algorithm’s worst-case computation time is polynomial for any number of VMs and
servers.
Several works employed the Game theory to model the resource optimization problem
in cloud platforms [127, 129, 138]. Wei et al. [127] adopted the Game theory to solve a
QoS constrained resource allocation problem across a cloud-based network. Kunsemoller
et al. [129] elaborated on cloud economics benefits for businesses using a game-based
cloud model of an IaaS economy including the dynamics of pricing and usage. Pillai
et al. [139] proposed a VM allocation policy onto cloud platforms, based on the principles of coalition formation and the uncertainty principle of the Game theory. They
illustrated that the coalition-formation of the VMs leads to higher resource utilization and
higher request satisfaction. Teng et al. [140] suggested a new Bayesian pure NE-based
resource management policy assumes heterogeneous and distributed resources, cognitive
behaviors of cloud consumers, non-perfect information, and dynamic successive allocation. They proved that the resource price would converge to the optimal rate at the end
of the gambling sequence. Jalaparti et al. [138] similarly employed the Game theory
to optimize resource efficiency, and pricing policies by modeling the client-provider and
client-client interactions, respectively. They introduced multiple heuristic algorithms with
near-optimal allocation and pricing policies compared to the fixed-pricing strategies used
today by cloud providers, such as in Amazon EC2. However, all the above ignored the
cybersecurity effects of their allocation methods.
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2.3.3

Cloud cybersecurity countermeasures using the Game theory

As more and more organizations, companies, and private users move their computing
facility to cloud data centers, there have been increasing interests and concerns in the
cybersecurity problem in the cloud (e.g., [90, 141]).
Several works focused only on studying the types of cybersecurity attacks that are resulted from the commonly shared infrastructure of the cloud among several applications
and users. Side-channel attacks are one of the most popular types of cybersecurity attacks on cloud infrastructure. Several countermeasures were proposed in the literature to
mitigate or prevent side-channel attacks [51–53]. The proposed methods include modifying or tuning up the infrastructure to prevent hackers from extracting information about
private keys (i.e., secret key extraction attack [51]), preventing attackers from verifying
co-residence with the victim’s VM [52], or introducing a new infrastructure design (e.g.,
mitigate the threat of timing channels by eliminating high-resolution clocks [142], or
adding latency to potentially malicious operations [52, 142]).
Kamhoua et al. [33] used a non-zero-sum game framework to model the VM-to-VM
interdependent cybersecurity risks between an attacker and two users in the cloud. They
showed that the existence of NE strategy profiles depends on the probability that the hypervisor is compromised, after a successful attack on one of the users, and the total cost of
the user’s security investments. They also irrationally concluded that there exists no NE
strategy profile when all the users in the cloud fully invest in cybersecurity countermeasures. Et al. Kwiat [55] applied the same cybersecurity model introduced by Kamhoua
to a different allocation problem. They considered a game between an attacker and three
users. The first user never invests in security and is always allocated to the first insecure
hypervisor. The second user invests in security countermeasures and is always assigned
to the second secure hypervisor. In this dissertation, we use a zero-sum game frame-
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work between an attacker and a provider to model and analyze the VM-to-VM mutual
interdependent cybersecurity risks in cloud data centers.
Unlike [33, 55], wherein the defender strategies are to invest or not to invest, we assume that all VMs have different resource requirements and cybersecurity countermeasures installed. The provider’s strategy is to choose the allocation policy that minimizes
his/her loss under a worst-case cybersecurity attack on a cloud cluster with a limited set
of resources.

2.3.4

Cybersecurity-aware cloud resource allocation

Cybersecurity is the most critical concern when adopting cloud computing [42, 44]. The
commonly shared infrastructure of the cloud among VMs and users, unfortunately, exposes cloud workloads to several cybersecurity risks, such as side-channel attacks [51–53]
and VM-to-VM interdependent cybersecurity risks [39].
The side-channel attacks occur using virtual machine collocation. The successful collocation allows the attacker to build different kinds of side channels to extract private
information about the victim’s VMs (e.g., the victim’s workload, traffic rate [52], cryptographic keys [51], etc.) that eventually enables him/her to launch a successful attack.
Several software-based and hardware-based methods were proposed to address this type
of attacks [88, 89]. Software level methods are usually limited in their capabilities to
boundaries of the hosting VM or unable to keep up with all the new attack techniques
proposed by hackers [90]. Rao et al. [143] used the Game theory to search the ability of a
cloud computing provider to guarantee a given capacity C with a particular probability P
given a physical or cybersecurity attack on his/her data center. They proposed the use of
reinforcement strategies to decrease the attacker’s utility. While many works focused on
VM migration to maximize resource utilization and minimize power consumption, et al.
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Zhang [90] is the first to develop a formal and quantified migration strategy in the cloud
to improve cybersecurity against collocation attacks and with accepted costs.
[141] used the Game theory to model the co-location attack between attackers and a
provider. The attackers try to collocate their VMs with target VMs on the same physical
server and exploit side-channel attacks to extract private information from the VMs of
victims. The provider aims to minimize the attackers’ possibility of collocating their VMs
with the target VMs while maintaining a satisfactory workload balance and low power
consumption for the system. The provider strategy is to choose among four different
allocation policies: servers with the least number of VMs, servers with the most number
of VMs, random, and round-robin.
Hardware-level methods proposed to face side-channel attacks are costly and impractical as they required modifying the architecture of the cloud infrastructure [88, 89]. Furthermore, dynamic VM allocation, i.e., VM live migration, can significantly minimize
the attacker chances of colocating his/her VM with the victim VM [90, 91]. Although
dynamic VM allocation maximizes resource utilization [92] and minimizes cybersecurity
risks resulted from side-channel attacks [51] through live VM migrations, it brings about
a migration overhead results in performance degradation and SLA violations [49].
In the VM-to-VM Interdependent Cybersecurity (IC) attacks, an attacker can compromise the hypervisor after a successful attack on one of its vulnerable VMs [33, 55].
He/she consequently can compromise all other coexisted secure VMs on that hypervisor. VM multiplexing methods, which are extensively used in cloud data centers, expose
VMs with sensitive data or high values to interdependent cybersecurity risks which allow
the attackers to bypass any security measures applied to those critical VMs by indirectly
compromising them using a less secured colocated VMs [33, 52]. While allocating VMs
with different security requirements to different servers incurs lower security risks, it exacerbates resource usage and energy cost. The challenging question accordingly is –how

35

can the providers optimize the trade-off between minimizing the IC risks and improving
his/her energy cost and operating expense?–.

2.4

Summary

In this section, we discuss the difference between real-time and cloud scheduling for
time-sensitive requests. We also discuss the works about the power-aware scheduling of
time-sensitive cloud requests which we categorize into cloud resource management without assuring QoS guarantees and cloud resource allocation with QoS-awareness. Finally,
we review the research about our VM allocation methodologies in cloud platforms. We
further classify those works into Vector Bin Packing (VBP) based cloud resource allocation, game theoretic-based cloud resource management, cloud cybersecurity measures
using the Game theory, and security-aware cloud resource allocation approaches.
In the next section, we describe our cloud prototype which we designed and implemented to validate our findings in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
THE GREEN CLOUD COMPUTING PROTOTYPE (GCCP)
In this section, we first state our motivation and shed light on the importance of building
an experimental cloud platform. We then describe the hardware and software components
of the platform. Second, we show how to use our platform in analyzing the performance
of actual cloud clusters. Finally, we list various types of open-source benchmarks that the
platform can run and conclude the chapter.

3.1

Motivation

Purely theoretical analysis and study of the performance of cloud platforms and the behavior of virtualized systems undergo numerous challenges that prevent scholars from
providing realistic and applicable conclusions [144]. Variations in Virtual Machine (VM)
Managers, hypervisors, virtualization scenarios, and cloud workload types makes it almost impossible to develop a single universal benchmark tool that can carry out performance testing tasks on any cloud platform. Furthermore, new simulation models were
developed to study cloud data centers. However, those models fall short in considering
the performance interference and interdependence among hosting hypervisors, VMs, and
applications that compete over the shared resources (e.g., processing, memory, storage,
and network). Furthermore, simulation develops a margin of errors that contribute to
inaccurate validation results.
We hence realize the need to build an experimental validation platform that allows us
to generate synthetic or to import open-source cloud-specific benchmarks when validating
our proposed resource management schemes.
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3.2

Platform characteristic

In this section, we introduce the Green Cloud Computing Prototype (GCCP) that conforms to the industrial standards applied in practice. Fig. 3.1 shows the different components of which the GCCP consists. We built GCCP so that it can have the following
characteristics:
• Industry compatibility
The architecture model of GCCP conforms to the model introduced by IBM in [25],
whereas the organization of its infrastructure model conforms to the well-known
cloud providers, such as Google Compute Engine, Amazon EC2, Rackspace, and
Microsoft Windows Azure. The prototype can import and integrate any of the
industrial-compatible cloud software or benchmarks (e.g., the cloud orchestrator
OpenStack, different hypervisors, Memchashed benchmarks, etc.) as we illustrate
later in this chapter.
• Modularity
Our cloud prototype consists of individual functional modules that are implemented
in Java and running on management nodes.
• Full automation for better usability
The system workflow is fully automated and controlled using Python scripts at the
system level, and bash scripts at the operating system level which makes using the
prototype easy for users from any background.
• Versatility
The prototype is equipped with a dedicated workload submodule that is capable
of generating cloud or general-purpose workload with different characteristics and
functionality allowing it to be used for several purposes.
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Figure 3.1: High-level representation of the Green Cloud Computing Prototype (GCCP). The
cloud prototype consists of four functional modules that are implemented in Java and running on
management nodes. The system workflow is automated and controlled using Python scripts at the
system level, and bash scripts at the operating system level.

• Scalability
In this chapter we show how to deploy GCCP software components over several
personal desktop computers inside a small classroom or over a typical cloud cluster,
which consists of several powerful rack servers, exists in a server room or actual
data center.
We describe each of the hardware and software components of GCCP next.

3.2.1

GCCP’s hardware components

GCCP consists of two management and two compute physical machines. The two management nodes (e.g., VMs) are launched using the open-source Kernel Virtual Machine
(KV M) hypervisor and managed using the open-source Webvirtmgr. KVM hypervisor is
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hosted onto two Dell Precision T1500 machines with Quad-Core Intel i-5 CPU, 16 GB,
1333 MHz DDR3 memory, and a 300 GB SATA Disk Drive. The management VMs run
Ubuntu Server Linux 12.04.5 LTS Precise Pangolin release with a kernel version 3.2.0.76.
We installed Citrix XenServer 6.5 platform, which is based on the hypervisor Xen
[145], to manage the physical resources onto two compute nodes. Each compute node is
an HP Workstation Z800 with two Intel Xeon Six-Core E5645 (2.40 GHz, 12 MB cache),
1333 MHz DDR3 memory of size (32 GB), and 1 TB disk space.

3.2.2

GCCP’s software components

GCCP consists of four functional modules implemented in Java and running on management nodes. The system workflow is automated and controlled using Python scripts at the
system level, and bash scripts at the Linux nodes level.
Next, we describe each of the functional modules in detail.

User input module
The UserInput module allows users to define service types having request classes with
different QoS requirements. The synthetic request classes imitate the requests of a cloud
broker under different Service Level Agreements SLAs via the Service and SLA Input submodule. On the other hand, the submodule Unified Workload Modeling Engine (UWME)
models and generates request instances of a specific service type and class according to
parameters and QoS constraints defined in the Service and SLA Input submodule. Specifically, UWME is a Java tool that generates workloads with desired timing, functional and
computational characteristics. As shown in Fig. 3.2, UWME is essentially a server/client
model program that can generate workloads with different stress levels, which can be
identified by the number of processes to be launched at a specified VM. The UWME
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Figure 3.2: Unified Workload Modeling Engine (UWME). UWME is essentially a server/
client model program that can generate workloads with different stress levels.

server is a VM residing in a management compute node and contains four main modules,
i.e., Modeling Manager, Producers, Consumer, and Database.
All the submodules in the user input module run on allocated VMs that enable potential failure reneging and allow results logging.
In the following chapters, we employ UWME to generate several scientific and cloud
workloads. For example, we utilize UWME to generate memory-intensive cloud services, which is a Matrix MULtiplication (MMUL) Java application, using the open source
lightweight Apache Common Mathematics Library [146]. We also employ UWME to produce CPU-intensive cloud services, shaped with a one-dimensional Fast Fourier Transform (1-D FFT) Java application, using the open source multi-threaded (FFT ) library
Jtransforms [147].
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In addition to our newly developed synthetic workloads, we employ UWME to incorporate cloud-specific cloud benchmarks. As we discuss later in this dissertation, we use
the UWME submodule’s server and clients to mimic the behavior of a Memcached server
and clients. A Memcached server is a distributed memory object caching system that
speeds up dynamic web applications by alleviating the delay of a single database worker
(e.g., a single execution queue) that is capable of producing the data caching requests, i.e.,
Get or Set. The Memcached clients receive the caching requests to schedule and process
them according to our proposed scheduling algorithms. The Performance Monitoring
Module then collects the results on all VMs.

Service management module
The ServiceManagement module accepts inputs from the User Input Module and schedules/dispatches cloud workloads onto the available computing resources using the Scheduler and Resource Allocator/Request Dispatcher submodules. Different resource provisioning and workload scheduling algorithms can run in the Scheduler and Resource
Allocator sub-module.

Infrastructure management module
The In f rastructureManagement module is responsible for operating the hardware and
software computing resources of the cloud cluster. We employ Citrix XenServer 6.5 platform, which is based on the hypervisor Xen [145], to manage the physical resources on
both HP Workstations Z800 with two Intel Xeon Six-Core E5645 with a 2.40 GHz and
12 MB cache CPU, 1333 MHz DDR3 memory of size 32 GB, and 1 TB disk space. We
also developed a Cloud Orchestrator submodule that communicates with the Scheduler
and Resource Allocator and XenServer to automate the processes of creating VMs, pro-
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visioning VMs, configuration VMs, and to make VMs available online for the Request
Dispatcher onto which requests are forwarded from the UWME submodule.

Performance monitoring module
The Per f ormanceMonitoring module monitors the performance of the cloud cluster, collects performance statistics, and measures resource usage and power consumption via
three major submodules (e.g., the Power Metering, Resource Metering, and Run-time
statistic collection sub-modules).
The Power Metering submodule measures the static and dynamic power consumption
of the server pool under different configurations and running conditions. To measure the
actual power consumption, we used an AC/DC Fluke i410 current clamp meter with an
output of 1 mVolts(mV)/Amps(A), connected to an Agilent 34401, which is a multimeter
with a resolution of +/- 120 mWatts (mW). The Power Metering submodule automates
the power reading process using a C program running within Ubuntu Linux 12.04.5 LTS
on a dedicated Dell desktop that communicates with the multimeter through a serial cable
to automatically record electrical current readings.
Consider a server pool SPi = {V Mi,1 , ...,V Mi,mi } allocated to physical cores {PCPUi,1 , ..., PCPUi,mi },
respectively. Recall that a single workstation in GCCP has at most 10 available physical
mi
cores –Note that we reserve 2 cores for Xen’s Domain-0–. SPi must be hosted by d 10
e

workstations, and the power consumption for SPi is the total power consumption of these
workstations. Now assume that mi ≤ 10. The power consumption Pi consumed by SPi
can be formulated as
mi

Pi =

∑ (Pi,d j ϕi, j ) + Pis,

(3.1)

j=1

where Pi,d j is the dynamic power when each core is 100% utilized, ϕi, j is the utilization
of V Mi, j , and Pis is the static power of the HP workstation when mi physical cores are
allocated to the VMs.

43

To calculate Pis , we measured the drawn AC current by the workstation, i.e, I s , when
all mi VMs are idle. The corresponding static power consequently is Pis = I s × 120V .
To calculate Pi,d j , we used the UW ME submodule to generate enough request instances
such that all VMs were kept busy and achieved 100% utilization, and we afterward measured the drawn AC current by the workstation to calculate the total power consumption,
i.e., static and dynamic power. The difference accordingly, between the full and static
measured power, is the overall dynamic power consumption of mi cores with 100% utilization.
We further assume that the cores that are hosting the same service type (e.g., Si ) with
the same capacity size (e.g., Ci ) consume the same amount of dynamic power. We thereupon divide the total dynamic power by the number of cores mi to get Pi,d j . As an illustration, let a server pool with a single VM. We measured its static power as 186W . It’s dynamic power consumption when running memory-intensive workload and CPU-intensive
workload on a fully utilized core are 16.8W and 18W , respectively.
The Resource Metering submodule leverages the available system tools and our newly
developed user-level tools to collect and measure the computing resource usage. For example, to measure the amount of CPU usage, i.e., the processing rate of a CPU, consumed
by each VM in MegaHertz (MHz), we can use the command xentop. To measure the CPU
usage in Instruction Per Second (IPS), we can use our newly developed scripts that parse
the run-time logs generated by the Run-time Statistic Collection submodule.
The Run-time statistic collection submodule collects and stores run-time statistics of
the dispatched request instances in log files based on the light-weight RAM Filesystem
(Ram f s). Information obtained by this submodule includes IDs of service types, request
classes, instances and hosting VMs, along with with the instances start times, finish times,
QoS violations, completion ratios, and so on.

44

In Fig. 3.1, steps one to five illustrate the processes of initiating a new service and its
request classes (step one), running a packing and allocation algorithm (step two), spawning and configuring VMs (step three), returning the IDs of a VMs to the ServiceManager
module to be available to the server the request instances (steps four and five). Furthermore, steps a, b and c illustrate the processes of generating instances of a request type,
dispatching them to the allocated VMs, and collecting the system performance readings
upon their completion.

3.3

How to deploy and utilize GCCP with actual cloud clusters

In this section, we show how to extend the usage of GCCP to include analyzing the
performance of actual cloud clusters. Specifically, we will replace the four physical nodes
used in the implementation of GCCP with real rack servers used in cloud clusters. We will
further replace our cloud orchestrator with the open-source cloud orchestrator OpenStack,
which is adopted heavily in cloud data centers [148].
We can replace the four nodes used in GCCP with seven or nine rack servers (e.g.,
five controller nodes, two or four compute nodes, and two storage nodes), and a Juniper
EX2200 Ethernet Switch [149]. The cluster should be moved to one of FIU’s server
rooms where reliable power source and cooling are provided. Fig. 3.3 shows the physical
specification and the role of each server. There are five controller nodes (e.g., two compute
nodes, a block storage node, and an object storage node [148]).
There are five different networks configured over the cluster [6, 7, 148]. First, a public
network connects all nodes in the cluster. Second, an internal private network serves the
VMs and Quantum plugins control it. Third, a management network connects all OpenStack components [148]. Fourth, an object storage network connects the object storage
node to the server running the load balancer (HAproxy) [150]. Finally, a block storage
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Figure 3.3: Physical infrastructure specifications for a typical middle-size cloud cluster

network that connects compute nodes to the block storage node. Controller, compute and
block storage nodes are connected to the management and the public networks via two
bonded (10) Gigabit Ethernet interfaces.
Each controller node has a single 6-core CPU, (16) MB of RAM and two (1) TB hard
disks with Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID) controller uses a RAID-5 level.
the compute nodes use a RAID-5 level too. They, however, have twice the memory and
the storage capacity that the controller nods have. Object and block storage nodes share
the same physical specifications of a single 6-core CPU, (64) MB of RAM, and eight (1)
TB hard disks. Nevertheless, the object storage node uses a RAID-10 level for better data
transfer rates, while the object storage node uses a RAID-1 level.
We can replace the GCCP’s cloud orchestrator with the open-source cloud orchestrator, OpenStack, and deploy it on the controller nodes. OpenStack [14, 15, 148] is a fullymodular, open-source software architecture helps to provide on-demand processing, storage, memory, and network bandwidth resources [148] over cloud clusters. OpenStack can
dynamically scale up and down to meet service requirements, while accordingly adapting to intensive workload situations [6, 7]. OpenStack consists of several individuals, yet
integrated, and distributed software projects (e.g., Horizon, Keystone, Nova, Quantum,
Cinder, Glance, and Swift [148]).
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Figure 3.4: GCCP’s high availability deployment model. Deploying a cloud orchestrator (e.g.,
OpenStack) using load balancing and controller redundancy as recommended by Mirantis [6] and
Rackspace [7].

• OpenStack dashboard (Horizon)
Horizon is the OpenStack dashboard which provides a web user interface to manage
OpenStack services.
• OpenStack Identity (Keystone)
Keystone is the identity and authentication project that provides identity, token, and
catalog for OpenStack services.
• OpenStack compute (Nova)
Nova is the OpenStack compute project. Nova provides Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) by provisioning VMs. Nova also manages OpenStack VMs using
Nova worker called (Nova-compute) via hypervisor’s API’s, such as XenAPI for
XenServer [145], libvirt for KVM or QEMU [151], and VMwareAPI for VMware
[152]. Nova consists of Nova RESTful API (nova-api), Nova-database (nova-db),
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message queue (RabbitMQ), Nova scheduler (nova-scheduler), Nova conductor
(nova-conductor), and Nova compute (nova-compute) processes.
• OpenStack networking (Quantum)
Quantum manages OpenStack network topology. It provides Network as a Service
(NaaS) for OpenStack services and for the VMs operated by Nova. Quantum consists of Quantum server (quantum-server), Quantum plugins and agents (quantumdhcp-agent and quantum-openvswitch-agent), and quantum database (quantum-db)
processes.
• OpenStack block storage (Cinder)
Cinder manages the volumes attached to the VMs in OpenStack. Cinder consists
of Cinder API (cinder-api), Cinder scheduler (cinder-scheduler), Cinder database
(cinder-db), Cinder volume (cinder-volume), and message queue (RabbitMQ) worker
services.
• OpenStack image service (Glance)
Glance is an image repository that discovers, registers, stores, deletes and retrieves
all virtual images in OpenStack. Glance contains Glance API (glance-api), Glance
database (glance-db), and Glance registry (glance-registry) processes.
• OpenStack object storage (Swift)
Swift is a redundant object storage tool developed by Rackspace [7]. It offers a
methodology for storing and retrieving large scale of data objects through API web
services.
The two compute nodes in GCCP can run two different hypervisors: KVM [151] and
Xen [145] respectively. Both compute nodes host the VMs that are being launched by
OpenStack compute services. OpenStack modules and KVM hypervisor run on top of
Ubuntu Linux Precise release with kernel version 3.12-4. Object storage services, such
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as Swift and Ceph, can run on the object storage node, while block storage services,
such as Cinder, Ceph or iSCSI, can run on the block storage node. Fig 3.4 shows our
high availability cloud deployment model of the OpenStack using load balancing and
controllers redundancy based on industrial standards [6, 7, 148].
Next, we review several open-source cloud benchmarks that are readily deployable
over GCCP.

3.4

List of cloud and virtualization benchmarks that are readily deployable over GCCP

The following open-source cloud and virtualization benchmarks and tools can be easily
modified and deployed over GCCP to conduct experiments under different orchestrated
scenarios.
• BenchVM:
BenchVM [153] is an open-source virtualization benchmark suite. It was originally
developed to help perform automated testing and comparison between KVM and
Xen Hypervisors in terms of the overall performance, performance isolation and
scalability [144].
• Virtbench:
Virtbench is a set of smaller benchmarks [154]. It is designed to help developers and
engineers optimize hypervisors. Virtbench launches four VMs, install the Virtbench
client on each one, then runs various tests and collects the results.
• vConsolidate:
The vConsolidate benchmark was developed mainly by Intel. It measures the performance of aggregated servers in different consolidation scenarios. It spawns up
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four parallel VMs with separate workloads running a Java server, a Web server,
a mail server, and a database server. Those VMs along with their workloads are
called Consolidation Stack Unit (CSU), and they are used to model the performance
of each application in different server consolidation scenarios.
• SPEC Benchmark Suit:
The Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) is a non-profit organization that concerns with developing High-Performance Computing benchmarks
[155]. For example, SPECpower ss j2008 is the first industry-standard power benchmark. It evaluates the power parameters in a single server or over a cluster of
multiple servers. Other benchmarks that were developed by SPEC for powerperformance analysis are SPECvirt sc2013, SPECvirt sc2010, SPECweb2009 and
SPEC OMP 2012.
• Rally:
Rally is a member of OpenStack projects family [156]. Rally or Benchmark as a
Service combines multiple components that cooperate to perform automated and
reproducible tests over different deployment scenarios.
There are a large number of other testing and monitoring tools and related projects
that can perform the benchmarking task with our GCCP. For example, Autotest is a fully
automated framework for testing the Linux kernel that can be used to perform several
virtualization testing tasks [157]. Sensu [158] and Najios [159] likewise are open source
monitoring frameworks that can evaluate the performance of any virtualized system.

3.5

Summary

In this chapter, we introduce the Green Cloud Computing Prototype GCCP which is
equipped with workload generator tools based on open source cloud software (e.g., [148]),
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and closely mirrors industry-compatible cloud platforms. We also show how to extend the
functionality of GCCP to actual cloud clusters. Finally, we list many general and cloudspecific benchmarks that GCCP can utilize.
In the next chapter, we discuss our contribution for power-aware cloud workload consolidation with QoS guarantees and describe how we employed GCCP to validate our
proposed algorithms using in-house synthetic and open-source cloud-specific workloads.
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CHAPTER 4
WORKLOAD CONSOLIDATION FOR CLOUD DATA CENTERS WITH
GUARANTEED QUALITY OF SERVICE USING REQUEST RENEGING
Cloud data centers are widely employed to offer reliable cloud services. However, low
resource utilization and high power consumption have been considerable challenges for
cloud providers. The accelerated rise in need for affordable cloud services magnifies the
obstacles for proficient resource management policies. In this chapter, we investigate
how to improve resource utilization and power consumption in cloud data centers when
delivering services with statistically guaranteed Quality of Service (QoS). We assume
that the cloud service provider allocates different types of services, each of which has request classes with different QoS requirements. Different from the traditional approaches
that distribute workloads with different QoS levels on different Virtual Machines (VMs),
we introduce a method to pack requests of the same service type, even with different
QoS requirements, into the same VM, and to remove potential failure requests in time to
improve resource usage and energy cost. We formally prove that our algorithm can statistically guarantee QoS conditions in terms of deadline miss ratios. We develop a cloud
prototype to validate our proposed methods and algorithm empirically. Our intensive
experimental results confirm that our approach can significantly outperform other traditional approaches in terms of QoS guarantees, power consumption, resource demand, and
electricity cost.

4.1

Introduction to the research problem

Cloud computing [15] has recently become the dominant trend for the continuous delivery of online services over the internet using large-scale data centers. In the meantime,
the relentless increase in demand for different services [20, 21], in both personal and
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professional life sectors with high Service Level Agreements (SLAs), has posed critical
challenges on cloud service providers. Maintaining excessive computing resources won’t
effectively address this problem, as it can lead to tremendously high power consumption
rates and energy costs.
Exorbitant power consumption rates and energy costs are among the main concerns in
cloud infrastructure facilities. Cloud service providers strive to enrich competing markets
with more reliable, yet less costly, services to a modern world handles Everything as a
Service (EaaS) [15]. Whereas the price for online services decreases and the performance
of computing systems increases at almost the same rate as Moore predicted five decades
ago, the performance-per-watt of computing components increases at a much slower pace
than what Moore has anticipated [45]. As an example, in 2013, the annual electricity
consumption of data centers only in the United States was close to 91 billion KiloWatt
Hour (KW H), which is larger than the annual amount of electrical power required by
most countries [46]. Thereupon, service providers are taxed by intimidating energy bills
as they try to provide adequate Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees. Such a consumption rate of electricity is not only a cost-and-profit problem but also a severe threat to the
environment as a result of the massive amounts of carbon dioxide emissions during powering and cooling those data centers [46]. As a result, proficient power-aware resource
management policies become a necessity and a critical infrastructure component for any
agile, consolidated and dynamically scalable cloud’s data center that provides affordable
and reliable high-quality services.
On the other hand, power-saving techniques tend to, if not always, cause a degraded
computing performance. The QoS is the key to clients’ satisfaction, and service providers
normally provide multiple (SLAs) regarding different QoS kinds. For example, a database
may be queried internally by a company’s employees or externally by a company’s customers, who may have a higher or a lower priority than that of the employees [82]. Cloud
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service providers need to provide a competing and guaranteed QoS, but with fewer energy
costs. Whereas over-provisioning is a common and simple solution to avoid SLA violations, resource over-provisioning is an expensive method by which resources are drastically underutilized, particularly under the unpredictably fluctuating cloud workloads [84].
Low resource utilization [50] is a prevailing problem in virtualized data centers, and
is a major leading factor to their high power consumption and increased operational
costs [45]. For example, while Google service provider makes its data centers greener by
benefiting from wind and solar energy sources, and operating recycling cooling systems,
the utilization of Google’s servers is less than 50% on average [21]. Maximizing resource
utilization becomes more crucial when performance must meet a defined satisfactory level
of service given by QoS conditions. The challenge is then how to allocate the cloud’s
workloads in a way that maximizes resource usage and guarantees the QoS requirements.
In this chapter, we propose and investigate new power-aware cloud workload allocation
policies to minimize the processing power demand of cloud’s services in cloud’s data
centers, and to reduce energy consumption, with statistically guaranteed QoS for users.
We assume that clustered data centers can accommodate different types of services, each
of which can have request classes with different QoS requirements. Our main contributions in this research are (1) Different from previous studies that employ separate Virtual
Machines (VMs) for requests with different QoS requirements, we develop a workload
multiplexing method that enables requests of the same service type, but with various QoS
constraints, to share the same VM. To our best knowledge, this is the first approach by
which different requests with different QoS guarantees are assigned to a single node to
increase resource utilization. (2) We also devise a novel methodology that correctly discards potential failure requests as soon as possible to minimize processing rate demands,
and to reduce total power consumption with statistically guaranteed QoS. We introduce a
packing and consolidation algorithm, called Green Workload Packing and Consolidation
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algorithm (GWPC) that statistically ensures the QoS requirements of service requests in
terms of deadline miss ratios. (3) In addition to the analytical validation of our proposed
methods, we experimentally verify them, under general and cloud-specific workloads in
one of our designed cloud platforms (e.g., Green Cloud Computing Prototype (GCCP)),
described in Chapter 3. For example, we used the Data Caching Benchmark that emulates the behavior of a Twitter caching server and assumes the strict quality of service
guarantees, such as 95% of the request must finish within 200 ms. Extensive experimentation results show that GWPC widely outperforms existing approaches in terms of QoS
satisfaction, power consumption efficacy, resource demand minimization, and electricity cost saving. Extensive experimentation results show that GWPC outperforms current
methods widely in terms of QoS satisfaction, power consumption efficacy, resource demand minimization, and electricity cost saving. We use the words VM, node, and server
interchangeably throughout the chapter.
Numerous efforts have been made to reduce power and energy consumption in serviceoriented computing systems. We can categorize those researches into different abstraction
levels and/or according to different criteria. For example, according to the scale/type of
the computing systems, Cai et al. in [50] categorized the energy-aware techniques applicable for servers [68,113], clusters [57,59,114], data centers [45,115] and the cloud [116].
Power/energy aware approaches can also be classified according to the different resource
types, such as CPUs [45, 117], memory [84], storage devices [118], and/or network [30].
However, since CPUs usually acquire the highest power consumption among all resource
types [115], we focus on improving power/energy efficiency of CPUs in cloud data centers
using techniques such as virtualization, workload consolidation, and scheduling [119].
Dynamic Voltage Scaling and Dynamic Frequency Scaling (DV S/DFS) have been
powerful conventional methods for adaptive performance and power dissipation adjustment to achieve power efficiency [57, 114]. Hwang et al. showed that the maximum
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energy savings in virtualized multi-core servers could be achieved when combining the
DV S/DFS methods and the consolidation algorithms [68]. Beloglazov et al. introduced in [116] a global-and-local layer approach to make virtualized servers more powerefficient by adjusting the frequency and voltage of processors according to VMs’ utilization. Likewise, Kim et al. [114] proposed DV FS-enabled, with both time-shared and
space-shared, cluster scheduling policies for a bag of tasks to reduce power consumption
and to meet end-users’ deadline requirements. Although many researchers and engineers
acknowledge that DV FS scheduling algorithms are powerful energy-saving solutions on
the server’s level, there are many challenges when they are applied in the current virtualized data centers; for instance, they are architecture dependent, hence they may not
achieve their best power/energy-saving when used to the current heterogeneous cloud data
centers.
As virtualization technology evolved as a norm in today’s data centers to amplify
resource usage through running multiple VMs on a single server, VM migration has been
widely employed to optimize server utilization and to reduce power consumption [29]. In
[120], Mastroianni et al. statistically modeled and analyzed the effects of VMs allocation
and migration on minimizing the number of powered-on servers, and on reducing power
consumption in data centers. Zhen et al. [29] introduced the concept of skewness to
measure the unevenness in the servers’ multidimensional-resource utilization. However,
VM live migration requires a delay that can degrade the overall system performance and
availability and consequently leads to SLA violations [121].
In conjunction with VM migration, server consolidation is of particular interest among
efficient resource allocation policies [85]. Server consolidation, comparatively to DV FS,
improves resource utilization without demanding excessive hardware resources, and it is
easy to implement and to deploy [120]. Now that, server power consumption is not exactly proportional to its utilization, and a server may waste a non-trivial amount of power
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even if it is shut down [120], server consolidation methods pack running VMs on a smaller
number of physical servers and/or turn off the rest, to minimize the total power consumed
by those servers [58, 113, 120]. In [113], Verma et al. presented a two-dimensional, i.e.,
memory-based and CPU-based, consolidation strategy in which decisions are based on
the correlation among different workloads. In [113], Pinheiro presented an algorithm to
dynamically turn servers on and off according to the imposed load in computing clusters.
Chase et al. [122] reduced the energy consumption of server clusters by degrading services according to their SLAs, when power consumption or thermal dissipation exceeds
certain limits.
Whereas saving power/energy is important, service providers must also ensure that
their services can satisfy users’ QoS requirements, such as response time and/or deadline
miss ratios. For instance, a recent report has found that a 100ms extra delay costs Amazon 1% of sales revenue [123]. The problem becomes more challenging with interactive
workload types [61], such as online gaming [21] and multimedia streaming services [62],
whose response times are crucial. These online interactive services are defined by softtimely constraints [61], in that service providers must guarantee that a predefined percentage of them meet their deadlines. Otherwise, service providers fail to keep up with their
SLAs [20].
VM placement methods with performance-interference awareness were introduced
in [124] to improve the performance of VMs and the utilization of physical machines.
Resource overbooking, i.e., allocating more resources than the actual available capacity
to raise service provider profit, with different real-time constraints is presented in [61].
Energy-aware resource allocations with response time and end-to-end time guarantees
were introduced in [58] and [59], respectively. Greenberg et al. [30] studied the costs
of cloud data centers and recommended to developing new management systems within
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and across geographically distributed data centers with the focus on network agility to
improve their efficiency and end-to-end performance.
SLA-aware workload consolidation had been proposed to achieve higher dynamic
power efficiency and to overcome the under-utilization problems resulting from applying
the over-provisioning policies [86]. Lee et al. [125] developed a pricing model, based on
the queue model M/M/1/PS, and used it to produce a profit-driven scheduling algorithm
with SLA for the cloud’s dependent services.
To guarantee service requests with different classes of QoS requirements, it has been
a common approach (e.g., [59]) to serve requests with the same QoS requirements on the
same VM. Now that, all requests on the same machine have the same QoS requirements,
different types of QoS can be captured by a single variable, such as provisioned resources
(e.g., [113] [120] [116]), required processing speed (e.g., [57]) or latency (e.g., [58] [59]).
Although this approach simplifies the resource management problem to guarantee one
specified QoS criteria, it excludes requests that can share resources, and the overall resource usage can be rather inefficient, as illustrated later in this research. Additionally,
almost all previous works implicitly assumed that all accepted requests must be served,
even if they do not meet their QoS conditions. We show in this chapter that if we can judiciously discard the requests that are likely to miss their deadlines, we can significantly
improve resource usages without compromising QoS conditions.

4.2

System model

In this section, we describe our proposed system model and formulate the problem.
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4.2.1

Service model

We assume that a cloud data center consists of several cloud computer clusters, each of
which consists of two or more physical machines, and has its own service manager that is
analogous to the cluster schedulers in Google’s clustered data centers [82]. Each cloud’s
cluster has a cloud orchestrator (such as, OpenStack) and a virtualization hypervisor (such
as, Xen [145]) that work together to create VMs with different types and capacities for
hosted services, and to make them available online for customers who submitted requests
with different QoS requirements. We assume that a service provider provides n different
types of services based on their application purpose S = {S1 , ..., Sn }. Each type of service
(e.g., Si ) can accommodate different classes of service requests Γi = {τi, j , j = 1, . . . , ri },
i.e., requests under different SLAs. Each class of requests (e.g., τi, j ) has its own QoS
requirements (e.g., Qi, j ). We assume that different types of services must be hosted on
different VMs, but different classes of requests of the same type can be potentially hosted
in the same VM. We assume that there are n types of VMs {V M1 , ...,V Mn } with capacities
of {C1 , ...,Cn } supporting n different types of services {S1 , ..., Sn }, respectively. VMs with
the same service type Si are logically grouped together into a single server pool SPi . A
server pool SPi may contain up to mi VMs. Each VM {V Mi,k , k = 1, . . . , mi } within a
server pool SPi can require a different processing rate {Ui,k , k = 1, . . . , mi }. Our service
model is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. We can see that different request classes of the same
service type can share the same VM (e.g., τ11 and τ14 share V M12 , and τ12 and τ13 share
V M11 ). Contrarily, {τ21 , τ2m } are hosted separately on {V M21 , ...,V M2m }, respectively.
As long as both waiting and average response times distributions of industrial workloads’ requests have variances with small coefficients, we assume that request arrival
patterns follow the Poisson distribution, and their response times follow the exponential
distribution [160], as they approximate the actual corresponding distributions with acceptable precision [161]. Different request classes of the same service type may have different
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arrival times, deadlines, and completion ratios. Specifically, a request is modeled with a
3-tuple, i.e., τi j = {λi, j , Di, j , Ri, j }; where λi, j is the arrival rate of j-class requests in service Si , Di, j is the deadline of j-class requests in Si , and Ri, j is the required completion
ratio of j-class requests in Si . The QoS requirement Qi, j of a request τi, j is defined by
{Di, j , Ri, j }, meaning that at least Ri, j percent of τi, j requests have to be served no later
than Di, j as in [69]; for example, CloudSuite [162], a benchmark suite for cloud services,
describes the QoS constraints of web search requests by a latency of D = 500 ms and
completion ratio of R = 90% [163].

4.2.2

Power model

Considering that the allocation of processing units in cloud data centers generally occurs
at levels of whole core(s) [69, 164], we assume that each VM is allocated to an individual
processing core on a physical server, and, thus, we adopt a power model similar to that
in [120] to model the power consumption of a VM, as shown in (4.1):
P = Pd ϕ + Ps

(4.1)

where; Ps is the static power, Pd is the dynamic power, and ϕ is the utilization of a
processing core. ϕ is defined as ϕ = UC ; where U is the processing rate for a VM, and C is
the capacity limit of the core allocated to it (i.e., the maximum processing rate available).
We calculate Pd and Ps empirically, as explained later on in section 3.2.2, and we assume
that they are constant and the same for each set of mi cores hosting the same service
type Si . This model can be easily extended to the scenarios wherein a VM is mapped to
multiple cores.
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4.2.3

Problem definition

With the system model defined above, the problem we are to address can be formulated
as follows.
Problem 4.1. Given service requests Γ = {τi, j : j = 1, ..., ri ; i = 1, . . . , n}, determine the
server pools SP = {SPi : i = 1, . . . , n}; where SPi = {V Mi,k : k = 1, ..., mi }, the corresponding processing rate {Ui, j : i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ..., mi } for each VM (e.g., V Mi, j ), and
the allocation of Γ to the VMs within each server pool in SP, such that the QoS requirements of the requests {Qi, j , i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ..., ri } are guaranteed, and the power
consumption of each server pool is minimized.
This problem involves two intertwined problems: (a) how to judiciously pack service
requests to a VM, (b) and how to determine the proper service rate to minimize the power
consumption while guaranteeing the QoS for all classes of request types. Next, we discuss
our analytical results for this problem, and then present our algorithm in details.

4.3

Preliminaries

This section presents several key analysis results with regard to QoS guarantees, requests
multiplexing, and requests packing. These results form the basis of our approach.

4.3.1

Processing rate minimization for QoS guarantee using request
reneging

Traditionally, M/M/1 queue [160] has commonly been adopted to represent the request
processing procedure [20], as shown in Fig. 4.2a. Service requests arrive with a rate λ,
wait in a queue with an infinite size, and are processed with a rate µ. Accordingly, the
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Figure 4.1: Service model

Probability Density Function (PDF), and the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of
the response time can be formulated as:
f (t) = (µ − λ)e−(µ−λ)t
λ

F(t) = 1 − e−tµ(1− µ )

(4.2)
(4.3)

with a mean response time:
E[t] =

1
µ−λ

(4.4)

The q-percentile of the response time tq (i.e., tq is larger than q% of all response times)
has the following relationship:
λ

1 − e−tq µ(1− µ ) =

q
100

(4.5)

To this end, given a request τi, j ’s arrival rate λi, j , deadline Di, j , and completion ratio
requirements Ri, j . In order to guarantee Qi, j , the required service rate µi, j (when τi, j is
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hosted alone) is:
1
]
ln[ 1−R
i, j

µi, j =

Di, j

+ λi, j

(4.6)

The µi, j defined above can guarantee Qi, j , i.e., no more than (1−Ri, j )% of the requests
can miss their deadlines.
It is rational to drop a request if it is a potential failure in terms of missing its deadline
so that we can save the precious resource for requests that are more likely to successfully
complete in time. The problem nevertheless is how to discard these requests without
compromising the QoS. To this end, we employ the M/M/1 queue with the reneging
model [165], as illustrated in Fig. 4.2b.
As shown in Fig. 4.2b, according to the reneging model, each request is associated
with a deadline. If a request is not fully served by its deadline, it is removed from the system. According to this model, there exists a provocative relationship among the request’s
deadline miss probability Pmiss , arrival rate λ, processing rate µ, and deadline D, which
can be formulated as [165]:
Pmiss =

(1 − ρ)eµD(ρ−1)
1 − ρeµD(ρ−1)

(4.7)

where ρ = λµ . Accordingly, for a given λi, j , Ri, j , and Di, j of request τi, j , we can derive µ∗i, j
that guarantees Qi, j :
λ

(1 −
1 − Ri, j ≤

i, j
∗
λi, j µi, j Di, j ( µ∗i, j −1)
)e
µ∗i, j
λ

1−

i, j
∗
λi, j µi, j Di, j ( µ∗i, j −1)
µ∗i, j e

(4.8)

By judiciously removing the requests from the queue, we can guarantee the same QoS
with lower processing rates. This conclusion is formally formulated in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. A service request τ = {λ, D, R}; where λ, D, and R refer to its arrival rate,
deadline, and completion ratio requirement, respectively. Let µ∗ and µ be the processing
rates to satisfy R based on the M/M/1 queue model with and without request reneging,
respectively. Then µ ≥ µ∗ .
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Proof. From (4.6), we have
µ=

1
ln[ 1−R
]
+λ
D

(4.9)

If we apply the same processing rate for requests of the same service type with reneging,
and let the result completion ratio be R∗ , then based on Equation 4.8 we have
R∗ = 1 − Pmiss
(4.10)

1 − e(λD−µD)

=

1 − λµ e(λD−µD)

Then with (4.9), we have
1 − e[λD−(

R∗ =

1−
=

Since (1 −

λ
1 ]
ln[ 1−R
+λ
D

1 ]
ln[ 1−R
+λ)D]
D

λ [λD−(
µe

1 ]
ln[ 1−R
+λ)D]
D

(4.11)

R
1−

λ
1 ]
ln[ 1−R
+λ
D

(1 − R)

(1 − R)) < 1, we have:
R∗ =

R
1−

λ
1 ]
ln[ 1−R
+λ
D

(1 − R)

>R

(4.12)

Equation 4.12 indicates that the processing rate µ based on the M/M/1 queue can lead to
a larger completion ratio R∗ , if request reneging is allowed. Therefore, to obtain the same
completion ratio (e.g., R), we have µ∗ ≤ µ.

4.3.2

Request multiplexing

When a service Si has multiple request classes {τi, j , j = 1, ..., ri }, a common approach is
to host each request class on a single VM {V Mi, j , j = 1, ..., ri }, respectively. The Ri, j -th
percentile response time tRi, j of τi, j can be formulated as:
tRi, j =

1
1
ln[
].
µi, j − λi, j 1 − Ri, j

64

(4.13)

(a) M/M/1 queue model

(b) M/M/1 model with request reneging
Figure 4.2: Processing models

When hosting each request class τi, j individually on V Mi, j , let the server pool SPi
= {V Mi, j , ...,V Mi,ri } has the processing rates {Ui,1 = µi,1 , ...,Ui,ri = µi,ri }, respectively.
Then to satisfy each Qi, j , the processing rates can be calculated according to Equation
4.6:
µi, j =

1
]
ln[ 1−R
i, j

Di, j

+ λi, j

(4.14)

A better approach, withal, is to host multiple request classes in a single VM with a
processing rate U that satisfies the QoS requirements of all hosted classes. We formulated
this essential finding in Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. For the i-type service requests {τi, j , j = 1, ..., ri } hosted in a single node
V ˆM, let the processing rate of V ˆM be Û and let
ri

Ui, j = µi, j +

∑

λi,q .

(4.15)

q=1,q6= j
i
Then the QoS requirements for {τi, j , j = 1, . . . , ri } can be satisfied if Û ≥ maxrj=1
Ui, j .
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Proof. When all classes of requests are hosted together in a single node (e.g., V ˆM =
V Mi,1 ), the processing rate of V Mi,1 , i.e., Ui,1 , has to satisfy the QoS
ri

Ui,1 = µi,1 − λi,1 + ∑ λi, j

(4.16)

j=1

ri

= µi,1 +

λi, j .

∑

(4.17)

j=2, j6=1

We can equivalently derive the required processing rates for any V Mi,l , i.e., Ui,l ; where
i ∈ [1 − ri ], according to the QoS requirements of τi,l as follows:
ri

Ui,l = µi,l +

∑

λi, j ,

(4.18)

j=1, j6=l

Therefore, when {τi,1 , ..., τi,ri } are hosted together in V ˆM = V Mi,l , in order to satisfy the
QoS requirements for all classes of requests
Û = max{Ui,1 , ...,Ui,ri }.

(4.19)

From Theorem 4.2, when multiple classes of service requests are multiplexed in a single VM, the processing rate can be easily identified to ensure the QoS conditions for these
requests. In the meantime, we show that request multiplexing helps improve resource utilization, as implied in the Theorem 4.3. Let us first define the processing rate Ω(SPi ) of a
server pool SPi .
Definition 4.1. The processing rate of a server pool, denoted as Ω(SPi ); where SPi =
{V Mi,1 , ...,V Mi,ri }, is the sum of all VMs’ required processing rates {Ui,1 , ...,Uri } in that
server pool:
ri

Ω(SPi ) =

ri

∑ µi, j = ∑ [

j=1

j=1
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1
]
ln[ 1−R
i, j

Di, j

+ λi, j ]

(4.20)

Theorem 4.3. Given the i-type service requests {τi,1 , . . . , τi,ri }, let SPi = {V Mi,1 , . . . ,
V Mi,ri } be all VMs, when each class of requests, τi, j , is served separately with a dediˆ i = {V ˆM i,1 } be a server pool with a single VM that serves all the
cated V Mi, j , and let SP
ˆ i )) be the processing rate of the server pool SPi
requests simultaneously. Let Ω(SPi ) (Ω(SP
ˆ i , resp.) such that the QoS requirements for all {τi, j , j = 1, ..., ri } are satisfied. Then
(SP
ˆ i ).
Ω(SPi ) ≥ Ω(SP
Proof. When each class of requests is served separately with a dedicated VM, we have
from Definition 4.1:
ri

Ω(SPi ) =

ri

∑ µi, j = ∑ [

j=1

1
]
ln[ 1−R
i, j

j=1

Di, j

+ λi, j ].

(4.21)

When all requests are served by a single VM, we have from Theorem 4.2:
ri
ˆ i ) = max
Ω(SP
Ûi, j
j=1

(4.22)

i
where Ûi, j = µi, j + ∑rq=1,q6
= j λi,q is the required processing rate of V Mi, j to meet Qi, j .

Because µi, j ≥ λi, j for all j ∈ [1, ri ], we have
Ω(SPi )
≥ 1,
ˆ i)
Ω(SP

(4.23)

ˆ i ).
or, equivalently, Ω(SPi ) ≥ Ω(SP
Theorem 4.3 indicates that multiplexing different request classes on a single V Mi, j
can result in a smaller processing rate for the server pool, provided that the processing
rate is feasible on V Mi, j ; i.e., required processing rate must not exceed the VM’s maximum capacity Ci, j . If only one VM cannot accommodate all service requests without
compromising their QoS requirements, we will need more than one VM. How can we
allocate service requests to VMs while optimizing the processing rate utilization of the
hosting servers utilization? We address this question next.
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Table 4.1: Processing rate comparison with different requests packing strategies

Packing Strategy 1
VM1
VM2
τi = {τ1 , τ2 } τi = {τ3 , τ4 }
U1 = 160
U2 = 140

4.3.3

Packing Strategy 2
VM’1
VM’2
τi = {τ1 , τ4 } τi = {τ2 , τ3 }
U10 = 150
U20 = 130

Request packing

From the discussions above, clustering multiple classes of requests into the same VM
helps improve the resource usage. When more than one VM is needed, the question then
becomes how to group different classes of requests into each VM to minimize the server
pool processing rate Ω = ∑i ∑k Ui,k , and to maximize the overall resource usage efficiency.
Consider the following example with four request classes of the same type {τ1 , τ2 , τ3 , τ4 },
with λ = {60, 40, 50, 20} request’ Instances Per Second (IPS), and µ = {120, 80, 70, 90}
IPS, respectively. µi is the minimum processing rate of request τi to satisfy its QoS, when
it is allocated individually to a VM. To guarantee all the QoS requirements, two requestgrouping strategies are shown in Table 4.1. The server pool’s processing rates using
both strategies are Ω(V1 ,V2 ) = 300 and Ω(V10 ,V20 ) = 280, respectively (derived based on
Theorem 4.2). This example clearly shows that different requests’ allocation strategies
lead to server pools with different processing rates and, thus, utilizations.
We show in Theorem 4.6 that the general packing problem is NP-hard in nature. Subsequently, we focus on the development of an effective and efficient heuristic solution for
this problem. Specifically, we have made several crucial observations, based on a service
allocation onto two servers, which we formulate in the following theorems.
Theorem 4.4. Let Γ1 = Γ1,p
τ1,q2 , ..., τ1,qs }, and Γ1,p

T

S

Γ1,q ; where Γ1,p = {τ1,p1 , τ1,p2 , ..., τ1,ps }, Γ1,q = {τ1,q1 ,

/ Assume Γ1,p and Γ1,q are mapped to two VMs with
Γ1,q = 0.

the same capacity, V M1,p and V M1,q , respectively. For each τi, j , let
φi, j = µi, j − λi, j .
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(4.24)

Let U1,p (U1,q , resp.) denote the minimum processing rate for V M1,p (V M1,q , resp.) that
guarantees the QoS requirements of Γ1,p (Γ1,q , resp.). Then the processing rate for the
server pool SP = {V M1,p ,V M1,q }, i.e., Ω(SP) = U1,p +U1,q , is minimized if the quantity
given in Equation 4.25 is minimized:
Φ = max φ1,p + max φ1,q .
τ1,p ∈Γ1,p

τ1,q ∈Γ1,q

(4.25)

Proof. From Theorem 4.2, we know that
ps

u1,p ≥
=

max {µ1,p +

τ1,p ∈Γ1,p

λ1, j }

∑

(4.26)

j=p1 , j6= p
ps

max φ1,p +

τ1,p ∈Γ1,p

∑

(4.27)

λ1, j

j=p1

comparatively,
qs

u1,q ≥
=

max {µ1,q +

τ1,q ∈Γ1,q

∑

λ1, j }

(4.28)

j=q1 , j6=q
qs

max φ1,q +

τ1,q ∈Γ1,q

∑ λ1, j

(4.29)

j=q1

Thusly, Ω(V ) = U1,p + U1,q is minimized if Φ = maxτ1,p ∈Γ1,p φ1,p + maxτ1,q ∈Γ1,q φ1,q is
minimized.
Theorem 4.4 means that to minimize the processing rate for a server pool SPi , we
need to minimize the sum of maximum φi, j (defined in Equation 4.24) for the services
allocated to each node. A simple heuristic is, hence, to sort all requests classes {τi, j , j =
1, ..., ri } according to their {φi, j , j = 1, ..., ri }, and allocate as many high-ranking classes
as possible on the same VM. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Let Γi = {τi,1 , τi,2 , ..., τi,ri } be mapped to two VMs with the same capacity,
V Mi,p and V Mi,q . Let τi,k ∈ Γi and let
Γhi,k = {τi, j ∈ Γi |φi, j > φi,k }.
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(4.30)

Then the processing rate for the server pool SPi = {V Mi,p ,V Mi,q }, i.e., Ω(SPi ) = Ui,p +
Ui,q , is minimized if τi,k is the one with the smallest φi,k such:
• Γhi,k are feasibly allocated to one server (e.g., V Mi,p );
• Γhi,k +{τi,k } cannot be feasibly allocated to the same server (V Mi,p ) simultaneously;
• τi,k is feasibly allocated to another server (e.g., V Mi,q ).
Proof. From Theorem 4.4, to minimize Ω(SPi ) we only need to minimize Φ = maxτi,p
∈ Γi,p φi,p + maxτi,q ∈ Γi,q φi,q . Without loss of generality, assume that τi,α ∈ Γi is the one
with the largest value of φ, and is allocated to V Mi,p . Then to optimize Ω(SPi ) we only
need to optimize maxτi,q ∈Γi,q φi,q . Note that any τi, j ∈ Γhi,k allocated to V Mi,q will lead to
a larger maxτi,q ∈Γi,q φi,q than it is when all Γhi,k are allocated to V Mi,p . But, Γhi,k + {τi,k }
cannot be feasibly allocated to the same node V Mi,p simultaneously, and, thus, τi,k has to
be allocated to V Mi,q . For the rest of τi, j , their allocations do not affect the optimality of
Ω(SPi ) as shown in Theorem 4.4.
Note that Theorem 4.5 helps to identify the optimal service packing solution for two
VMs. However, if there are more than two VMs, finding the optimal solution becomes
substantially more complicated due to the trade-off between minimizing the maximum
value of φ for a VM, and the total number of needed VMs. In Theorem 4.6, we show that
the service packing problem involving more than two VMs is NP-hard.
Theorem 4.6. Let SPi = {V Mi,1 ,V Mi,2 , . . . ,V Mi,mi } be a server pool with m ≥ 3, hosts a
set of requests Γi = {τi,1 , τi,2 , ..., τi,ri } from the same service type Si , but with different QoS
constraints. Assume that all VMs in SPi have the same capacity C. Then packing the rei
Ui, j
quest set Γi in the server pool SPi such that the server pool processing rate Ωi = ∑mj=1

is minimized is NP-hard.
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4.4

The Green Workload Packing and Consolidation (GWPC) algorithm with statistical guarantee

We are now ready to discuss our approach for power consumption minimization in cloud
data centers with guaranteed QoS. Inasmuch as the overall power consumption of a server
pool depends on both the processing rates of its VMs, and the static power consumption
of the physical servers hosting those VMs (see Equation 4.1), to solve Problem 4.1, we
need to minimize the number of VMs, and their processing rates. Thus, we develop
an algorithm, called Green Workload Packing and Consolidation algorithm (GWPC) to
allocate VMs and map service requests onto them.
First, GWPC intends to consolidate multiple request classes to the same VM. As
shown in Theorem 4.2, when various classes are hosted in the same VM, the total processing rate of a server pool reduces, which helps to minimize the dynamic power consumption of the physical cores on which VMs run. Moreover, consolidating multiple request
classes in a single VM reduces the total number of needed VMs, which in turn minimizes
the total number of hosting physical machines and their static power. Second, GWPC
adopts the reneging model to judiciously expunge service requests. Specifically, in Fig.
4.3, the required processing rate (e.g., µ j ) for each class of requests (e.g., τ j ) is calculated
based on the reneging model (line 1). We then sort all requests based on φ j = µ j − λ j in
a decreasing order (line 2), and pack the requests from the list to VMs with the capacity
(i.e., the maximum processing rate) of C (line 3 to 13). Theorem 4.6 clearly demonstrates
that Problem 4.1 is NP-hard, so we resort to the traditional first-fit bin-packing algorithm
to pack the requests, and minimize the number of VMs. This helps reduce the static power
consumption of the server pool. Sorting the requests according to the value of φ is a good
heuristic with a basis presented in Theorem 4.5. It helps minimize the processing rate of
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Figure 4.3: The Green Workload Packing and Consolidation (GWPC) algorithm

each VM, and, thus, it also help minimize the dynamic power consumption of the server
pool.
In what follows, we present the experiments and results we obtained based using the
GCCP cloud platform, that we described in the previous chapter.

4.5

Experimental validation

In this section, we use experiments to validate our analytical findings and to test the
performance of the GWPC algorithm using the GCCP platform, described in Chapter 3.
To investigate the performance of our approach, we implemented the following workload mapping and scheduling algorithms, which also employ failure reneging: (1) Split
(denoted as (SPT)): the traditional method by which each request class is hosted in a
separate VM [113], [166]; (2) Random (denoted as (RND)): the method that fills mul-
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(a) S1 : 256 × 256 MMUL

(b) S2 : 1 × 256 1-D FFT

Figure 4.4: Minimum required processing rates for guaranteed QoS using M/M/1 queue model
with and without reneging for (a) S1 and (b) S2 cloud service types

(a) S1 : 256 × 256 MMUL

(b) S2 : 1 × 256 1-D FFT

Figure 4.5: Response time comparison for guaranteed QoS using M/M/1 queue model with and
without reneging for (a) S1 and (b) S2 cloud service types

tiple request classes randomly into a VM; (3) First-Fit-Decreasing (denoted as FFD):
the bin-packing method [167] with service classes combined based on the decreasing order of their required processing rates; (4) Green Workload Packing and Consolidation
(denoted as (GWPC): our proposed method.

4.5.1

Performance with request reneging

We first empirically study the advantages of request reneging on minimizing the required
processing rates and average response times with QoS guarantees. We also compare the
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performance of the system with and without request reneging using two different service
types; i.e., memory-intensive (e.g., S1) and CPU-intensive (e.g., S2) types.
We generated two sets of classes with six different request classes each {τi, j : i = 1,
2; j = 1, ..., 6}, with the first set from (S1 : 256 × 256 MMUL), and the second set from
(S2 : 1 × 256 1-D FFT). Request classes from both types were set to have average arrival
rates of {λi,1 = 50, λi,2 = 100, ..., λi,6 = 300; where i = 1, 2}, completion ratios of Ri, j =
95%, and deadlines randomly generated following a uniform distribution in the ranges
[5 − 15]× 102 µs and [2 − 6]× 102 µs for S1 and S2 classes, respectively. All parameters
and their values were arbitrarily chosen.
We generated 105 Instances Per Request class (IPR), and request instances of each
class were executed in a VM with and without reneging. The capacity of the VM was
set to 1800 IPS and 6000 IPS for S1 and S2 , respectively. In each run, we calibrated
the maximum processing rate of each VM by assigning a cap to each VM’s Virtual CPU
(VCPU) that limits the maximum amount of processing rates a VM receives from its
allocated physical core. We then applied the traditional binary search method to find the
minimum required processing rates that can meet the given QoS conditions. We repeated
the experiment for each setting 104 times, and the average results are shown in Fig. 4.4
and Fig. 4.16.
Fig. 4.4 compares the minimum required processing rates with and without reneging
under different arrival rates and QoS settings. We see that for both S1 and S2 requests,
the minimum required processing rates with reneging are much lower than those without
reneging. For example, when the arrival rate is 200 IPS, the minimum required processing rates with reneging for S1 ’s and S2 ’s are 1000 IPS and 4800 IPS, respectively. If
no requests have reneged, the minimum required processing rates become 1600 IPS and
5600 IPS, respectively. The increase in the processing rate thus is 60% and 16.7% over
its counterparts. The minimum required processing rates unsurprisingly increase with
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the increment of arrival rates. Nonetheless, the minimum required processing rates with
reneging increase at a much slower rate, as clearly shown in Fig. 4.4. In average, the minimum required processing rates with reneging for S1 and S2 are 62% and 58% lower than
those without reneging, respectively. These results evidently conform to the theoretical
conclusion formulated in Theorem 4.1 that request reneging helps reduce the processing
rates while guaranteeing the same QoS requirements.
We can also observe that request reneging helps lower service response times. As
shown in Fig. 4.5a and Fig. 4.5b, the average response times of S1 and S2 classes without
reneging are always longer than those with reneging. On average, the average response
times of S1 ’s and S2 ’s are 225% and 409% longer than those with reneging. As the arrival
rates increase, the minimum required processing rates must increase to ensure the same
QoS requirement. As a result, response times are reduced. While response times for requests without reneging change dramatically, as arrival rates increase, the response times
for requests with reneging do not vary as significantly, which implies that requests with
reneging can deliver service more stable in terms of response time variations. When comparing the response time improvement with reneging for the memory-intensive service S1
and the CPU-intensive service S2 , we can see that S1 benefits more than S2 in term of the
improvement for the minimum required processing rates and response times, as shown in
Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.16. We conjecture that this is because S1 requests require longer I/Orelated operations, and cannot be easily terminated for request reneging, which negatively
affects their response times when compared with the CPU-intensive requests.
Request reneging to a great extent not only reduces processing rate requirements to
guarantee the same QoS requirements like the one without reneging, but also results in
lower and more stable average response times, and is, therefore, a promising approach to
achieve reliable and predictable performance.
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4.5.2

Multiplexed vs. split request processing

Having validated the performance improvement of request reneging, we now compare
the completion ratios and average response times when serving requests in a multiplexed
manner (e.g., GWPC) and a split manner (e.g., SPT).
We generated two types of services, S1 (128 × 128 MMUL) and S2 (1 × 64 1-D FFT).
We randomly generated six testing groups of request classes from each service type, with
the number of classes in each group varying from r = 5 to r = 10, i.e., {τi, j ; i = 1, 2;
j = 1, . . . , r}. The arrival rates and deadlines in each request class were randomly generated with the average following a uniform distribution in the ranges [20 − 120] IPS and
[5 − 6] × 102 µs, respectively. We set 90% and 95% completion ratios for S1 and S2 , respectively. In each test, we generated 105 IPR for each of S1 and S2 classes, separately
applied the GWPC and SPT methods on those instances using VMs with a capacity set
to 104 IPS, and calculated the achieved completion ratios and average response times in
each run for each request class. All these parameters and their values were arbitrarily
chosen. We repeated the experiment for each setting 104 times, and the average results
are shown in Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7.
Fig. 4.6 compares the completion ratios achieved by the multiplexed and split approaches under different experiment settings. As shown, both methods successfully guarantee the required completion ratios for S1 and S2 . Nonetheless, GWPC can achieve a
much higher average completion ratios than SPT. Note that, for the test cases when there
are eight different request classes (i.e., r = 8), GWPC achieves a completion ratio of 94%
for S1 and 97.5% for S2 , in comparison with 90.2% for S1 and 95.8% for S2 achieved by
SPT. Those results comply with the conclusion in Theorem 4.3 that request multiplexing
helps reduce required processing rates without compromising QoS requirements. When
all VMs have the same capacity, GWPC can unsurprisingly lead to better completion
ratios in all test cases. GWPC can on average achieve an average completion ratios of
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93.87% for for S1 and 97.2% for S2 , whereas SPT can only achieve 90.18% and 95.92%
for S1 and S2 , respectively.
Request multiplexing also results in less average response times than those in SPT,
as shown in Fig. 4.7. The average response times in the multiplexed approach outperform those in SPT in all test cases. The reason for such improvement is that GWPC can
efficiently utilize computing resources among different request classes, as a result of request reneging and multiplexing. Moreover, allocating a smaller number of VMs reduces
the overhead on the VM Manager (V MM). For example, the hypervisor, especially with
memory-intensive workloads, which demand more privileged operations, such as memory accesses, context switches, system calls and interrupts [168]. For instance, in Fig.
4.7, when the number of classes is r = 10, GWPC results in an average response time that
is 2.26µs less than those in SPT for S1 classes, but for S2 and with the same number of
request classes r = 10, GWPC shows only 0.06µs better average response time than that
of the SPT.
Overall, our experiments show that request multiplexing not only guarantees QoS
requirements, but can also achieve higher completion ratios than required. It can better
utilize computing resources than SPT does, especially with the memory-intensive service
types.

4.5.3

Performance under different service utilizations

In this section, we analyze the performance of GWPC in terms of power consumption and
processing rate demand, compared with SPT, FFD, and RND.
We generated five groups of test cases, each of which has a different number of request
classes {τi, j : i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., ri }; where ri = 10, 20, ..., 50, from two service types, i.e.,
(S1 : 128×128 MMUL) and (S2 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT). The arrival rates and completion ratios
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(a) S1 : 128 × 128 MMUL

(b) S2 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT

Figure 4.6: Performance of completion ratios between request multiplexing and splitting using
requests of (a) S1 and (b) S2 cloud service types

(a) S1 : 128 × 128 MMUL

(b) S2 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT

Figure 4.7: Performance of average response times between request multiplexing and splitting
using requests of (a) S1 and (b) S2 cloud service types

were randomly generated with the average following uniform distributions in the ranges
[20 − 500] IPS and [90% − 95%], respectively. We recall that, from Equation (4.8), when
the arrival rate is a constant value, the smaller the deadline, the higher the required processing rate is. Thence, as the deadline reduces, the processing rate µi, j increases, and
then the service utilization increases. We accordingly varied request utilization by changing the intervals from which we randomly picked the deadlines. For each set of request
classes, we varied the deadline range among four intervals, starting from 500 µs and
600 µs with interval length of 50µs and 100µs for S1 and S2 , respectively.
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(a) D1, j ∈ [500 − 550]µs

(b) D1, j ∈ [550 − 600]µs

(c) D1, j ∈ [600 − 650]µs

(d) D1, j ∈ [650 − 700]µs

Figure 4.8: Power-saving performance normalized to that of SPT for S1 : 128×128 MMUL service
type with different deadline ranges

GWPC, SPT, FFD, and RND were tested using the same test cases. In each run, we
generated 105 IPR with reneging on the VMs V Mi, j ; i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, ..., mi . We repeated
each run 104 times, calculated the average results, normalized them to the results by SPT,
and presented them in Fig. 4.8 to Fig.4.11. Specifically, Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9 show the
power consumption of different approaches, and Fig 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 compare the total
minimum processing rates required by each server pool (i.e., Ω(SPi )) to satisfy the given
QoS constraints.

From Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9, we can immediately observe that GWPC

outperforms the other three approaches under the different testing condition. For example, for S1 ’s request in Fig. 4.8, and when the deadlines are within the range of [50 - 550]
µs, and the number of classes is 30, the power consumption by GWPC is about 46% of
that by SPT. Whereas it is about 52% and 58% for FFD and RND of that by SPT, respec-
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(a) D2, j ∈ [6 − 7] × 102 µs

(b) D2, j ∈ [700 − 800]µs

(c) D2, j ∈ [800 − 900]µs

(d) D2, j ∈ [900 − 1000]µs

Figure 4.9: Power-saving performance normalized to that of SPT for S2 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT service
type with different deadline ranges

tively. We can also see that GWPC’s power-saving performance increases with increasing
the number of classes, as well as with increasing the tightness of their deadline ranges. As
the number of classes increases and the solution space to map requests to different VMs
increases, GWPC can henceforth take advantage of the bigger solution space, and achieve
better power-saving performance. Correspondingly, when the deadlines are long, or the
workload intensity is light, the differences among packing approaches become smaller,
and hence the power consumption patterns become similar. As the deadlines become
larger and larger, the workload becomes heavier and heavier, and like this GWPC can
greatly benefit from its effective request reneging and packing methods, and can consequently achieve higher and higher power-saving performance. For example, from Fig.
4.9(d) and Fig. 4.9(a), the power consumption ratios achieved by GWPC increase from
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(a) D1, j ∈ [500 − 550]µs

(b) D1, j ∈ [550 − 600]µs

(c) D1, j ∈ [600 − 650]µs

(d) D1, j ∈ [650 − 700]µs

Figure 4.10: Processing rate performance normalized to that of SPT for S1 : 128 × 128 MMUL
service type with different deadline ranges

61% to 82.8% as request utilizations decrease (e.g., the deadline range changed from
[650 − 700]µs to [500 − 550] × 102 µs).
The behaviors of the minimum required processing rates and power consumption rates
are closely related. Thus, it is not unforeseen to observe the similar phenomena, when
studying our experimental results in terms of the minimum processing rates of the server
pools. The total processing rates required by GWPC are lower than those required by
the other three approaches for both types of services and under different testing cases,
as shown in Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11. We can also notice, from the same figures, that
the improvement of GWPC over the other three approaches increases, when the class
number for each service type increases, as well as when the tightness of the deadline
ranges increase. Recall that, in Theorem 4.6, we prove that request packing is an NP-hard
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(a) D2, j ∈ [600 − 700]µs

(b) D2, j ∈ [700 − 800]µs

(c) D2, j ∈ [800 − 900]µs

(d) D2, j ∈ [900 − 1000]µs

Figure 4.11: Processing rate performance normalized to that of SPT for S2 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT
service type with different deadline ranges

problem [169], when a server pool SPi needs more than two VMs. Yet, our experimental
results clearly show that the heuristic proposed in GWPC, i.e., packing requests ordered
by φi, j (see Equation 4.24) is much more effective than the one (i.e., FFD) that packs
requests ordered by their individual processing rates (e.g., µi, j ) only. For example, in Fig.
4.11 for S2 classes, when the class number is 30, the average total processing rate by
GWPC is about 85% of that by FFD.

4.5.4

Performance under different server capacities

Different server capacities affect how many requests can be accommodated in a single
server, and how many servers are needed to ensure the QoS requirements for a given
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set of service requests. In this section, we investigate how the performance of different
allocation and packing approaches varies with different server’s capacities, (e.g. Ci, j ).
We generated two types of services, S1 (128 × 128 MMUL) and S2 (1 × 64 1-D FFT),
with five testing groups of requests from each service type, and with each group has
a different number of classes {τi, j ; i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., r; r = 10, 20, ..., 50}. The average
arrival rates were randomly varied with the average following a uniform distribution in
the range of [20 − 500] IPS and [500 − 1500] IPS for S1 ’s requests and S2 ’s requests,
respectively. The deadlines of the requests were chosen randomly from the interval [500−
600]µs. We varied the server’s capacities from 6000 IPS to 6750 IPS, and from 6000 IPS
to 12000 IPS for S1 and S2 , respectively. We configured each VM with 2 GB memory, 20
GB disk storage, and a dedicated physical core with an adjustable maximum processing
rate, i.e., capacity, according to a given value (e.g., Ci, j ) using Xen’s credit scheduler
[145]. For example, to pin a VCPU to a single physical core, i.e., CPU, we can use xl
vcpupin VM Name VCPU ID CPU ID. Then to adjust the processing rate of a VCPU
in a VM according to a given capacity Ci, j in terms of RPS, we can use Xen Credit
scheduler that assigns a Cap to the VCPU of a VM, which limits the maximum amount
of the physical CPU that VCPU can use. For example, a VM with a 100 Cap means
that the VM can consume up to a 100% of its CPU’s maximum processing rate: xlsched
-credit -d VM Name -c Cap Value. The arbitrarily chosen parameters and their values
are summarized in Table 4.2(a), Table 4.2(b), and Table 4.2(c). For each experimental
setting, we repeated each run 104 times, collected the total power consumption and the
total minimum processing rates, and presented the average results normalized to those by
SPT in Fig. 4.12 to Fig. 4.15.
Fig. 4.12 and Fig. 4.13 show how power consumption of different approaches vary
with different capacities, and Fig. 4.14 and Fig. 4.15 show how total required processing
rates change with different capacities. From the results, we can see that GWPC outper-
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forms others in terms of both power consumption rates and total processing rate demands
under different server capacities. As shown in the figures, when the VMs’ capacities
increase from 6500 IPS (Fig. 4.12(a)) and from 6500 IPS (Fig.4.13(a)) to 6750 IPS
(Fig.4.12(d)) and to 12000 IPS (Fig.4.13(d)), the improvement of GWPC over RND and
FFD diminishes for S1 (S2 ) service types. This is because when the VMs’ capacities
increase, more request classes can be hosted together in the same VM, and, thus, all
multiplexing approaches show similar performance. Nevertheless, we can see that the
performance improvement of power-saving and the processing rate demands by the multiplexing approaches over SPT approach continue to improve as the server’s capacities
grow larger. For example, in Fig. 4.12(a), when server capacity is 6000 IPS and the number of classes is 30, the power consumption by GWPC is about 53% of that by SPT. In
Fig.4.12(d), when the server capacity is 6750 IPS and the number of classes is 30, the
power consumption by GWPC becomes about 24% of that by SPT. This again conforms
to theoretical conclusion in Theorem 4.3.

4.5.5

Validation using cloud benchmarks

We further evaluate our methods using the Data Caching Benchmark, i.e., a benchmark
that emulates the behavior of a Twitter caching server, from the benchmark suite of cloud
services, CloudSuite [162]. The benchmark assumes the strict quality of service guarantees such as 95% of the request must finish within 200 ms.
We exploited the GCCP platform, described in Chapter 3, to bootstrapped two VMs
with 10 GB memory capacity, and a single VCPU pinned to a single physical core in each
VM. We then implemented a Memcached server—a distributed memory object caching
system that speeds up dynamic web applications by alleviating a database’s delay—on
the first VM with a single worker (e.g., a single execution queue) to process the data
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(a) C1 = 6000IPS

(b) C1 = 6250IPS

(c) C1 = 6500IPS

(d) C1 = 6750IPS

Figure 4.12: Power-saving performance normalized to that of SPT for S1 : 128 × 128 MMUL
service type with different server capacities

caching requests, i.e., Get or Set. The caching requests are generated by a Memcached
client implemented within the workload engine UWME, and the Memcached server processes those requests. The UWME replicates those requests, and forward them to the
second Memcached server running on the second VM with reneging. The Performance
Monitoring Module collects the results on both servers.
We considered two main service types generated by the UWME; i.e., Get (e.g., S1 ),
and Set (e.g., S2 ). We generated one set of request with nine classes each from each
service type, {τi, j : i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., 9}, with arrival rates following the exponential distribution and averages of {1000, 2000, ..., 9000} RPS. The completion ratios were set to
be Ri, j = 95%. The deadlines in both sets were set such that the maximum achieved
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(a) C2 = 6000IPS

(b) C2 = 8000IPS

(c) C2 = 10000IPS

(d) C2 = 12000IPS

Figure 4.13: Power-saving performance normalized to that of SPT for S1 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT service
type with different server capacities.

throughput does not violate the target QoS requirements when the requests are served
with the Memcached server without reneging.

Data caching workload with request reneging
We first compare the average response times under QoS guarantees with and without
request reneging. We generated 107 IPR, and processed these instances on both V M1 and
V M2 . The average results are shown in Figs. 4.16.
Our experimental results clearly show that request reneging can significantly reduce
service response times. As shown in Fig. 4.16(a), the average response times of Get and
Set classes without reneging are always longer than those with reneging. On average,
the average response times of Get requests are 8%, 14%, and 17%, longer than those
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(a) C1 = 6000IPS

(b) C1 = 6250IPS

(c) C1 = 6500IPS

(d) C1 = 6750IPS

Figure 4.14: Processing rate performance normalized to that of SPT for S1 : 128 × 128 MMUL
service type with different server capacities

with reneging for Get requests classes with the arrival rates {λ1,1 = 1000, λ1,5 = 5000,
λ1,9 = 9000} RPS, respectively. We also observe a similar trend in Fig. 4.16(b), where the
average response time of Set requests is on average 14% longer than those with reneging.
When the arrival rates increase for S1 ’s and S2 ’s requests, the minimum required processing rates must increase to guarantee the same QoS requirement, as the waiting times of
requests increased. From Fig. 4.16(a), and Fig. 4.16(b), we can also observe that the
response time improvement by the reneging over non-reneging server increases with the
arrival rate of the requests. For example, in Fig. 4.16(b), and when the arrival rate of Set
requests is 5000 RPS, the response time by the reneging server is 14% shorter than the
non-reneging server, and it becomes 19% when the arrival rate increases to 9000 RPS.
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(a) C2 = 6000IPS

(b) C2 = 8000IPS

(c) C2 = 10000IPS

(d) C2 = 12000IPS

Figure 4.15: Processing rate performance normalized to that of SPT for S1 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT
service type with different server capacities.

Energy-saving performance of data caching workload with request reneging
To study the potential electricity cost savings of our approach, we tested GWPC, SPT,
FFD, and RND, using the same test cases defended above, with different request classes
each time ranging from 10 to 50. We also varied the completion ratio for each class
randomly from the interval of [90%,99%]. We assume that each HP workstation with a
total memory capacity of 32GB can hold up to 3 Memcached servers. We generated 105
IPR for each request class and repeated each run 104 times with and without reneging.
The results are taken among different completion ratios, and service utilization averaged
and normalized to the results by SPT and presented them in Fig. 4.17. More details about
power measurement and electricity cost calculation can be found in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 4.2: Power-saving performance of GWPC with different server capacities
(a) Services and Nodes Specifications

Si
S1 : 128 × 128 MMUL
S2 : 1 × 64 1-D FFT

SPi ’s Size ( mi Nodes)
m1 = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}
m2 = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}

Ci textbf(IPS)
C1 = (6, 6.25, 6.50, 6.75) × 103
C2 = (6, 8, 10, 12) × 103

(b) Requests Specifications for S1 and S2

τi, j
(τ1,1 . . . τ1,r1 )
(τ1,1 . . . τ1,r1 )
(τ1,1 . . . τ1,r1 )
(τ1,1 . . . τ1,r1 )
(τ2,1 . . . τ2,r2 )
(τ2,1 . . . τ2,r2 )
(τ2,1 . . . τ2,r2 )
(τ2,1 . . . τ2,r2 )

λi, j (IPS)
[20 − 500]
[20 − 500]
[20 − 500]
[20 − 500]
[500 − 1500]
[500 − 1500]
[500 − 1500]
[500 − 1500]

V i,j
V1,1 . . .V1,m1
V1,1 . . .V1,m1
V1,1 . . .V1,m1
V1,1 . . .V1,m1
V2,2 . . .V2,m2
V2,2 . . .V2,m2
V2,2 . . .V2,m2
V2,2 . . .V2,m2

Ci,j (IPS))
6 × 103
8 × 103
10 × 103
12 × 103
6 × 103
8 × 103
10 × 103
12 × 103

Run ID
(0 to 4)
(5 to 9)
(10 to 14)
(15 to 19)
(20 to 24)
(25 to 29)
(30 to 34)
(35 to 39)

(c) Shared Parameters among Requests

Ri,j (%)
[90 − 95]

IPRi,j
105

Run Repetition
104

ri
(10, 20, 30, 40, 50)

Di,j (102 µs)
[5 − 6]

The annual electricity cost-saving performance of GWPC follows a similar pattern
of the power-saving performance, and total processing rate as our experimental results
showed before. First, compared with SPT, all three request multiplexing approach (i.e.,
GWPC, SPT, and RND), by sharing servers and reneging requests, can improve the processing efficiency and reduce the electricity cost significantly. In addition, as the number
of classes increases, the improvement becomes more significant. For example, when the
number of classes increases from 10 to 50, the annual electricity cost ratios over SPT by
GWPC, FFD and RND decrease from 38 (35, resp.), 39 (36, resp.), and 40 (36, resp.)
to 19 (16, resp.), 21 (17, resp.), and 25 (20, resp.) for S1 (and S2 , resp.), respectively.
Moreover, we can see that GWPC outperforms FFD and RND. According to Fig. 4.17(a)
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(a) Get’s Request Classes

(b) Set’s Request Classes

Figure 4.16: Get’s (a) and Set’s (b) average response times under different arrival rates with and
without request reneging

and Fig. 4.17(b), GWPC on average saves around 4% and 3% more than FFD and 12%
and 10% more than RND for S1 ’s and S2 ’s requests, respectively. Furthermore, such an
improvement increases while the number of classes increases. For example, when the
number of classes is 10, the relative improvement of GWPC over FFD and RND is 2.6%
(2.8%, resp.) and 5.3% (2.8%, resp.) for S1 (S2 , resp.) requests, respectively. When the
number of classes is 50, the relative improvement of GWPC over FFD and RND becomes
10.5% (6.25%, resp.) and 31.6% (25.0%, resp.) for S1 (S2 , resp.) requests, respectively. This is because that when the number of classes increases, the solution space to
map requests to different VMs increases, and GWPC consequently can take advantage
of the bigger solution space, and achieve better power-saving performance. Overall, our
experimental results have clearly demonstrated that request reneging with data caching
workload results in lower average response times, and less energy costs comparing to its
counterpart. GWPC is therefore a promising approach that should be studied and applied
to more complicated cloud workloads.

4.6

Summary

In this chapter, we discuss our novel approach that can be applied in virtualized data
centers to optimize resource usage and to minimize power consumption when delivering
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(a) Get’s Request Classes

(b) Set’s Request Classes

Figure 4.17: Energy-saving performance of GWPC normalized to that of SPT using Get’s and
Set’s request classes under various QoS conditions

cloud services with statistically guaranteed QoS. The effectiveness and efficiency of our
novel methodology are rooted in two facts. First, our approach can effectively remove
potential failure requests as soon as possible to improve resources usage. Second, our
approach allows requests with different QoS requirements to be served on the same VM.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach by which different requests with
different QoS guarantees can be hosted on a single node to increase resource utilization
further and to reduce power consumption. We present several interesting characteristics
of our proposed approach with formal proofs. We also present the GWPC algorithm that
allocates services on the same VMs and reneges potential failure request while statistically
guarantees QoS constraints in terms of deadline miss ratios. We also design the GCCP
cloud prototype to validated the GWPC algorithm, and our experimental results confirm
that our approach can significantly outperform other traditional approaches in terms of
guaranteed QoS levels, power consumption, resource demands, as well as electricity costs.
For the future work, we will extend this work to platforms with heterogeneous servers
having different power consumption and processing rates characteristics. We also plan
to study the effects of interferences among different service types on the performance of
cloud data centers modeled by exploiting different queue models with request reneging.
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Next, we study how to securely collocate critical VMs and non-critical VMs onto
cloud clusters.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURE ALLOCATIONS OF CRITICAL VMS IN CLOUD DATA CENTERS
WITH RELAXED AND CONSTRAINED RESOURCE USAGE AND POWER
CONSUMPTION
Virtual Machine (VM) multiplexing in the cloud optimizes resource usage and power
consumption. However, consolidating VMs of different security requirements on a single
server results in cybersecurity threats, such as the VM-to-VM Interdependent Cybersecurity (IC) risks. For example, the odds of successfully compromising a secure Critical
VM (CV M) are high when an attacker, i.e., a hacker, compromises the hosting hypervisor
after a successful direct attack on one of its less secured, Non-critical VMs (NV Ms).
In this chapter, we study how to securely and efficiently allocate Critical and Noncritical VM types (e.g., CV Ms and NV Ms) onto a cloud cluster. Specifically, we formulate
the allocation problem using non-cooperative zero-sum and non-zero-sum game models,
between a cloud service provider and an attacker, under relaxed and constrained resource
usage and power consumption constraints. Our analysis completely characterizes the
existence of all the static and dynamic Equilibrium strategies of the provider. We mean
by an –Equilibrium– strategy that neither the provider nor the attacker can gain more if
the provider deviates from that Equilibrium strategy.

5.1

Introduction to the research problem

Cloud service providers usually allow several users and applications to share the resources
of the cloud infrastructure to maximize resource utilization and minimize energy costs.
Packing several VMs on a single server reduces the total number of allocated servers
which, in turn, minimizes the power consumption and operating expense (e.g., software
licenses, cybersecurity investment, etc.) of cloud clusters [126], [170]. Nevertheless,
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consolidating VMs with different security requirements (e.g., CV Ms and NV Ms) impose
security risks on both types of VMs. We refer to those risks as VM-to-VM Interdependent
Cybersecurity (IC) risks [33], and we call the attack in which an attacker can compromise
the hypervisor, after a successful direct attack on one of its hosted VMs, and eventually
can compromise all its hosted CV Ms and NV Ms as an IC attack.
Compromising critical applications could result in a complete functional failure of a
whole system (e.g., mission-critical applications, like space navigation systems), could
lead to a financial crisis (e.g., business-critical applications, like banking systems), could
have a catastrophic impact on the environment or human lives (e.g., safety-critical, like
nuclear reactor safety system), or could result in a leakage of classified data (e.g., securitycritical, like hospital storage systems). VMs that host critical applications, in consequence, are Critical VMs (CV Ms) and must be highly secured and must run in safe environments that reduce technology cost.
Cloud data centers are primarily built with global scalability and are profoundly resilient to optimizing the costs of cloud service providers. According to an article published in The Business of Data Centers [171], many agencies, which operate critical workloads, are yet reluctant to make the transition to the cloud due to cybersecurity concerns.
According to the Datacenter Dynamic [40], the U.S. federal CIO started the Governmentwide Data Center Consolidation and IT Modernization Program in 2010. This program
shut down thousands of national, private data centers and enforced the adoption of efficient resource management policies pushing most agencies to outsource their IT infrastructure to the cloud. Any general online search quickly reveals numerous examples of
cloud providers hosting critical workloads (e.g., Microsoft Azure government cloud computing [172] and the Hybrid Critical Cloud by Virtustream and VMware [173]).
Cloud providers permit their clients to have full control over the security settings
and policies of their critical workloads, as reported by several cloud providers (e.g., the
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Mission Critical Cloud [174]). VM multiplexing methods are extensively used in cloud
data centers to maximize server sharing among VMs, applications, and users. Resource
sharing, unfortunately, exposes CV Ms to IC risks resulted from the coexistence with other
vulnerable or less secured VMs, such as NV Ms [33, 52].
On the contrary, the Split allocation policy, which allocates CV Ms and NV Ms to separate servers, incurs lower cybersecurity risks. It, however, exacerbates resource usage and
energy costs. The challenging question therefrom is – How can cloud service providers
optimize the tradeoff between minimizing the IC risks and optimizing energy costs and
operating expense of cloud clusters?– Our problem is, thus, a Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) problem with conflicting goals and non-cooperative decision-makers.
Although MOO methods (e.g., Mathematical Programming (MP) and Evolutionary
Multi-objective Optimization (EMO)) are useful methods in solving problems with multiple conflicting objectives [175, 176], we choose the Game theory to formulate our VM
allocation problem. Our rationale is that the Game theory offers “mathematical models of
conflict and cooperation between cooperative and non-cooperative intelligent, rational
decision-makers” [135]. Furthermore, non-cooperative games model all the procedural
details of the game, unlike MOO methods which only describe the structure, strategies,
and payoffs of coalitions. For example, non-cooperative games can provide a socially
optimal way to deal with the different behaviors of cybersecurity attackers [177].
In this chapter, we study how to allocate two types of VMs (e.g., CV Ms and NV Ms)
onto a cloud cluster so that the provider’s Worst-case Potential Cybersecurity (W PC) loss
is minimized, while the overall energy costs and operating expense of the cloud cluster are
optimized. First, we formulate the VM allocation problem with cybersecurity awareness
using a non-cooperative, zero-sum game model between an attacker and a service cloud
provider. Second, we incorporate the processing rate utilization, power consumption,
energy costs, and operating expense of the cluster into a non-zero-sum game model. Our
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analysis completely characterizes the existence of all the static and dynamic Equilibrium
strategy profiles with relaxed and constrained resource usage and cost. We mean by an
–Equilibrium– profile that a pair of an attacker strategy and a provider strategy in which
neither the provider nor the attacker can gain more from unitarily deviating from his/her
strategy. We also derive the lower-bound and upper-bound of the IC risks.

5.2

Related work

We can divide the most related literature works to our problem into three major categories, i.e., cloud resource allocation without considering cybersecurity risks, cloud security without focusing on resource usage optimization, and security-aware cloud resource
allocation. Each of those categories can further be divided into approaches that use gametheoretic based models or use other types of models.
Cloud online services entered in each sector of our lives. Accordingly, optimizing
resource utilization and power consumption became a necessity for providers who are
always eager to attract more customers and survive in the competing cloud-based service
market. Numerous heuristics and meta-heuristics (e.g., genetic algorithm, fuzzy logic,
etc.) have been used in the literature to model cloud resources and IoT services over the
cloud [126, 170, 175, 176]. Makhlouf et al. [175] suggested using a linear integer program to optimize the partitioning of the cloud workload among the federation members,
while dynamically optimizing the provider’s prices to achieve the highest revenue. Gai et
al. [176] proposed a Cost-Aware Heterogeneous Cloud Memory Model (CAHCM) to provision a high-performance cloud-based memory service offering. Their model depends
on a Dynamic Data Allocation Advance (2DA) Algorithm that employs genetic programming to allocate data to cloud-based memories efficiently. As heuristic and meta-heuristic
methods tend to include external resources of uncertainties into the MOO model, they in-

96

crease the complexity of the problem [178]. In addition to the complexity, all previously
mentioned approaches analyze the tradeoffs among local objectives in isolation of the
dynamic of the different running scenarios of the optimization problem. Even if several
cases are taken into consideration, those approaches cannot simultaneously optimize multiple objectives from several actors. Such interaction, fortunately, can be captured using
the Game theory, which is crucial in predicting the attacker’s behavior when modeling
multi-objective security models.
Game theory-based approaches applied in cloud resource management were proposed
in [127, 129, 138]. Wei et al. [127] suggested improving the efficiency of cloud resources
by proposing two, non-multiplexing and multiplexing, resource assignments using an
evolutionary game model. Jalaparti et al. [138] introduced multiple heuristic algorithms
with near-optimal allocation and pricing policies, modeling the client-provider and clientclient interactions, compared to the fixed-pricing methodologies used today by cloud
providers, such as in Amazon EC2. While all such methodologies effectively optimize
resource utilization and/or cost savings, none of them consider the cybersecurity risks
implications of their allocation algorithms.
Server sharing results in challenging security threats, such as the side-channel attacks
[51, 52], and the IC risks [33, 55]. In the side-channel attacks, an attacker can build
different kinds of side channels to extract private information about the victim’s VM (e.g.,
the victim’s workload, traffic rate [52], cryptographic keys [51], etc.,) that eventually
enables him/her to launch a successful attack.
On the other hand, the authors in [33, 55] used a non-zero-sum game model to study
how to minimize the security expense of the cloud users. They assumed that users could
either allocate their VMs to a secure server, i.e., users invest in cybersecurity countermeasures, or to an insecure server to save in the cybersecurity-related expense. They
focused on minimizing the cybersecurity risks for a targeted user while reducing his/her
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cybersecurity related-expense. Whereas it is unrealistic to assume that a service cloud
provider would operate a cloud cluster with servers openly vulnerable to cyber attacks,
we presume, in this chapter, that a provider always secures all servers and VMs but with
different security levels. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to model the
IC risks, processing rate utilization, energy costs, and operating expense in cloud data
centers using the Game theory. Our goal is to ensure that the provider’s resource usage
and cybersecurity loss are optimized.
Security-aware resource allocation techniques were introduced in [90,141,179]. Zhang
et al. [90] are the first to develop a formal and quantified migration strategy to improve
the security against collocation attacks and with acceptable cost. Han et al. [141] used the
Game theory to model the cybersecurity between an attacker and a cloud provider. The
provider aims to minimize the attacker’s possibility of collocating his/her VMs with the
target VMs while maintaining a satisfactory workload balance and low power consumption. Using a game-solver software, they concluded that rather than adopting a single
allocation policy, a provider should have a pool of VM allocation policies. In [179], the
authors considered both direct and side-channel attacks on hypervisors. They developed
VM migration-based techniques to reduce the security risks considering the connection
cost among VMs while improving the survivability of the system. Rao et al. [143] used
the Game theory to study the ability of a cloud provider to guarantee the survivability of
predefined resource capacity and with a certain probability after a physical or cybersecurity attack on his/her data center. They proposed the usage of reinforcement strategies to
decrease an attacker’s utility. To this end, we assume that a provider secures CV Ms and
NV Ms using two different types of cyber protection measures. We aim to model the IC
risks and resource usage in cloud clusters using zero and non-zero sum game to investigate
how to allocate CV Ms and NV Ms to a two-server cluster so that the IC risks are mitigated,
and the overall energy costs, operating expense, and the W PC loss are minimized.
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Figure 5.1: A cloud cluster model. The cluster consists of h hypervisors, each of which is hosted
on a physical server Si ; i = 1, 2, ..., h. A server has a processing rate capacity Ci = C MIPS., utilization Ui , and power consumption Pi . The cluster hosts n Non-critical VMs (e.g., NV M) and m
Critical VM (e.g., CV Ms), that is {NV M1 , NV M2 , ..., NV Mn } and {CV M1 , CV M2 , ...,CV Mm },
respectively. `T , qT , and cT are the maximum security loss after a successful attack on a V MT ,
the security level, i.e., the successful attack probability on a V MT , and the processing rate requirements of V MT ; where V MT = NV M or V MT = CV M. qh is the probability of successfully
compromising any hypervisor after a successful direct attack on any of its hosted VMs.

5.3

System models

In this section, we introduce our system models.
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5.3.1

Cloud cluster model

Cloud data centers usually consist of hundreds or thousands of clusters. Fig. 5.1 illustrates a virtualized cloud cluster with h hypervisors, each of which is hosted on a
physical server Si . Each server has a processing rate capacity C MIPS, utilization Ui .
The cluster hosts n Non-critical VMs and a m CV Ms, e.g.,{NV M1 , NV M2 , ..., NV Mn }
and {CV M1 ,CV M2 , ..., NV Mm }, respectively. `T , qT , and cT are the maximum potential
security losses after a successful attack on V MT , the security level of V MT , and the processing rate requirements of V MT ; where T = C for the CV Ms and T = N for the NV Ms.
qh is the probability of successfully compromising any hypervisor after a successful direct
attack on any of its hosted VMs first.

5.3.2

Cloud service model

In this section, we model the VM allocation problem with cybersecurity and resource usage awareness using game-theoretic model between an attacker RA and the cloud service
provider RV . We assume that both players are reasonable, have a full understanding of
the cloud platform, and can only take the actions that maximize their potential payoffs.
RA ’s goal is to indirectly compromise a hypervisor and all its hosted VMs after successfully and directly attacking one of its hosted VMs. We assume that RA has just enough
time to compromise one server. We accept the fact that RA is capable of indirectly compromising a hypervisor via one of its directly compromised VMs, as proven experimentally
in [52]. Once RA has full control over the hypervisor, he/she can easily compromise all
VMs hosted on that hypervisor [179]. Specifically, RA ’s strategies identify the VM on
which he/she launches his/her initial direct attack to use it later in compromising its hosting hypervisor and all its coexisting VMs. Therefore, RA can either directly attack an
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NV M, i.e., a strategy we denote as N, or directly attack a CV M, i.e., a strategy we denote
as C.
RV can either allocate the VMs using the Split (e.g., S) allocation, in which different
types of VMs are allocated separately to a single server or using the multiplexing (e.g.,
X) allocation in which both types are hosted on a single server. The goal of a provider is
to select the allocation strategy that minimizes his/her potential cybersecurity Loss (e.g.,
L) assuming RA is capable of attacking any VM in the cluster that maximizes his/her
potential Gain (e.g., G). Therefore, this loss represents the provider’s Worst-case Potential
Loss (e.g., W PC) loss under a given VM allocation strategy.
Equation 5.1 shows the set of the four possible strategy profiles for RA and RV .
Possible Strategy Pro f iles = {(N, X), (N, S), (C, X), (C, S)}

(5.1)

For example, the strategy profile (C, S) implies that RA attacks a CV M when RV chooses
the S allocation policy. We assume that the relative importance of a VM is determined
by the potential expected loss for RV if that VM is compromised. Each strategy profile
results in a different payoff to RV and RA .
We denote RA ’s or RV ’s cybersecurity gain or loss if RA successfully compromises an
NV M, or a CV M, as `N and `C . Further, it is rational to assume that:
`N < `C

(5.2)

This implies that RV will suffer more loss if RA successfully compromises a CV M instead
of an NV M. Therefore, CV Ms require higher security levels, i.e., security measures and
cost, than those of the NV Ms to be protected against any direct cybersecurity attack.
We can define the security level of a VM as follows:
Definition 5.1. The Security Level of a VM is the probability of a direct and successful
attack on that VM. If the success probability is substantial (e.g., q → 1), the VM is said to

101

have a low-security level. If the success probability is tiny (e.g., q → 0), the VM is said to
have a high-security level.
For example, the security levels of an NV M and CV M are denoted as qN and qC ,
respectively. It is consequently rational to assume that:
0 < qC < qN < 1

(5.3)

The probability of a successful attack on any hypervisor after one of its VMs has been
compromised by RA is denoted as:
0 < qh < 1

(5.4)

High-security levels, nonetheless, do not protect VMs from other indirect cybersecurity attacks (e.g., an IC attack) that can occur when they coexist with vulnerable VMs on
the same hypervisor. We can define the indirect cybersecurity attack as follows:
Definition 5.2. The indirect cybersecurity attack is an attack on a hypervisor via one
of its directly compromised VMs, or an attack on another VM using that compromised
hypervisor to bypass any security measure applied to them.
For example, RA is unable to launch a successful direct attack on any of the CV Ms
when they have high-security levels, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. RA can rather indirectly
compromise them by launching an indirect attack involving any of the NV Ms and the
hypervisor. We call such an indirect attack on the CV Ms an IC attack and call such
cybersecurity risks IC risks.
Definition 5.3. The Interdependent Cybersecurity (e.g., IC) attack is an indirect cybersecurity attack on targeted VMs, usually with high-security levels, in which RA involves
another VM, usually with a low-security level, and the hosting hypervisor to bypass any
sound security levels applied to those targeted VMs.
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Definition 5.4. The IC risks imposed on a V Mi is RV ’s potential security loss due to a
successful IC attack on that V Mi , after a successful and direct attack on another coexisting V M j , with a security level q j , and followed by an indirect attack on the hypervisor
hosting both VMs with a success probability qh . Consequently, the IC risks imposed on
V Mi by V M j are q j qh `i .
When an IC attack on any VM under a given allocation strategy is optimal in terms of
maximizing RA ’s potential cybersecurity gain, we call this attack the Worst-case Potential
Cybersecurity W PC attack from RV ’s perspective.
Using those previously introduced definitions, we can now define the Equilibrium
strategy.
Definition 5.5. The allocation strategy is a static or dynamic Equilibrium strategy if it
optimally minimizes RV ’s W PC loss
In other words, the static Equilibrium allocation strategy corresponds to a pure Nash
Equilibrium (NE) strategy profile at which neither RV nor RA can improve their payoffs
by unitarily deviating to another strategy.
Let E(X) and E(S) be RV ’s operating expense under the allocation policies X and
S, respectively. Operating expense includes the cost of renting or purchasing servers,
security investment, hardware/software upgrade, licenses, etc. The operating cost of X
and S allocation strategies, according to Fig. 5.3 are:
E(X) = EX

(5.5)

E(S) = 2 × EX

(5.6)

We see that it costs RV an extra EX units when using the S strategy compared to using
the X strategy, in which RV acquires fewer servers.
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Let P(X) and P(S) be the cluster’s total, static and dynamic, power consumption under
the allocation policies X and S, respectively. For instance, when CV Ms and NV Ms coexist
on a single server, i.e., the X allocation strategy, the static power consumption of the
cluster is minimized due to reducing the number of utilized servers. Equation 6.7 models
the total power consumption consumed by a cloud cluster, as in the previous chapter:
P(X or S) = (DP ·Utz) + SP

(5.7)

DP is the maximum dynamic power consumed by all servers in the cluster; Utz is
the utilization of all servers (e.g., Utz = ∑hi=1 Ui ; where {i = 1, 2, ..., h}). SP is the static
power of the non-idle servers in the cluster. The total power consumption for the X and S
allocation strategies are given in Equation 5.8 and Equation 5.12, respectively.
P(X) = DP × (UtzX ) + SP

(5.8)

P(S) = 2 × (DP × (UtzS ) + SP)

(5.9)

Psvg = P(S) − P(X)

(5.10)

Let:

Where (Psvg > 0) represents the savings in the cluster’s total power consumption when
switching from the allocation strategy S to the strategy X. For ease of representation, we
will write the power equations as:
P(X) = PX

(5.11)

P(S) = PX + Psvg

(5.12)

In this chapter, we ignore the VM-to-hypervisor IC risks, i.e., RA cannot directly
attack a hypervisor. Next, we introduce our research problem.
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5.4

Problem definition

With the system and service models defined above, we can define our allocation problem
as follows:
Problem 5.1. Given the cloud cluster described in Section 5.3 with h = 2 servers, (n ≥ 1)
NV Ms and (m ≥ 1) CV Ms. Determine if RV should multiplex both types of VMs onto a
single server (e.g., the X allocation strategy), or if RV should split them off across two
separate servers (e.g., the S allocation strategy) so that RV ’s W PC loss is minimized and
the overall power consumption and operating expense is optimized.

5.5

Security-aware allocation with unconstrained resource usage

We first analyze our VM allocation problem assuming no resource usage and power consumption constraints via formulating it into a zero-sum game model. The normal form of
the game model is illustrated in Fig. 5.2.
We denote RA ’s and RV ’s Gain and Loss as G and L, respectively. As illustrated in
Fig. 5.2, the strategy profile G(N, X) denotes RA ’s gain when directly attacking an NV M
under the multiplexing allocation strategy, i.e., (N, X). RA ’s gain at this strategy profile
is, thus, equal to the probability of a successful attack on an NV M (e.g., qN ) times the
maximum security gain from attacking that NV M (e.g., `N ). Because both NV Ms and
CV Ms, are packed on the same server (e.g., the X strategy), RA can indirectly attack the
hypervisor and eventually compromise all its VMs. Therefore, the potential security loss
for RV if RA compromises the rest (n − 1) VMs upon compromising the hypervisor is
((n − 1) × qh × qN × `N ). Similarly, the potential security loss from compromising all m
CV Ms via launching an IC attack on them is (m × qh × qN × `C ).
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Figure 5.2: The zero-sum security game in normal form

Similar reasoning is applied to calculate RA ’s gain at other strategy profiles. We can
see that while RA is trying to maximize his/her gain, RV is trying to minimize his/her
expected loss. Therefore, RV ’s loss is L =−G, i.e., a zero-sum game.
RV wishes to minimize his/her cybersecurity loss assuming that RA can attack the VM
that maximizes his/her potential cybersecurity gain, i.e., RV wants to minimize his/her
W PC loss. Therefore, we need to find the strategy profiles at which no player has an
advantage in deviating from his/her current decision after considering all the opponent’s
possible choices. We call such strategy profile an NE [135].Our allocation problem is for
this reason a problem of identifying the NE strategy profile of our game model.
In order to identify the existence of the NE strategy profiles, we first have to analyze
RA ’s attack preferences under X and S allocation policies using the following lemmas and
theorems.
Lemma 5.1. RA always and directly attacks a CV M under the allocation X if:
qh < qh0

(5.13)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.14)

where qh is defined in Equation 5.15.
qh0 = (

((qN − qC )(n`N + m`C ) −1
)
(qC `C − qN `N ))

(5.15)

Proof. RA prefers the strategy profile (C, X) over (N, X), if:
G(C, X) > G(N, X)
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(5.16)

qC `C + (m − 1)qh qC `C + nqh qC `N > qN `N + (n − 1)qh qN `N + mqh qN `C

(5.17)

qC `C − qN `N > (n − 1)qh qN `N + mqh qN `C − (m − 1)qh qC `C − nqh qC `N

(5.18)

qC `C − qN `N > nqh qN `N − nqh qC `N + mqh qN `C − mqh qC `C + qh qC `C − qh qN `N (5.19)
qC `C − qN `N > qh (n`N (qN − qC ) + m`C (qN − qC ) + (qC `C − qN `N ))

(5.20)

qC `C − qN `N > qh ((n`N + m`C )(qN − qC ) + (qC `C − qN `N ))

(5.21)

qh ((n`N + m`C )(qN − qC ) + (qC `C − qN `N )) > 0

(5.22)

qh ((n`N + m`C )(qN − qC ) + (qC `C − qN `N )) < 0

(5.23)

Note that:

because if

then using simple transformation, we get:
qN
(n`N + m`C − `C)
<
qC
(n`N + m`C − `N )

(5.24)

but qN > qC , and `C > `N according to Equation 5.3 and Equation 5.2, respectively. Therefore:
qN
(n`N + m`C − `C )
>
qC
(n`N + m`C − `N )

(5.25)

((n`N + m`C )(qN − qC ) + (qC `C − qN `N )) > 0

(5.26)

((qN − qC )(n`N + m`C ) −1
(
) > qh
(qC `C − qN `N ))

(5.27)

or

then

which is Equation 5.17.
We can rewrite qh0 as:
qh0 = qC `C − qN `N /(n`N (qN − qC ) + m`C (qN − qC ) + (qC `C − qN `N ))
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(5.28)

and since 0 < qh < 1, and from Equation 5.26, we find that if qh < qh0 then:
qh0 > 0

(5.29)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.30)

and therefore:

Lemma 5.1 implies that securing the hypervisor can significantly reduce the IC risks
imposed on the CV Ms under the X allocation strategy. When qh is small enough (e.g.,
qh < qh0 ), the IC risks imposed on any of the CV Ms are small as well, i.e., qN qh `C .
According to Equation 5.14, RA ’s gain from attacking a CV M is larger than the gain from
attacking an NV M. RA consequently prefers to directly attack a CV M. Moreover, when
qh is large enough (e.g., qh > qh0 ), the IC risks imposed on CV Ms are maximized, and RA
benefits more from launching an IC attack on the CV Ms.
Whereas Lemma 5.1 shows that the number of VMs has no effect on RA ’s decision
under the X allocation strategy, Lemma 5.2 states that RA ’s preferences under the S allocation strategy not only depend on the value of qh , but also depend on the number of
CV Ms and NV Ms per server.
Lemma 5.2.

• RA always and directly attacks a CV M under the S allocation strategy

if all the conditions in any of the following cases hold:
Case 1-1

(qC `C > qN `N )

(5.31)

m ≥ n; ∀n > 0

(5.32)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.33)

Case 1-2
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m < n; ∀m ≥ 1

(5.34)

n−1
qC `C
<
m − 1 qN `N

(5.35)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.36)

n−1
qC `C
>
; ∀ m ≥ 2, ∀ n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.37)

qC `C < qN `N

(5.38)

qC `C
n−1
<
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.39)

qh > qh1 > 0

(5.40)

Case 1-3

Case 1-4

• RA always and directly attacks an NV M under the S allocation strategy if all the
conditions in any of the following cases hold:
Case 2-1

qC `C > qN `N

(5.41)

qC `C
n−1
>
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.42)

1 > qh > qh1 > 0

(5.43)

qN `N > qC `C

(5.44)

n ≥ m; ∀m > 0

(5.45)

Case 2-2
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Case 2-3

qC `C < qN `N

(5.46)

qC `C
n−1
>
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.47)

qC `C < qN `N

(5.48)

qC `C
n−1
<
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.49)

0 < qh < qh1 < 1

(5.50)

Case 2-4

where (n ≥ 2), (m ≥ 2), and qh1 is defined in Equation 5.51.
qh1 =

(qC `C − qN `N )
(n − 1)qN `N − (m − 1)qC `C

(5.51)

The proof of Lemma 5.2 can be easily verified using Fig. 5.2. Lemma 5.2 lists all
the cases when any of the CV Ms or NV Ms are the direct target of RA ’s attack under the
S allocation strategy. When there are no IC risks, RA ’s preferences are determined by the
value of qh , the potential gain of attacking each VM type, and the number of CV Ms and
NV Ms per server.
After understanding RA ’s preferences under different cybersecurity requirements and
allocation strategies, we can now identify RV ’s Equilibrium strategies assuming a worstcase attack scenario, i.e., the VM allocation strategy that corresponds to an NE strategy
profile.
Theorem 5.1. If all conditions in any of the following cases hold, RV ’s static Equilibrium
strategy is the S allocation strategy in which one of the CV Ms is a direct target for RA ,
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i.e., the allocation game model admits the strategy profile (C, S) as a pure NE strategy
profile.
Case 1
qC `C > qN `N

(5.52)

m ≥ n; ∀ n ≥ 1

(5.53)

0 < qh < qh0

(5.54)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.55)

m ≤ n; ∀m ≥ 1

(5.56)

0 < qh < qh0

(5.57)

n−1
qC `C
<
m − 1 qN `N

(5.58)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.59)

(n − 1)/(m − 1) > (qC `C )/(qN `N ); ∀ m ≥ 2, ∀ n ≥ 2

(5.60)

qC `C
n−1
>
; ∀ m ≥ 1, ∀ n ≥ 1
m − 1 qN `N

(5.61)

0 < qh < qh1 < qh0

(5.62)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.63)

qC `C
n−1
>
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.64)

n
qN `C
<
; ∀ m ≥ 1, ∀ n ≥ 1
m (qC `N

(5.65)

0 < qh < qh0 < qh1

(5.66)

Case 2

Case 3

Case 4
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Proof. When Case 2-1 from Lemma 5.1 holds, and when Case 1-1, Case 1-2 with qh1
< qh0 , or Case 1-3 with qh1 > qh0 from Lemma 5.2 hold, we get the conditions listed in
Cases 1 to 4 from Theorem 5.1, respectively.
We use the Minimax method [180] to prove Theorem 5.1. RA is trying to maximize
his/her expected gain (e.g., G) after a successful attack on an NV M or CV M. On the other
hand, RV is trying to minimize his/her potential loss by choosing the best allocation policy
(e.g., S or X) to mitigate RA ’s expected gain L = −G.
RA chooses to attack the VM that maximizes his/her gain, i.e., RA seeks to maximize
his/her minimum gain causing RV ’s a W PC loss.
Let min(G(N)), and min(G(C)) represent RA ’s minimum expected payoffs when successfully attacking an NV M and a CV M under both X and S policies. From Fig. 5.2, we
can write:
min(G(N, X), G(N, S)) = G(N, S)

(5.67)

min(G(C, X), G(C, S)) = G(C, S)

(5.68)

RA , hence, chooses to attack the VM with the maximum minimum payoff, and according to Lemma 5.2:
a = max(min(G(N, X), G(N, S)), min(G(C, X), G(C, S))) = G(C, S)

(5.69)

Therefore, RA ’s prefers to attack a CV M under the allocation S, i.e., the strategy profile
(C, S).
On the other hand, RV seeks to minimize his/her worst maximum loss assuming that
the attacker is capable of successfully attacking any VM in the cluster ( e.g., minimize
his/her maximum loss).
According to Lemma 5.1, Case 2-1, we can write:
max(G(N, X), G(C, X)) = G(C, X)
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(5.70)

Based on Case 1-1, Case 1-2, Case 1-3 when qh1 < qh0 , and Case 1-3 when qh1 > qh0 in
Lemma 5.2, we can see that the following is true when Case 1, Case 2, Case 3, and Case
4 in Theorem 5.1 hold:
max(G(N, S), G(C, S)) = G(C, S)

(5.71)

RV as a result chooses the allocation strategy with the minimum potential loss assuming that the attacker can launch a successful attack on the VM that maximizes his/her gain
under the S and X allocation strategies. That is:
v = min(max(G(N, X), G(C, X)), max(G(N, S), G(C, S))) = G(C, S)

(5.72)

From Equation 5.69 and Equation 5.72, we see that a = v. Further, from [180], we
find that the preferred strategies for both RA and RV are that for RA to attack a CV M when
RV chooses the allocation strategy S if any of the cases in Theorem 5.1 holds. Using the
Game theory terminology, we can say that the game admits the pure strategy profile (C, S)
as a pure NE strategy profile when the conditions stated in any of the cases of Theorem
5.1 holds because RV and RA cannot increase their payoffs by unilateral deviation from
the strategy profile (C, S)
Theorem 5.2. The CV Ms are the targets of IC attacks under the X allocation strategy and
the targets of direct attacks under the S allocation strategy. Moreover, the Equilibrium
strategy of RV is the S allocation (e.g., the game admits the strategy profile (C, S) as a
pure NE strategy profile, If all the conditions in any of the following cases hold.)
Case 1
qC `C > qN `N

(5.73)

m ≥ n; ∀n ≥ 1

(5.74)

0 < qh0 < qh

(5.75)
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Case 2
qC `C > qN `N

(5.76)

m ≤ n; ∀m ≥ 1

(5.77)

qC `C
n−1
<
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.78)

0 < qh0 < qh

(5.79)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.80)

Case 3

n−1
qC `C
>
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N
qN `C
n
<
; ∀m ≥ 1, ∀n ≥ 1
m (qC `N

(5.81)
(5.82)

0 < qh0 < qh << qh1

(5.83)

qC `C < qN `N

(5.84)

qC `C
n−1
<
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.85)

0 < qh < qh1

(5.86)

Case 4

Proof. When Case 2-1 from Lemma 5.1 and Case 2-1, Case 2-2, or Case 2-3 from Lemma
5.2 hold simultaneously, or when Case 2-2 from Lemma 5.1 and Case 2-4 from Lemma
5.2 hold simultaneously, we get the conditions listed in Cases 1 to 4 in Theorem 5.2,
respectively.
To this end, we use the Minimax method [180] to prove Theorem 5.2. RA is trying to
maximize his/her expected gain by attacking a CV M or an NV M. RV is trying to minimize
his/her W PC loss, by choosing the S or X allocation policy.
Using the minima method [180], RA considers the minimum gains after attacking an
NV M and a CV M under the S and X policies. RA next chooses to attack the VM with the
maximum minimum gain. In other words, RA seeks to maximize his/her minimum gain.
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min(G(N, X), G(N, S)) = G(N, S)

(5.87)

min(G(C, X), G(C, S)) = G(C, S)

(5.88)

RA thus chooses the strategy profile with the maximum gain from the strategies with the
minimum payoffs at each row of the payoff matrix in Fig. 5.2, and according to Lemma
5.2:
a = max(min(G(N, X), G(N, S)), min(G(C, X), G(C, S))) = G(C, S)

(5.89)

Therefore, RA ’s strategy profile with the maximin gain is (C, S).
On the other hand, RV seeks to minimize his/her worst maximum loss at each column
of the payoff matrix in Fig. 5.2, i.e, the minimax payoff. From Lemma 5.1, Case 2-2, we
have:
max(G(N, X), G(C, X)) = G(N, X)

(5.90)

and from Case 1-1, Case 1-2, Case 1-3 and Case 1-4 in Lemma 5.2, we can see that in
Case 2-1, Case 2-2, Case 2-3, and Case 2-4 in Theorem 5.2, respectively:
max(G(N, S), G(C, S)) = G(C, S)

(5.91)

RV hence chooses the strategy profile with the minimum potential payoff out of the strategies with the maximum potential payoff at each column of the payoff matrix in Fig. 5.2.
According to Lemma 5.1, we have:
G(C, X) < G(N, X)

(5.92)

but G(C, X) > G(C, S), therefore:
v = min(max(G(N, X), G(C, X)), max(G(N, S), G(C, S))) = G(C, S)

(5.93)

From Equation 5.89 and Equation 5.93, we see that a = v and according to [180], we
find that the game admits the pure strategy profile (C, S) as an NE when the conditions
stated in any of the cases stated in Theorem 5.1 hold.
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Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 identify all the conditions under which RV always
prefers the split allocation policy to minimize his/her W PC loss when RA prefers to directly attack a CV M. Both Theorems also imply that when RA always takes advantage
of the IC risks exists in the X allocation to indirectly compromise CV Ms, RV ’s best response to minimize his/her W PC loss is to choose the allocation strategy S. On the other
hand, Theorem 5.3 helps identify RV ’s Equilibrium strategy when RA always prefers to
use direct attacks under either available allocation strategies.
Theorem 5.3. If all the conditions in any of the following cases hold, the CV Ms are always the primary targets of a direct attack under the X allocation strategy, and the NV Ms
are the primary target of a direct attack under the S allocation strategy. Moreover, the
Equilibrium strategy is the S allocation strategy (e.g., the game admits the strategy profile
(NV M, S) as a pure NE strategy profile.)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.94)

qC `C
n−1
>
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.95)

0 < qh1 < qh < qh0

(5.96)

qN `C
n
>
; ∀m ≥ 1, ∀n ≥ 1
m qC `N

(5.97)

Proof. When Case 1-1 from Lemma 5.1 and Case 2-1 from Lemma 5.2 hold simultaneously, we get the conditions listed in Theorem 5.3, respectively.
We use the Minimax method [180] to prove Theorem 5.3. RA is trying to maximize
his/her expected gain by launching an attack on a CV M or on an NV M. On the contrary,
RV is trying to minimize his/her W PC loss, by choosing between the S and X allocation
policies to mitigate RA ’s expected gain L = −G.
RA considers the possible strategies at each row of the payoff matrix in Fig. 5.2,
determines the profiles with the worst payoffs if he/she plays that row, and chooses the
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profile at which his/her payoff is best, among those with the worst payoffs, i.e., RA seeks
to maximize his/her minimum payoffs.

min(G(N, X), G(N, S)) = G(N, S)

(5.98)

min(G(C, X), G(C, S)) = G(C, S)

(5.99)

RA thus chooses the strategy profile with the maximum payoff from the strategies with
the minimum payoffs at each row of the payoff matrix, illustrated in Fig. 5.2, and from
Lemma 5.2, we have:
a = max(min(G(N, X), G(N, S)), min(G(C, X), G(C, S))) = G(C, S)

(5.100)

Therefore, RA ’s strategy profile with the maximin payoff is (C, S).
On the other hand, RV seeks to minimize his/her W PC loss at each column of the
payoff matrix in Fig. 5.2, i.e, the minimax payoff.
According to Lemma 5.1, Case 1-1:
max(G(N, X), G(C, X)) = G(C, X)

(5.101)

According to Lemma 5.2, we can see:
max(G(N, S), G(C, S)) = G(N, S)

(5.102)

RV then chooses the strategy profile with the minimum potential payoff out of the strategies with the maximum potential payoff at each column of the payoff matrix, illustrated
in Fig. 5.2. From Case 1-1 in Lemma 5.1, we have:
G(C, X) > G(N, X)

(5.103)

but G(N, X) > G(N, S), therefore:
v = min(G(C, X), G(N, S)) = G(N, S)
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(5.104)

From Equation 5.100 and Equation 5.104, we see that a = v and according to [180],
we find that the game admits the pure strategy profile (N, S) as an NE when the conditions
stated in Theorem 5.3 hold true.
On the contrary to Theorem 5.2, Theorem 5.3 lists the conditions by which the IC
risks, imposed on the CV Ms, are minimized under the X allocation strategy.
Theorem 5.4. If all the conditions in any of the following cases hold, then the NV Ms are
always the primary target of a direct attack under both the X and S policies. Moreover, the
Equilibrium strategy is the S allocation policy (e.g., the game admits the strategy profile
(NV M, S) as a pure NE strategy profile.)
Case 01:
qC `C > qN `N

(5.105)

qC `C
n−1
>
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.106)

n
qN `C
>
; ∀m ≥ 1, ∀n ≥ 1
m qC `N

(5.107)

0 < qh < qh1 < qh0

(5.108)

qC `C > qN `N

(5.109)

n−1
qC `C
>
; ∀m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.110)

n
qN `C
<
; ∀m ≥ 1, ∀n ≥ 1
m qC `N

(5.111)

0 < qh < qh0 < qh1

(5.112)

qC `C < qN `N

(5.113)

m ≥ n; ∀n ≥ 1

(5.114)

Case 02:

Case 03:
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Case 04:
qC `C < qN `N

(5.115)

m > n; ∀ n ≥ 1

(5.116)

qC `C
n−1
<
; ∀ m ≥ 2, ∀n ≥ 2
m − 1 qN `N

(5.117)

qh < qh1

(5.118)

Case 05:

Proof. When Case 2-1 from Lemma 5.1 and Case 2-1, when qh1 < qh0 , or Case 2-2, when
qh1 > qh0 from Lemma 5.2 hold, or when Case 2-2 from Lemma 5.1 and Case 2-2, Case
2-3 or Case 2-4 from Lemma 5.2 hold simultaneously, we get the conditions listed in
Case1 to Case 5 from Theorem 5.4, respectively.
We use the Minimax method [180] to proof Theorem 5.4. RA is trying to maximize
his/her expected payoff, G, after a successful attack on NV M or CV M, and RV is trying
to minimize his/her potential loss, by choosing between the S and X allocation policies to
mitigate RA ’s expected gain L = −G.
RA considers the possible strategies at each row of the payoff matrix in Fig. 5.2,
determines the profiles with the worst payoffs if he/she plays that row, and chooses the
profile at which his/her payoff is best, among those with the worst payoffs, i.e., RA seeks
to maximize his/her minimum payoffs.

min(G(N, X), G(N, S)) = G(N, S)

(5.119)

min(G(C, X), G(C, S)) = G(C, S)

(5.120)

RA chooses the strategy profile with the maximum payoff from the strategies with the
minimum payoffs at each row of the payoff matrix, illustrated in Fig. 5.2, and from
Lemma 5.2, we have:
a = max(G(N, S), G(C, S)) = G(N, S)
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(5.121)

Therefore, RA ’s strategy profile with the maximin gain is (N, S).
On the other hand, RV seeks to minimize his/her WPC loss at each column of the
payoff matrix, illustrated in Fig. 5.2, i.e, the minimax payoff. From Lemma 5.1, Case
2-2, we have:
max(G(N, X), G(C, X)) = G(N, X)

(5.122)

and from Case 1, when qh1 < qh0 , or from Case 2, 3, 4, or 5 in Theorem 5.4, we have:
max(G(N, S), G(C, S)) = G(N, S)

(5.123)

RV selects the strategy profile with the minimum potential payoff out of the strategies
with the maximum potential payoff at each column of the payoff matrix in Fig. 5.2:
v = min(G(N, X), G(N, S)) = G(N, S)

(5.124)

From Equation 5.121 and Equation 5.124, we see that a = v and according to [180],
we find that the game admits the pure strategy profile (N, S) as a pure NE strategy profile
when the conditions stated in any of the cases in Theorem 5.4 hold.
The reason why the S allocation strategy is always the Equilibrium strategy of RV is
that the zero-sum game does not incorporate resource usage in its model. This results in
the fact that the zero-sum game does not have a mixed NE strategy profile. In other words,
the Equilibrium allocation strategy of RV is always the static VM allocation strategy S.
Theorem 5.5. The zero-sum security game model, described in Fig. 5.2 does not accept
a mixed NE strategy profile, i.e., there is no Equilibrium dynamic VM allocation strategy.
Proof. At the mixed NE strategy profile, both RA and RV are indifferent in choosing their
strategies. For example, RA must randomize in such a way that RV does not care which
VM is to be attacked, i.e., GX = G(N, X)) = G(S, X) and GS = G(N, S)) = G(S, S). Let
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(0 < β < 1) be the probability that RA attacks an NV M, then:
GX = β(qN `N + (n − 1)qh qN `N + mqh qN `C )

(5.125)

+(1 − β)(qC `C + (m − 1)qh qC `C + nqh qC `N )
GS = β(qN `N + (n − 1)qh qN `N ) + (1 − β)(qC `C + (m − 1)qh qC `C )

(5.126)

In the context of attacker randomizing, in order to find β, we must equalize Equation
5.125 and Equation 5.126 and solve them. This eventually gives:
−nqC `N
(mqN `C ) − (nqC `N )

(5.127)

1
(mqN `C )/(−nqC `N ) + 1

(5.128)

β=
or
β=

if |(mqN `C )/(−nqC `N )| > 1 then β < 0, and if |(mqN `C )/(−nqC `N )| < 1 then β > 1. But
this contradicts the fact that β is a probability, i.e., 0 < β < 1. Therefore, we conclude
that there is no mixed NE strategy profile for the zero-sum security game.
We can so far draw several conclusions from our analysis to the zero-sum game model
under no resource usage and power consumption constraints. First, the Equilibrium strategy that solves Problem 5.4 under different cybersecurity requirements, which are detailed
in Theorem 1 to Theorem 4, is always the static VM allocation strategy S, under which
there are no IC risks imposed on the CV Ms. Second, the existence of the IC risks under
the X allocation strategy primarily depends on the probability of indirectly compromising
the hypervisor. Third, there are no Equilibrium dynamic allocation strategies. We show
in Section 5.6 that the mixed NE strategy profiles are of great importance in optimizing
RV ’s loss and cost.
Although minimizing the potential cybersecurity loss is important, RV also aims to optimize cloud resource usage and related expense to strive in the competing cloud market.
In the next section, we extend our cybersecurity-aware zero-sum game model to include
resource usage and power consumption constraints.
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Figure 5.3: The non-zero-sum security game in normal form

5.6

Security-aware allocation with resource usage and power consumption constraints

In this section, we formulate our allocation problem using a non-zero-sum game model
taking into consideration energy costs and operating expense. Fig 5.3 shows the game in
its normal form. Whereas RA ’s payoff matrix is the same as the payoff matrix described
earlier in Fig. 5.2, RV ’s payoff, in this case, is calculated using the utility function illustrated in Equation 5.129. We can see that Equation 5.129 consists of three sub-utility functions, L, P, and E), that are multiplied by three coefficients, w1 , w2 , and (1 − w1 − w2 ),
respectively. Those coefficients reflect the relative importance of the sub-utility functions
to RV :
L(V M, A) = −w1 · G(V M, A) − w2 · P(A) − (1 − w1 − w2 ) · E(A)

(5.129)

where
V M ∈ {N,C}

(5.130)

A ∈ {S, X}

(5.131)

0 < w1 , w2 < 1

(5.132)

L(V M, A) is RV ’s loss after a successful attack on an NV M or a CV M and under the
allocation policy A = X or A = S. P(T ) and E(T ) are the cluster’s total energy and
operating cost under the allocation strategy A = X or A = S, as described in Section 5.3.2.
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RA aims to attack the VM that maximizes his/her security gain. RV , on the other hand,
wishes to allocate the VMs so that the overall cybersecurity loss and cost is always at its
minimum, i.e., multiplexing all VMs on the fewest number of servers while minimizing
the W PC loss. However, collocating CV Ms with other NV Ms on a single server maximizes RV ’s W PC loss. Therefore, we need to analyze the tradeoffs between cost savings
optimization and cybersecurity loss minimization.

5.6.1

The VM-to-VM Interdependent Cybersecurity (IC) risk’s bounds

In the following Theorem, we define the IC risk’s bounds.
Theorem 5.6. RV ’s possible cost savings when selecting the S VM allocation strategy is
constrained by the following upper and lower IC risk bounds.
mqh qN `C > Cost Savings > nqh qC `N

(5.133)

Proof. Equation 5.12 and Equation 5.6 show that RV can minimize his/her energy costs
and operating expense by choosing the X strategy. Therefore, if RA prefers a direct attack
on a CV M, i.e., Lemma 5.1, a rational provider should always choose the X allocation
strategy in which there are no IC risks are imposed on the CV Ms. In the game model, this
translates to L(C, X) > L(C, S), which can be simplified to:
E + Psvg > nqh qC `N

(5.134)

Equation 5.134 represents the IC risk’s Lower Bound (LB). This bound quantifies the
relationship between RV ’s energy costs and operating expense and the IC risks that the
CV Ms impose on the NV Ms under the X strategy. In other words, Equation 5.134 implies
that RV ’s minimum cost savings must always be larger than any IC risks imposed on the
NV Ms.
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Moreover, RV aims to minimize the IC risks imposed on any CV M by the NV Ms.
RV , thus, should use extra resources to prevent RA from indirectly attacking one of the
CV Ms. However, the question is –when is it justified, for RV , to use extra resources to
minimize his/her cybersecurity loss that is resulted from an IC attack, and how many extra
resources are needed?– For example, RV can eliminate the IC risks imposed on the CV Ms
(e.g., the strategy profile (N, X)) by using the S strategy (e.g., switching to the strategy
profile (N, S)), if RV ’s overall loss and cost under the S strategy is less than the overall
loss and cost under the X allocation strategy. That is, L(AC , X) < L(AC , S), or:
mqh qN `C > EX + Psvg

(5.135)

Equation 5.135 represents the Upper Bound (UB) of the IC risks. This bound quantifies the tradeoff between minimizing the IC risks that the NV Ms impose on the CV Ms
under the X strategy and between optimization the cost savings by switching to the S strategy. This IC risks’ limit sets the resource usage threshold over which RV is not allowed
to exceed when using the S allocation to minimize the IC risks. It is rational that when
the cost of the extra resources used to mitigate the IC risks exceed the cybersecurity loss,
RV chooses the X strategy, (e.g., the strategy profile (C, X)) to minimize his/her overall
potential loss and cost.
To this end, we can see that from Equation 5.134 and Equation 5.135 that RV ’s feasible
cost savings are bounded by the lower and upper bounds of the IC risks. We can merge
the previous two inequalities into a single inequality (e.g., Equation 5.136), and call it the
Cyber-constrained cost Savings Range (CSR):
mqh qN `C > EX + Psvg > nqh qC `N

(5.136)

Both IC risk’s lower and upper bounds are illustrated in Fig. 5.4(a) and Fig. 5.4(b),
respectively. We assume a single CMV and a single NV M (Other experiment setup and
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Figure 5.4: Trade-off optimization between cybersecurity risks and cost savings.

values are detailed in Section 5.7). Fig. 5.4(a) shows that RV can improve his/her cost
savings by almost 50% while incurring less than a 5% increase in the W PC loss, due
to the IC risks imposed on the NV Ms, by multiplexing both types of VMs on the same
server. On the other hand, when one of the CV Ms is the target of an IC attack, RV can
minimize his/her W PC loss by more than five times when allocating the CV Ms and NV Ms
to separate servers, as illustrated in Fig. 5.4(b).
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Next, we will identify RV ’s Equilibrium strategies that solve Problem 5.4 under different attack scenarios.
Theorem 5.7. If any of the cases in Theorem 5.1 hold, and if the LB inequality (e.g.,
Equation 5.134) holds, the X strategy is RV ’s static Equilibrium strategy (e.g., the nonzero-sum game admits the strategy profile (C, X) as a pure NE strategy profile). However,
if the LB inequality does not hold, i.e.
EX + Psvg < qh qC `N

(5.137)

then the S strategy is RV ’s static Equilibrium strategy (e.g., non-zero-sum game admits
the strategy profile (C, S) as a pure NE strategy profile).
Proof. If any of the cases in Theorem 5.1 hold, then according to Lemmas (5.1) and (5.2)
RA prefers to directly attack a CV M when RV chooses the allocation policy X or S.
On the other hand, if the lower bound inequality (e.g., Equation 5.134) holds, then
L(C, X) > L(C, S), and RV consequently prefers the X strategy (e.g., the strategy profile
(C, X)), the non-zero-sum game admits the pure strategy profile (C, X) as an NE. However, if Equation 5.137 holds, i.e., L(C, X) < L(C, S), and the non-zero-sum game admits
the pure strategy profile (C, S) as an NE because no player can increase his/her payoff by
unilateral deviation from the strategy profile (C, S).
Theorem 5.7 reflects the important role of the LB inequality in optimizing RV ’s cost
savings performance. RV can multiplex both types of VMs to save in his/her cost, while
imposing no IC risks on the CV Ms. Nonetheless, RV allows CV Ms to impose minimal IC
risks on NV Ms. However, if the potential cyber security loss, assuming that the shared
server is compromised, exceeds the total cost savings, RV should switch to the S allocation. Although, the second scenario is almost impossible, as `N is negligible in front of
`C , and qC is very small, i.e., Equation 5.134. Next, we will use the UB to help identify
RV ’s Equilibrium strategies using Theorem 5.8.

126

Theorem 5.8. If any of the cases in Theorem 5.4 hold, and if Equation 5.135 holds, the S
allocation strategy is RV ’s static Equilibrium strategy in which the NV Ms are the direct
target of RA (e.g., the non-zero-sum game admits the strategy profile (N, S) as a pure NE
strategy profile). However, if any of the cases in Theorem 5.4 hold true, and if Equation
5.135 does not hold, i.e.
E + Psvg > qh qN `C

(5.138)

then the X allocation strategy is RV ’s static Equilibrium strategy in which the CV Ms are
the direct target of RA , (e.g., the non-zero-sum game admits the strategy profile (N, X) as
a pure NE strategy profile).
Proof. If any of the cases in Theorem 5.4 hold, then according to Lemma 5.1 and Lemma
5.2, RA always prefers to attack an NV M (e.g., both players prefer the profile strategies
(N, X), and (N, S)).
On the other hand, if Equation 5.135 holds, i.e., L(N, S) > L(N, X), RV consequently
prefers the strategy profile (N, S), and the non-zero-sum game admits the pure strategy
profile (N, S) as an NE. However, if Equation 5.138 holds, i.e., L(N, S) < L(N, X), the
non-zero-sum game admits the pure strategy profile (N, X) as an NE because no player
can increase his/her payoff by unilateral deviation from the strategy profile (N, X).
Theorem 5.8 implies that RV can judiciously acquire more resources to minimize the
IC risks imposed on the CV Ms under the X strategy (e.g., the strategy profile (N, S) is a
pure NE strategy profile). However, if the cost of the newly allocated resources exceeds
the W PC loss under the X allocation, RV should switch from S to X (e.g., the strategy
profile (N, X) is a pure NE strategy profile).
So far, all RV ’s Equilibrium allocation strategies that we can identify are static. In
other words, all the provider’s optimal allocation strategies correspond to pure NE strategy profiles. The following two theorems discuss the cases, according to which, the
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provider optimal allocation strategy is dynamic (e.g., the non-zero-sum game accepts
mixed NE strategy profiles).
Theorem 5.9. If all of the conditions stated in Theorem 5.2 hold and if Equation 5.136
holds, RV ’s Equilibrium strategy is a dynamic allocation that involves both X and S strategies (e.g., the non-zero-sum game admits a mixed NE strategy profile). However, if Equation 5.136 does not hold and Equation 5.137 holds, the S strategy is RV ’s static Equilibrium strategy in which the CV Ms are the target of a direct attack (e.g., non-zero-sum game
admits the strategy profile (C, S) as a pure NE strategy profile). Moreover, if Equation
5.136 does not hold and if Equation 5.138 holds, the X strategy is RV ’s static Equilibrium
strategy in which the NV Ms are the target of a direct attack (e.g., the non-zero-sum game
then admits the strategy profile (N, X) as a pure NE strategy profile).
Proof. If all the conditions stated in Theorem 5.2 hold, according to Lemma 5.1 and
Lemma 5.2, RA and RV prefers the strategy profiles (N, X) and (C, S).
On the other hand, if Equation 5.136 holds, RV prefers the strategies (X), and (S) when
RA prefers to directly attack an NV M and a CV M, respectively. Thus, when RV chooses
the X strategy, RA directly strikes a VM of type NV M (e.g., the strategy profile (N, X)).
RV then switches to the X allocation strategy to minimize the IC risks imposed on the
CV Ms by the NV Ms (e.g., the strategy profile (N, S)). However, according to Theorem
5.3, RA can now gain more by directly attacking a CV M (e.g., the strategy profile (C, S)).
Further, RV can save in resource usage by switching to the X strategy (e.g., the strategy
profile (C, X)), and the game continues similarly in an infinite loop. In other words, there
is no pure NE strategy profile for the game described in Fig. 5.3, because there is no
strategy at which both players cannot make unilateral changes to improve their payoffs.
However, if Equation 5.134 and/or Equation 5.135 do not hold, and if Equation 5.134
and/or Equation 5.135 hold, RV prefers the strategy profiles (C, X) and/or (N, S) because
L(C, X) > L(C, S) and/or L(N, S) > L(N, X) when RA chooses to directly attack a VM
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of types CV M and/or NV M, respectively. Consequently, the game admits the strategy
profiles (N, X) and/or (C, S) as pure NE strategy profiles, respectively.
In the mixed NE strategy profile, described in Theorem 5.9, when RV selects the S
allocation, RA gains more by directly attacking a CV M (e.g., the strategy profile (C, S)).
However, Theorem 5.9 shows that RV can optimize his/her payoff by switching to the X
allocation (e.g., the strategy profile (C, X).) This decision is justified and quantified based
on Equation 5.134. However, RA can now utilize the IC risks that the NV Ms impose on
the CV Ms by switching to the X strategy (e.g., the strategy profile (N, X)). Again, RV can
minimize the IC risks by spending extra resources and switching to the strategy S (e.g.,
the strategy profile (N, S)). This decision is also justified and quantified according to
Equation 5.135. This scenario continues as players continue switching from one strategy
to another.
Theorem 5.10. If any of the cases stated in Theorem 5.3 holds and if Equation 5.137,
and/or if Equation 5.138 hold, RV ’s Equilibrium strategy is a dynamic allocation strategy
that involves both the X and S strategies (e.g., the non-zero-sum game admits a mixed
NE strategy profile). However, if Equation 5.136 holds, both the X and S are RV ’s static
Equilibrium strategies (e.g., the non-zero-sum game admits the strategy profiles (C, X)
and (N, S) as pure NEs strategy profiles).
Proof. If any of the cases stated in Theorem 5.3 hold, according to Lemma 5.1 and
Lemma 5.2, RA prefers to attack a CV M and an NV M (e.g., the strategy profiles (C, X)
and (N, S)) when RV chooses the X and S strategy, respectively.
On the other hand, if Equation 5.136 holds, according to Theorem 5.9, RV prefers the
strategies X and S (e.g, the strategy profiles (C, X) and (N, S)) when RA prefers to directly
attack an NV M and CV M, respectively. The non-zero-sum game, described in Fig. 5.3,
thus admits the strategy profiles (C, X) and (N, S) as pure strategy NE strategy profiles.
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Nonetheless, if the lower and upper bounds given in Equation 5.134 and Equation
5.135 do not hold, then RV prefers the strategies S and X (e.g., strategy profiles (C, S)
and (N, X)) since L(C, X) < L(C, S) and L(N, S) < L(N, X) when RA chooses to directly
attack CV Ms and NV Ms, respectively. The game hence admits (N, X) as a mixed NE
strategy profile and/or (C, S) as a pure NE strategy profile, respectively.
In the mixed NE strategy profile, discussed in Theorem 5.10, when RV selects the
S allocation, RA gains more by directly attacking the NV Ms (e.g., the strategy profile
(N, S)). This case is possible when the number of NV Ms is substantial, or the probability
of directly attacking an NV M or the hypervisor is very high. Theorem 5.10 shows that
RV can optimize his/her payoff by switching to the X allocation (e.g., the strategy profile
(N, X)). This decision is justified and quantified based on Equation 5.137. However,
RA can now exploit the IC risks that the CV Ms imposed on the NV Ms by switching to
the strategy profile (C, X). Again, RV minimizes the IC risks imposed on the NV Ms by
switching to the profile (C, S), i.e., Equation 5.138. The scenario continues as players
continue switching from one strategy to another.
When RV and RA randomize in such a way that the other player does not care which
strategy the first player selects, i.e., G(VN ) = G(VC ) and L(N) = L(C), the game reaches
a dynamic Equilibrium state, i.e., a mixed NE strategy profile. In Theorem 5.11, we show
how to calculate the probabilities by which every player randomly selects many strategies
resulting in uncertainty and unpredictability to the other player.
Whereas Theorem 5.10 and Theorem 5.9 identify the conditions at which RV can use
VM migrations to optimally minimize the overall W PC loss and costs, Theorem 5.11
calculates the percentage according to which RV should wait at each allocation strategy
before migrating the VMs and switching to another allocation strategy.
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Theorem 5.11. If all of the conditions stated in Theorem 5.2 hold, if Equation 5.136
holds, if RV assigns a probability weight α to choosing the X strategy and a probability
weight (1 − α) to choosing the S strategy, and if RA assigns a probability weight β to
directly attacking an NV M and a probability weight (1 − β) to directly attacking a CV M,
then:
1. The game admits the optimal dynamic Equilibrium state (e.g., a mixed NE strategy
profile) in which a player’s response to the other player is his/her best response.
2. RV ensures that the IC risks imposed on the CV Ms by the NV Ms under the X
strategy are minimized by (1 − β%); where:
G(C, S) − G(N, S)
G(N, S) + G(C, S) − G(N, S) − G(C, X)
L(C, S) − L(C, X)
β=
L(N, X) + L(C, S) − L(N, S) − L(C, X)

α=

(5.139)
(5.140)

Proof. First, according to Nash, An Equilibrium point is an n-tuple so that a player’s
mixed strategy maximizes his/her payoff if the strategies of the others are held fixed.
Thus, each player’s strategy is optimal against those of the others, which induces that RA
is indifferent in choosing the target which in turn significantly affects the cluster security.
Suppose that RV assigns probability weight α to choosing the X strategy and a probability weight (1 − α) to the S strategy. RA ’s expected gain, then, from attacking an NV M
is:
G(N) = αG(N, X) + (1 − α)G(N, S)

(5.141)

and RA ’s expected gain from attacking a CV M:
G(C) = αG(C, X) + (1 − α)G(C, S)

(5.142)

RV wants to randomize so that RA has no preference in which VM types to attack, i.e.,
G(N) = G(C):
αG(N, X) + (1 − α)G(N, S) = αG(C, X) + (1 − α)G(C, S)
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(5.143)

which can be simplified to Equation 5.139:
α=

G(C, S) − G(N, S)
G(N, S) + G(C, S) − G(N, S) − G(C, X)

(5.144)

Now suppose that RA assigns a probability weight β to attack an NV M, and a probability weight (1 − β) to attack a CV M. U
sing a similar argument, we find that RA must randomize in such a way that RV does
not prefer an allocation policy over the other, L(X) = L(S):
βL(N, X) + (1 − β)L(C, X) = βL(N, S) + (1 − β)L(C, S)

(5.145)

which can be simplified to Equation 5.140:
β = L(C, S) − L(C, X)/L(N, X) + L(C, S) − L(N, S) − L(C, X)

(5.146)

We can easily observe from equations 5.139 and 5.140 that:
0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1

(5.147)

and according to [181] and [182] the game admits an optimal NE strategy profile.
Second, RV ’s overall cybersecurity loss and cost expected from choosing the X strategy, assuming that RA attacks an NV M and a CV M with probabilities β and 1 − β is:
L(X) = βL(N, X) + (1 − β)L(C, X)

(5.148)

We can see from Equation 5.148 that the IC risks imposed on the CV Ms by the NV Ms
under the optimal mixed NE strategy profile are minimized by 1 − β%, i.e., β × m × qh
× qN × `C
Next, we discuss our experimental setup and present our numerical results.

132

5.7

Numerical results

We used Matlab to numerically analyze the existence of NE strategy profiles of the nonzero-sum game using different values of qC , qN , and qh .
In each simulation, we varied a specific parameter and studied the effect of that parameter on RV ’s W PC loss under the pure and mixed NE strategy profiles. Without loss
of generality, we assumed the following values to illustrate some of the non-intuitive
implications of findings: `C = 20, `N = 5, qC = 0.1, qN = 0.6, qh = 0.3, n = 3, m = 1,
EX = 0.5, and ES = 1. We used the Green Cloud Computing Prototype (GCCP) described
in [170] to measure the processing rate utilization and power consumption under every
allocation strategies, and we found that PS = 1, and PX = 0.6514 when the power consumption is normalized to the S.

The provider’s payoff performance with the change in qC
We varied qC from 0.001 to qN − 0.001 while measuring RV ’s payoff, as shown in Fig.
5.5(a). We observe that RV ’s payoff is maximized when qC is very small. For instance,
according to Theorem 5.3 and Case 03 of Lemma 5.2, when qC is small (e.g., qC < 0.24),
we can see that qC `C < qN `N and accordingly the game admits the strategy profile (N, S)
as a pure NE strategy profile.
When (0.24 < qC < 0.3070) and according to Lemma 5.2, Case 03, RA ’s payoff at
the strategy profile (CV M, S) becomes larger than his/her payoff at the profile (NV M, S).
But because the LB inequality holds true (Equation 5.134), RV changes from the S to
the X strategy. On the other hand, qh0 < qh and RA , thus, can gain more by directly
attacking a CV M (e.g., the strategy profile (N, X)) according to Lemma 5.1. However,
0 < qh0 < qh < qh1 < 1 and n/m < (qN `C /qC `N ). Therefore, according to Theorem 5.9,
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RV switch back again to the S allocation policy, and the players continue like this as the
game admits a mixed NE strategy profile.
When (0.3070 < qC < 0.5660), the LB inequality (e.g., Equation 5.134) holds, and
according to Theorem 5.8, the game admits the strategy profile (C, X) as a pure NE strategy profile since no player can unilaterally improve his/her payoffs by changing to another
profile.
On the other hand, when qC is relatively very large,(0.5660 < qC ) and almost equal
to qN , the IC risks the CV M imposes on the NV Ms become larger than the cost savings achieved from choosing the X allocation strategy (e.g., the profile (C, X)), and RV
switches to the S strategy (e.g., the strategy profile (CV M, S)) i.e., the LB inequality does
not hold anymore. Moreover, G(C, S) = 4.8 < G(N, S) = 11.32, and according to Theorem 5.11, the game admits the profile (C, S) as a pure NE strategy profile.

The provider’s payoff performance with the change in qN
We varied qN from qC to 1 and measured RV ’s payoff accordingly, as shown in Fig.
5.5(b). We notice that when qN is very small (e.g., qN < 0.1960), RA prefers to attack a
CV M under either allocation policy, i.e., Theorem 5.1. Furthermore, since the LB holds
(e.g., Equation 5.134), the game admits the strategy profile (C, X) as a pure NE strategy
profile, i.e., Theorem 5.9.
When (0.1960 < qN < 0.2510), we get qh0 = 0.2982 < qh < qh1 = 0.5204 and n/m
< (qN `C /qC `N )), therefore, the CSR inequality holds (e.g., Equation 5.136,) and according to Theorem 5.9, the game admits a mixed NE strategy profile. As qN increases (e.g.,
qN > 0.2510), RA prefers to directly attack an NV M under both strategies, i.e., Theorem
5.4. However, qh > qh1 = 0.2968 and n/m < (qN `C /qC `N ) = 251, and because the UB
inequality holds, the game admits the strategy profile (C, S) as a pure NE strategy profile,
i.e., Theorem 5.9.
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(a) The provider’s payoff performance with the change in qC

(b) The provider’s payoff performance with the change in qN

(c) The provider’s payoff performance with the change in qh
Figure 5.5: The provider’s payoff performance
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The provider’s performance with the change in qh
We varied qh from 0.001 to 1 and measured RV ’s payoff accordingly, as shown in Fig.
5.5(c). When 0 < qh < 0.0710, the IC risks that the NV Ms impose on the CV M are minimized. Therefore, RA always launches an IC attack on the CV M under either allocation
policies, i.e., Theorem 5.4. On the other hand, the UB inequality does not hold, (e.g.,
Equation 5.138), as qh is very small, and RV consequently can minimize his/her energy
costs and operating expense by choosing the X allocation strategy, and the game admits
the strategy profile (C, X) as a pure NE strategy profile, i.e., Theorem 5.10.
As qh increases, 0.0710 < qh < 1, the IC risks imposed on the CV M also increase, and
the UB inequality holds. On the other hand, RA ’s payoff from attacking the CV M under
the S allocation strategy (e.g., qC `C = 2) is smaller than his/her payoff from attacking an
NV M at the S strateg, i.e., (qN `N + 2qh qN `N ) = 3.4260, thus and according to Theorem
(5.10), the game admits the strategy profile (C, S) as a pure NE strategy profile.

5.8

Summary

In this chapter, we analyze the VM-to-VM Interdependent Cybersecurity IC risks imposed on VMs of different criticality when they coexist together on the same hypervisor.
We also investigate how to optimize the efficiency of resource usage and energy costs
while minimizing the provider’s W PC loss. Specifically, we study how to securely and
efficiently allocate critical and Non-critical VM types (e.g., CV Ms and NV Ms) onto a
cloud cluster so that the provider’s W PC loss is minimized. We formulate the allocation problem using non-cooperative zero-sum and non-zero-sum game models, between a
cloud service provider and an attacker, under relaxed and constrained resource usage and
power consumption. Our analysis completely characterizes the existence of all the static
and dynamic Equilibrium strategies.
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Next, we extend our cybersecurity models, presented in this chapter, to include VMs
with any levels of cybersecurity and resource requirements.
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CHAPTER 6
GAME THEORETIC-BASED APPROACHES FOR CYBERSECURITYAWARE VIRTUAL MACHINE PLACEMENT IN CLOUD CLUSTERS
Allocating several Virtual Machines (VMs) onto a single server helps to increase cloud
resource utilization and to reduce its operating expense. However, multiplexing VMs
with different security levels onto a single server gives rise to significant VM-to-VM cybersecurity interdependent risks. In this chapter, we address the problem of the static VM
allocation with cybersecurity loss awareness by modeling it as a two-player zero-sum
game between an attacker and a cloud provider. We first obtain the optimal solutions by
employing the mathematical programming approach. We then seek to find the optimal
solutions by quickly identifying the equilibrium allocation strategies in our formulated
zero-sum game. We mean by –equilibrium– that none of the provider nor the attacker has
any incentive to deviate from one’s chosen strategy. Specifically, we study the characteristics of the game model, based on which, to develop effective and efficient allocation
algorithms. Simulation results show that our proposed cybersecurity-aware consolidation algorithms can significantly outperform the commonly used multi-dimensional bin
packing approaches for large-scale cloud data centers.

6.1

Introduction to the research problem

Private data center managers should always configure servers to operate at high utilization rates. However, unwise workload allocation practices in private data centers result
in low server utilization (e.g., 12% to 18%) and high power consumption per customer
compared to (65%) cloud’s server utilization and (84%) power consumption per cloud’s
consumer, as reported by the Data Center Efficiency Assessment from the Natural Resources Defense Council in 2014. Traditional data centers are duplicative, costly and
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complex [40] causing the annual electricity cost to increase by 2.5% each year over the
last 20 years [41]. The scalable and elastic public cloud infrastructure maximizes resource
usage and server utilization by adopting efficient workload multiplexing policies, such as
VM consolidation. Therefore, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
issued guidance to reduce the number of federal, private data centers starting in 2010 as
reported in [39]. The goal is to shift most of the critical and non-critical IT workload to
public cloud data centers to save energy and operating costs.
The commonly shared infrastructure of public clouds among VMs and users, unfortunately, exposes cloud workload to several cybersecurity risks, such as side-channel attacks [51–53] and VM-to-VM Interdependent Cybersecurity (IC) risks. Packing several
VMs on a single server minimizes the total number of allocated servers, which in turn
minimizes power consumption and operating expense. For example, cloud clients require
(77%) fewer servers than what they need on-premises [31], assuming (15%) on-premises
utilization. However, when the consolidated VMs are of different security levels, the less
secure VMs impose security risks on the more secure VMs. An attacker can compromise
the hypervisor after a successful attack on one of its vulnerable VMs, and consequently,
he/she could compromise all other coexisted secure VMs.
We intend to investigate the static allocation problem of VMs with different cybersecurity and resource requirements in cloud clusters. The dynamic VM allocation is flexible,
adaptive and potentially more effective in a highly dynamic environment. On the other
hand, static VM allocation has many unique advantages (e.g., low overhead, reliable predictability, performance guarantee) and thus the study of static VM allocation not only
has solid theoretical values but is also useful and applicable in many practical scenarios.
For instance, static allocation is ideal for batch workload allocation during each epoch,
as they are usually well documented and characterized by predictable performance and
intensive computation time.
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We use the Game theory to formulate the static VM allocation problem into a noncooperative two-player game [135]. Game theory is an appealing approach that offers mathematical models of conflict between non-cooperative intelligent and rational
decision-makers, such as cloud providers and cyber attackers [135]. The game-based allocation model can help recognize the provider’s static VM allocation strategies which
optimally minimize his/her worst potential cybersecurity loss when an attacker can successfully compromise any VM in the cluster. We show later that the static VM allocation
strategy is optimal if a cloud provider and an attacker reach an Equilibrium state [183].
We mean by –Equilibrium– that none of the provider nor the attacker has any incentive to
deviate from one’s chosen strategy.
We have made the following contributions in this chapter:
(1) A constrained-allocation problem is a typical NP-hard problem, and thus we formulate the security-constrained and resource-constrained VM allocation problems using
the Mathematical Programming (MP) approach to obtain the optimal solutions, which
will be used as a comparison baseline against other proposed methods in this chapter
when the problem size is small;
(2) We formally formulate the resource and cybersecurity constrained VM allocation
problems as non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game models. We conduct a thorough
analysis of the characteristics of the pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) in our game model,
which is formulated as a series of lemmas and theorems;
(3) Based on our analysis insights, we have developed several effective and computationally efficient algorithms to allocate VMs, of different resource and security requirements, with resource usage and cybersecurity loss optimized;
(4) We have implemented our algorithms and studied their effectiveness and efficiency. Our extensive simulation results show that our novel approaches are good tradeoffs when compared with the computational-intensive approaches, such as MP based-
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approaches and existing NE search methods, or with the computational-efficient multidimensional bin-packing methods.

6.2

Related work

As cloud online services entered in each sector of our personal and professional lives,
maximizing resource usage and minimizing power consumption in cloud data centers using efficient allocation policies have become a necessity. Many allocation approaches,
based either on traditional optimization methods (e.g., MP [126], evolutionary programming method [127], fuzzy control [128]) or on a variety of different heuristics (e.g.,
[129]), have been proposed for applications and VMs with different characteristics, requirements, and optimization goals in cloud platforms.
In this section, we review the research about VM allocation in cloud platforms. We
can classify those related works on cloud computing into four significant categories directly related to our research focus in this dissertation, i.e., Vector Bin Packing (VBP)
based cloud resource allocation, game theory-based cloud resource management, cloud
cybersecurity measures using the Game theory, and security-aware cloud resource allocation approaches.
The VM allocation problem is a well-known NP-hard problem, as we show later on,
and hence heuristics, such as Vector Bin Packing (VBP), have been adopted heavily to
solve similar problems with multiple optimization goals [130]. In a VBP heuristic, there
is a weight function applied to the items so that each item is assigned a single scalar,
based on which, the standard bin packing can be used to sort those items. Wood et
al. [92] introduced a multi-dimensional First Fit Decreasing (FFD) approach to lively
migrate VMs out of overloaded servers. Their approach considers multiple CPU, memory, and network resource demands of each VM. Panigrahy et al. [131] proposed sev-
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eral VBP-based methods for VM allocation with different resource demands and optimization goals. Beloglazov et al. [126] suggested several VM migration algorithms to
improve CPU utilization and demonstrated that increasing the lower-utilization threshold
increases the Service Level Agreement (SLA) violations while reduces the server’s energy
consumption. In [128], the authors used combinatorial and multi-objective optimizations
to optimize resource usage in a two-level control system that allocates workloads from
virtual to physical resources. Using a local and a global fuzzy controller, they tried to
minimize power consumption, thermal dissipation, and a peak temperature of the system.
In [132], the authors introduced an application placement controller that consolidates applications according to the ratio of their CPU to memory demands. Microsoft’s Virtual
Machine Manager used in Azure applies the Dot-Product and Norm-based Greedy heuristics [133]. The authors in [133] proposed new geometric heuristics that run nearly as fast
as FFD. We are, however, not aware of any prior work that employs VBP to deal with
security requirements during a VM allocation process.
Several works employed the Game theory to model the resource optimization problem
in cloud platforms [127, 129, 138]. Wei et al. [127] adopted the Game theory to solve a
QoS constrained resource allocation problem across a cloud-based network. Kunsemoller
et al. [129] elaborated on cloud economics benefits for businesses using a game-based
cloud model of an IaaS economy including the dynamics of pricing and usage. Pillai
et al. [139] proposed a VM allocation policy onto cloud platforms, based on the principles of coalition formation and the uncertainty principle of the Game theory. They
illustrated that the coalition-formation of the VMs leads to higher resource utilization and
higher request satisfaction. Teng et al. [140] suggested a new Bayesian pure NE-based
resource management policy assumes heterogeneous and distributed resources, cognitive
behaviors of cloud consumers, non-perfect information, and dynamic successive allocation. They proved that the resource price would converge to the optimal rate at the end
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of the gambling sequence. Jalaparti et al. [138] similarly employed the Game theory
to optimize resource efficiency, and pricing policies by modeling the client-provider and
client-client interactions, respectively. They introduced multiple heuristic algorithms with
near-optimal allocation and pricing policies compared to the fixed-pricing strategies used
today by cloud providers, such as in Amazon EC2. However, all the above ignored the
cybersecurity effects of their allocation methods.
As more and more enterprises, companies, and private users move their computing
facility to public cloud data centers, there have been increasing interests and concerns
in the security problem in the cloud (e.g., [90, 141]). Several works focused only on
studying the types of cybersecurity attacks result from the commonly shared infrastructure
of public clouds among several applications and users.
Side-channel attacks are one of the most popular types of cybersecurity attacks on
cloud infrastructure. Several countermeasures were proposed in the literature to mitigate
or prevent side-channel attacks [51–53]. The proposed methods include modifying or
tuning up the infrastructure to prevent hackers from extracting information about private
keys (e.g., secret key extraction attack, [51]), preventing attackers from verifying coresidence with the victim’s VM [52], or introducing a new infrastructure design (e.g.,
mitigate the threat of timing channels by eliminating high-resolution clocks [142], or
adding latency to potentially malicious operations [52, 142]).
Kamhoua et al. [33] used a non-zero-sum game framework to model the VM-to-VM
interdependent cybersecurity risks between an attacker and two users in the cloud. They
showed that the existence of NE strategy profiles depends on the probability that the hypervisor is compromised given a successful attack on one of the users and the total cost
of the user’s security investments. They also irrationally concluded that there is no NE
strategy profile in which all the users in the public cloud fully invest in cybersecurity measures. Et al. Kwiat [55] applied the same cybersecurity model introduced by Kamhoua
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to a different allocation problem. They considered a game between an attacker and three
users. The first user never invests in security and is always allocated to the first insecure
hypervisor. The second user invests in security countermeasures and his VM is always
assigned to the second secure hypervisor.Unlike [33, 55], wherein the defenders’ strategy
is to invest or not invest, we assume that all VMs have different resource requirements
and cybersecurity counter-measurements. The provider’s strategy is to choose the allocation policy that minimizes his/her loss under a worst-case cybersecurity attack on a cloud
cluster with a limited set of resources.
Secure-aware resource allocation methods were introduced in [90, 141, 143]. Rao et
al. [143] used the Game theory to search the ability of a cloud computing provider to
guarantee a given capacity C with a particular probability P given a physical or cybersecurity attack on his/her data center. They proposed the use of reinforcement strategies to
decrease the attacker’s utility. While many works focused on VM migration to maximize
resource utilization and minimize power consumption, et al. Zhang [90] is the first to
develop a formal and quantified migration strategy of clouds to improve security against
collocation attack and with accepted costs.
On the other hand, [141] used the Game theory to model the collocation attack between attackers and a provider. The attackers try to collocate their VMs with target VMs
on the same physical server and exploit side-channel attacks to extract private information from the victims’ VMs. The provider aims to minimize the attackers’ possibility
of co-locating their VMs with the target VMs while maintaining a satisfactory workload
balance and low power consumption for the system. Specifically, the provider strategies
are to choose among a pool of allocation strategies.
In this chapter, we are more interested in studying the problem on how to optimize
the provider’s potential security loss or the provider’s resource usage when allocating
several VMs with different resource usage requirements and security vulnerabilities on a
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resource-constrained or security-constrained cloud cluster, respectively. In what follows,
we first introduce our game model and formally define our problem. We then present our
VM allocation approach in more detail.

6.3

Cloud system model

In this section, We formulate our cybersecurity-aware VM consolidation problems as noncooperative zero-sum game models between an attacker and a provider [135]. A zero-sum
game model is a game in which the players share no common interests [135]. We assume
a game with perfect information. That is both players are rational, have full knowledge
about the strategies of each other, and have the means to optimize their payoffs.
According to Nash [183], there is at least one best way, i.e., that corresponds to an NE
strategy profile, by which both players simultaneously choose the best strategy for any
limited number of strategies. The best policy for the provider, nonetheless, does not allow
the provider to win but allows him/her to minimize his/her potential loss. However, there
may not exist a pure NE strategy profile, and it is not always possible for players to find
it in a polynomial time due to the large sizes of the pure strategy profiles of the provider
and attacker.
A public cloud data center usually consists of hundreds or thousands of clusters, and
we are interested in the static VM allocation policy for each cluster. We assume that a
cloud cluster has n hypervisors that are hosted on the n physical servers Sr = {Si ; i =
1, 2, ..., n}. Each server has a maximum processing rate capacity Ci = C in Million Instructions Per Second (MIPS), a processing rate utilization Ui , power consumption Pi ,
and operating expense Ei (e.g., server costs, security investment, maintenance, etc.).
The cluster hosts m VMs (e.g., M = {V j ; j = 1, 2, ..., m}). A VM (e.g., V j ) is characterized by three parameters, i.e. (V j = {c j , q j , ` j }); where (c j ≤ C) is the processing rate
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Figure 6.1: A cloud cluster. The cluster has n hypervisors that are hosted on the n physical
servers Sr = {Si ; i = 1, 2, ..., n}. Each server has a maximum processing rate capacity Ci = C
in Million Instructions Per Second (MIPS), a processing rate utilization Ui , power consumption
Pi , and operating expense Ei (e.g., server costs, security investment, maintenance, etc.). The
cluster hosts m VMs (e.g., M = {V j ; j = 1, 2, ..., m}). A VM (e.g., V j ) is characterized by three
parameters, i.e. (V j = {c j , q j , ` j }); where (c j ≤ C) is the processing rate required by V j ; q j is
the probability that V j could be directly attacked and compromised; ` j is the provider’s maximum
security loss if V j is compromised.
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required by V j ; q j is the probability that V j could be directly attacked and compromised;
` j is the provider’s maximum security loss if V j is compromised (e.g., Fig. 6.1) .
We further assume that (` j ≥ `k ) if (q j ≤ qk ) implying that the VM with the higher
criticality level (e.g., V j ) has a smaller probability to be compromised. Moreover, we
accept the fact that an attacker is capable of indirectly compromising a hypervisor, via
one of its compromised VM (e.g., V Mm in Fig 6.1). Once an attacker has full control over
the hypervisor, he/she can easily compromise all its VMs (e.g., Vi ; i = {1, 2, ...m − 1} in
Fig 6.1).
We denote the probability of a successful attack on a hypervisor after one of its VMs
has been compromised as qh . Furthermore, we assume that the possibility that an attacker
successfully and directly attacks multiple VMs or a hypervisor is close to zero, and can
thus be ignored.
Commonly sharing the infrastructure of a cloud data center, among applications, VMs,
and users results in several cybersecurity risks, such as IC risks. For instance, an attacker
can compromise the hypervisor after a successful attack on one of its vulnerable VMs. An
attacker consequently can compromise all other coexisting secure VMs on that hypervisor.
In this chapter, we are interested in identifying the VM static allocation strategy that can
minimize the provider’s Worst-case Potential Cybersecurity (WPC) loss, resulted from
IC risks among coexisting VMs on a single server. The provider’s potential loss under
the zth allocation strategy is the cybersecurity loss that the provider suffers if an attacker
successfully and indirectly attacks a hypervisor, via one of its hosted VM that has been
directly compromised earlier by the attacker, and thereafter compromises all other hosted
VMs onto that hypervisor. If the attacker directly compromises the VM that maximizes
his/her gain, after indirectly compromising its hypervisor and all its other hosted VMs,
the provider’s potential loss is then called the (WPC) loss under the zth allocation strategy.
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We can formally formulate the provider’s WPC loss by first modeling the cybersecurityaware VM allocation problem as a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game defined by
the 3-tuple (decision-makers, strategy profiles, payoffs) [135].
The decision-makers are a cloud service provider, RV , and an attacker, RA , who share
no shared goals, i.e., a non-cooperative game model. RA tries to maximize his/her gain by
directly attacking one of the m VMs and potentially all other collocated VMs on the same
server by attacking the underlying hypervisor [52,179]. RV defends by trying to minimize
his/her security loss by choosing an allocation strategy that reduces the attacker’s gain.
RA has the pure strategy spaces M from which RA can choose to attack any VM
(e.g., V j ) as a strategy to maximize his/her profit. On the other hand, RV wishes to
allocate all VMs onto the available servers to minimize his/her W PC loss. Let Γ =
{Az ; z = 1, 2, ..., ζ} be RV ’s set of all possible allocations of m VMs to n servers. Specifically, Γ is a (1 × ζ) vector where each element, Az , is an (n × m allocation matrix; i.e.,
{Az = {azij ; i = 1, 2, ..., n; j = 1, 2, ..., m}; where:



1; i f V j is allocated to Si under Az
z
ai j =


0; otherwise

(6.1)

Thus, Γ represents RV ’s pure strategy space. In this chapter, we focus on static VM
allocation strategies, therefore we assume that RV and RA can only choose one allocation
strategy from their strategy spaces.
Choosing different strategies leads to different payoffs for RV and RA . Assume that
RV chooses the strategy Az in which V j is allocated to Si (e.g., (azij = 1) ), and assume
that RA chooses to attack V j directly. We denote the corresponding RV ’s potential cybersecurity loss or RA ’s potential cybersecurity gain by (l(V j , Az ) = l jz ) or (g(V j , Az ) = g jz ),
respectively; where (l jz = −g jz ) as this is a zero-sum game. Then we have:
z
g jz = azij (Σm
k=1 (aik qh q j `k ) + q j (` j − qh ` j ))
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(6.2)

where m is the total number of VMs; azij = 1. We can consequently model RV ’s and RA ’s
potential cybersecurity potential losses and gains as (m × ζ) payoff matrices L and G, in
which each column represents a single RV ’s allocation strategy (e.g., Az ) and each row
represents a single RA ’s attack strategy (e.g., V j ). That is:
L = {l jz : j = {1, 2, ..., m}; z = {1, 2, ..., ζ}}; L = −G

(6.3)

Specifically, we denote L∗ z as the W PC loss when RV chooses strategy Az ; where:
Lz∗ = −G∗z = −

max

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}

g jz

(6.4)

Our zero-sum allocation game thereupon is defined by the 3-tuple ({RA , RV }, {M, Γ}, {G, L}).
Let Eop be a (1 × ζ) vector representing RV ’s total operating expense under the allocation strategies Az ; z = 1, 2, ..., ζ. Operating expense includes the cost of renting or
purchasing servers, security investment, hardware/software upgrades, maintenance, etc.
For example, the operating expense of a cloud cluster under allocation AZ is given by
Equation 6.5.
Eopz = Σni=1 ezi εi

(6.5)

where εi is the operating expense of the non-idle server Si under allocation Az . That is:



1; i f Σmj=1 azij ≥ 1
z
ei =
(6.6)


0; otherwise
Let Eeng be a (1 × ζ) vector represents the cluster’s total energy cost under the allocation strategies Az ; z = 1, 2, ..., ζ when the cluster consumes a total, static and dynamic,
power Pz . Equation 6.7 models the total power WATT consumed by a cloud cluster under
allocation AZ .
Pz = Σni=1 (ezi DPi (Σmj=1 ((azij c j )/C)) + ezi SPi )
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(6.7)

Figure 6.2: Illustration of the different ways of consolidating three VMs onto a three-server cloud
cluster

where DPi is the maximum dynamic power consumed by the server Si when it is fully
utilized; c j is the processing rate requirements of V j measured by MIPS; C is the maximum processing rate capacity of server Si measured by MIPS. SPi is the total static power
consumed by server Si .
Therefore, the (1 × ζ) vector TC represents the Total energy Cost and operating expense (TC) of RV under an allocation strategy Az . That is:
TCz = Eopz + Eengz

(6.8)

On the other hand, RV ’s Overall W PC Loss and total energy Costs and operating
expense (OLC) under an allocation strategy Az is represented by the (1 × ζ) vector OLC.
RV ’s overall loss and costs under an allocation Az is then modeled using Equation 6.9.
OLCz = TCz + Lz∗

(6.9)

Fig. 6.2 shows that when a three-server cloud cluster hosts three VMs (e.g., {V1 ,V2 ,
V3 }), RV has five possible static VM consolidation strategies to allocate those VMs to the
three servers {S1 , S2 , S3 }. In the first allocation strategy, RV allocates one VM per server.
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Figure 6.3: The size of the provider’s pure strategy support vector with the increase of the numbers
of VMs and servers

In the second, third, and forth allocation strategies, RV consolidates two VMs on a single
server and allocates the third VM to a second server. In the fifth allocation strategy, RV
multiplexes all three VMS on a single server S1 .
The first strategy allocates one VM per server which eliminates any IC risks, but it
worsens the server’s utilization and operating expense as it involves three servers rather
than one server as opposed to the fifth strategy. Fig. 6.3 enumerates the different ways of
allocating m ≤ 20 different VMs to n ≤ 20 different servers.
Whereas the size of RA ’s pure strategy space is bounded by the total number of VMs
(e.g., m), the size of RV ’s strategy space, i.e. the number of columns in the payoff matrices
L and G, is a function rapidly increasing with the increase of the numbers of VMs and
available servers. To this end, Fig. 6.3 shows how the total number of different ways of
allocating m VMs to n servers exponentially increases with the increases of n and m.
Assuming all allocation strategies are feasible, the total number of RV ’s possible allocation strategies can be formulated as:
ζ = Σni=1 ST N(m, i)
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(6.10)

where ST N(m, i) is the Stirling numbers of 2nd kind representing the total number of
different ways to allocate m distinguishable VMs to exactly (i ≤ n) non-idle servers [184].
That is:
 
1 i
i0 i0
ST N(m, i) = ( )Σi0 =0 (−1)
(i − i0 )m
i
i!

(6.11)

Consequently, to enumerate all possible ways of allocating the m VMs to n servers, we
can rewrite Equation 6.11 as the recurrence equality given in Equation 6.12 [184]
ST N(m, i) = ST N(m − 1, i − 1) + i × ST N(m − 1, i)

(6.12)

For example, ST N(1, 1) = 1 because there is just one way to allocate a single VM to
a single server. We suppose that we know the number of ways to allocate (m − 1) VMs
to (i ≤ n) identical servers and that we know the number of ways to allocate (m − 1)
VMs onto (i − 1) identical servers. To this end, if we want to allocate one more VM and
use i servers. We can either start with any of the ST N(m − 1, i − 1) combinations and
allocate the mth VMs to a new empty server, or we can start with any of the ST N(m − 1, i)
combinations and allocate the mth VM to a non-empty server. In other words, for each of
the ST N(m − 1, i − 1) combinations, there is just one way to add the new VM to a new
server. However, for each of the ST N(m − 1, i) combinations, there are i ways to allocate
the new VM to a non-empty server. Thus the number of different ways to allocate m VMs
to n servers (e.g., ST N(m, i)) is the sum of ST N(m − 1, i − 1) and i × ST N(m − 1, i).
Fig. 6.4 shows the number of ways of allocating m = {1, 2, ..., 16} labeled VMs to
{n = 1, 2, ..., or16} identical empty or non-empty servers. It is clear that as the number
of VMs increases, the total number of RV ’s possible allocation strategies exponentially
increases. For instance, when the number of VMs is (m = 16), there are more than (10)
billion possible allocation strategies when using n = 16 servers (e.g., Fig. 6.4).
Based on our system models, we can formulate our research problems as follows.
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Figure 6.4: Enumerating the different ways of allocating m = {1, 2, ..., or16} different VMs to
n = {1, 2, ..., or 16} servers

Problem 6.1. Given the virtualized cloud cluster with n servers and m VMs that is defined
above, determine the static feasible allocation policy so that RV ’s W PC loss (e.g., L∗ ) is
minimized;
Problem 6.2. Given the virtualized cloud cluster with n servers and m VMs that is defined
above, and given RV ’s W PC loss threshold (e.g., T hrsh), determine the static feasible
allocation policy so that RV ’s overall loss and total energy cost and operating expense
(e.g., OLC) is optimized while RV ’s W PC loss is guaranteed to be less than the given
threshold, i.e. L∗ ≤ T hrsh.
In what follows, we first identify the optimal solutions for our VM allocation problems using the MP approach for comparison purposes, when RV ’s pure strategy space is
small. Second, we present our approaches by taking advantage of the game-theoretical
techniques to solve problems with much larger sizes as in practical scenarios.
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Figure 6.5: The MPL algorithm

6.4

The mathematical programming formulation of the VM allocation problems

Fig. 6.5 describes the Mathematical Program for Loss minimization (MPL) to solve Problem 1 in which the decision variables are defined as follows:



1; i f V j is allocated to Si
di j =


0; otherwise

(6.13)

For example, the first allocation strategy in Fig. 6.2 is represented by the decision
matrix:



1 0 0


0 1 0




0 0 1

in which V1 , V2 , and V3 are allocated to S1 , S2 , and S3 , respectively.
MPL minimizes RV ’s worst potential security loss by finding the allocation strategy
that minimizes RA ’s best potential gain G∗ (e.g., Equation 6.4). The attacker’s best gain
is larger than or equal to the gain of attacking any V j (e.g., Fig. 6.5, Line (1)) when it
is allocated to any server Si (e.g., Fig. 6.5, Line (2)). The potential security gain of RA
when attacking V j on Si is gi j (Line (3)). Further, a V j can be allocated to no more than
a single server (e.g., Fig. 6.5, Line (4)), and the total processing rate requirements of all
VMs allocated to a server Si cannot exceed the server’s capacity (Fig. 6.5, Line (5)).
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According to the MPL program, the optimal solution to Problem 6.1 which minimizes
RV ’s worst potential security loss given a worst case cybersecurity attack is the first allocation strategy in Fig. 6.2:


1 0 0



Asv (1) = 
0 1 0


0 0 1
For example, let the virtual machines V1 ,V2 ,V3 , illustrated in Fig. 6.2, have a securitylevel’s vector {0.4, 0.4, 0.9}, a loss-value’s vector {−99.63, −66.198, −36.685} × $103 ,
and resource-requirement’s vector {1, 4, 3} × 103 MIPS, respectively. If RV has three
servers S1 , S2 , S3 each of which with the capacity C = 8 × $103 MIPS, he/she can allocate
the VMs using the five allocation strategies given in Fig. 6.2. To this end, in order to understand the solution of the mathematical program illustrated above, let’s construct RV ’s
loss payoff matrix L that represents RV ’s potential cybersecurity loss given a successful
attack on Vi under the allocation strategy Az .


V /A
A1
A2
A3
A5
A4
 j i



 V1

39.852
39.852
44.254
47.795
52.198


L=
 × $ − 103


26.479 30.881 26.479 38.434 42.837
 V2


V3
33.016 50.890 59.916 33.016 77.790
RV ’s worst losses under each allocation Az are then:


A1
A2
A3
A5
A4 
V j /Ai


 V1

39.8520


47.7958



Lz∗ = 
 × $ − 103
 V




 
 2



V3

50.8900 59.9166

77.7901
Consequently, the optimal W PC is equal to L1∗ = −39.8520. In other words, the best
option for RV is to choose the first allocation policy in which he/she would optimally
minimize his/her W PC loss.
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Figure 6.6: The MPR algorithm

Similarly, Fig. 6.6 describes the Mathematical Program for Resource usage maximization (MPR) to solve Problem 2. MPR minimizes RV ’s total energy costs and operating expense (e.g., Fig. 6.6, lines (1 and 2)), while keeping RV ’s W PC less than a given
loss threshold (e.g., Fig. 6.6, lines (2-7)).
Using the same previous example with the three VMs, we see that the average resource
utilization under all different five possible allocation policies illustrated in Fig. 6.2 are:
U = { 31 , 32 , 32 , 23 , 1}. Moreover, if we set the cybersecurity loss threshold to T hrsh = 80 ×
103 , the optimal solution of Problem 2 is the fifth allocation strategy in Fig. 6.2 with an
average resource utilization that is equal to 1.
Although both MPL and MPR solve Problem 1 and Problem 2, both mathematical
programs have their limitations. The computation times of both algorithms are exponential in the increasing number of VMs. For example, in Section 6.8.2, we show that the
average computation time of both MPL and MPR using 25 servers and 50 VMs increases
by roughly 8000 times when increasing the number of servers and VMs to 250 servers
and 500 VMs. Therefore, in the next section, we explore more computationally efficient
methods to solve our allocation problems because such MP methods are not applicable in
today’s cloud data centers in which a single rack can have up to 1000 VMs [185].
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6.5

Finding the optimal VM allocation strategy using Nash Equilibrium (NE) general search algorithms

In this chapter, we explain how to use NE general search methods to solve our allocation
problems, after discussing several limitations of those methods.
Researchers use the Game theory to study and understand the interaction among economic, social, or military entities. We use Game theory in this chapter to analyze and
understand the interaction between RV and RA . The goal is to find a stable pair of static
strategies, i.e., NE [183], at which neither RV nor RA has any incentive to deviate from
their decisions. In other words, at the NE strategy profile, neither RV nor RA can further
minimize or maximize his/her potential cybersecurity loss or gain, respectively.
Theorem 6.1 shows that RA ’s allocation strategy that corresponds to a pure NE strategy profile is an optimal solution for Problem 1.
Theorem 6.1. If the strategy profile (V ∗ , A∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile, RV ’s static VM
allocation strategy A∗ is optimal to minimize his/her W PC loss.
Proof. According to the Minimax method [180, 186] in a two-player zero-sum game, the
strategy profile (V j∗ , Az∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile if:
max(min(GT )) = min(max(G)) = G∗

(6.14)

where G is RA ’s (m × ζ) payoff matrix.
RA ’s maximin gain (e.g., max(min(GT ))) is the highest potential security gain that
he/she can be sure to get without knowing the VM allocation strategy chosen by RV . On
the other hand, RV ’s minimax loss (e.g.,min(max(G))) is the smallest potential cybersecurity loss that RV can be sure to get without knowing the targeted VM by RA . In a
zero-sum game, if the maximin and minimax payoffs are equal in the absolute value (e.g.,
Equation 6.14), the strategy profile solution of the maximin and minimax is the same as
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the pure NE strategy profile of the game. Moreover, according to [187], a necessary and
sufficient condition for a saddle point, i.e., an NE strategy profile, to exist is the presence
of a payoff matrix element which is both a minimum of its rows and a maximum of its
columns, i.e., G∗ . Therefore, the NE strategy profile is the optimal solution for both RV
and RA given that each of them knows the other opponent well.
Theorem 6.1 implies that we can transform Problem 1, into a pure NE strategy profile
search problem, and thus existing NE searching algorithms can be readily applied to our
game model. However, we have two major problems when using those algorithms.
First, there may be no pure NE strategy profile in existence at all. For instance, let the
(m = 3 × ζ = 2) payoff matrix of RA be defined as follows:


V /A
A1
A2
 j i



 V1

0.375
0.530


G=



0.250 0.625
 V2


V3
0.156 0.756
According to the Minimax method [180,186], RA seeks maximizing his/her minimum
gain. The minimum potential gain of attacking any VM under all allocation policies is
the minimum of each row in the payoff matrix G. That is:


V /A
A1 A2
 j i



 V1

0.375



G=

 V
0.250  
 2



V3
0.156 
Consequently, to maximize his/her minimum potential gain, RA should attack the first
VM and gain G11 = min{0.375, 0.250, 0.156} = 0.3750.
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Similarly, RV wishes to minimize his/her maximum potential loss at each allocation
strategy or column of the payoff matrix G. That is:


V /A
A1
A2
 j i



 V1
0.375
 


G=



V


 2



V3

0.756
As a result, RV should choose the first allocation strategy such that his/her W PC loss
is minimized, i.e. G = min {0.3750, 0.7560} = 0.3750. Therefore, the strategy profile
(V1 , A1 ) is an NE strategy profile because none of RV nor RA can improve one’s payoff by
making a unitarily changing toward another strategy. Therefore, RV ’s optimal allocation
strategy in terms of minimizing the W PC loss is A1 .
Now consider this example in which there is no pure NE strategy profile. Fig. 6.2
is an illustration of the different ways of allocating (V1 = {c1 = 30 MIPS, q1 = 0.2,
`1 = 87.295}), (V2 = {c2 = 20 MIPS, q2 = 0.4, `2 = 76.803}), and (V3 = {c3 = 30 MIPS,
q3 = 0.6, `3 = 50.06}) onto a three-server cloud cluster with capacity C = 800 MIPS. We
can see that RV has five possible static VM allocation strategies. RA ’s gain under those
allocation strategies are given in the payoff matrix G as follows:


V j /Az
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5




 V1
17.4590 17.4590 20.4626 22.0672 25.0708


G=

 V

30.7212
36.7284
30.7212
41.1966
47.2038
 2



V3
30.0360 43.8605 45.7491 30.0360 59.5736
If the number of servers is reduced to n = 2 and the capacity of each server is reduced
to C = 5 × 103 MIPS, the allocation strategies {A j ; j = 1, 3, 5}) are not feasible anymore.
The only feasible allocations now are A2 and A4 in which either V1 or V3 is hosted alone.
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RA ’s (m = 3 × ζ = 2) payoff matrix G is then defined as follows:


A2
A3
A4
A5 
V j /Az A1


 V1


17.4590

22.0672



G=

 V
 36.7284  41.1966  
 2



V3
 43.8605  30.0360 
If RV chooses the allocation strategy A4 , RA will directly attack V2 because it maximizes his/her gain (e.g., G∗4 = g24 = 41.1966). Note that V2 imposes security risks (e.g.,
qh × q2 × `1 ) on V1 . However, RV can minimize his/her W PC loss from L4∗ = −41.1966
to l22 = −36.7284 by switching to the strategy A2 . RA now can improve his/her gain
by attacking V3 , i.e. G∗2 = g32 = 43.8605. To this end, RV can minimize his/her loss
from L3∗ = l32 = −43.8605 to l34 = −30.0360 by switching to the strategy A4 . This attack/defend scenario goes on. As we can see, RV and RA constantly change their strategies
and cannot reach stable decisions, i.e. they cannot reach the pure NE strategy profile.
Therefore, before we apply existing NE search algorithms, we need to study if a pure
NE strategy profile exists at all for a given problem setting. Later on in this chapter, we
will introduce several lemmas and theorems that characterize the existence of a pure NE
strategy profile .
Second, even though the commonly used NE search algorithms, such as the Minimax
method [180,186], take polynomial time concerning the size of strategy spaces of players,
RV ’s strategy space increases rapidly with the numbers of VMs and servers (e.g., see Fig.
6.4). which increases the time and space complexities of NE algorithms. It is, thus, necessary to study the characteristics of the game model and develop more computationally
efficient algorithms to solve this problem.
In the next section, we implement two common NE search algorithms, for comparison
reasons, using the MP approach to find the NE strategy profiles at which RV ’s W PC loss
is minimized.
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6.5.1

Obtaining the optimal VM allocation solution using the Minimax method

We first use the MP approach to implementing the Minimax method [180,186] to find the
pure NE strategy profile of our VM allocation game model. The Minimax method was
introduced by John Von Neumann [135]. The name of this method refers to the way it
searches for the NE strategy profiles of a game.
The maximin payoff value of RA is the highest potential cybersecurity gain that he/she
can be sure to get without knowing the allocation strategy of RV . On the other hand, the
minimax payoff value of RV is the smallest potential cybersecurity loss that RV can be
sure to get without knowing the targeted VM by RA . In a zero-sum game, if the maximin
and minimax payoffs are equal, the strategy profile solution of the maximin and minimax
is the same as the NE strategy profile of the game model. The NE strategy profile is the
optimal solution for both RV and RA given that each of them knows the other opponent
well. Same as our notion of a pure strategy with an excellent worst-case bound.
Using the game terminology, we need to find RA ’s and RV ’s pure strategy probability
ζ

vectors (e.g., Y = {y1 , y2 , ..., ym }T and X = {x1 , x2 , ..., xζ }; where Σmj=1 y( j) = 1; Σ j=1 x( j)
= 1; and Y and X are integer vectors) such that the pair ((Y, X) = (y j , xz ); j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m};
z ∈ {1, 2, ..., ζ}) is a pure NE strategy profile at which neither of RV nor EA can improve
his/her payoff by unitarily deviating to another strategy.
If RA successfully attacks a VM (e.g., V j ) given that RV chooses an allocation strategy
(e.g., Az ). RV ’s potential loss is L( j, z) = −G( j, z), i.e. a zero-sum game. RV selects the
allocation strategy Az with a probability of xz = 1. RA attacks the VM that maximizes
his/her payoff under the allocation Az with probability y j = 1. RV ’s and RA ’s pure strategy vectors {X = {x1 , x2 , ..., xζ } and Y = {y1 , y2 , ..., ym }T are consequently zero vectors
except at the zt h and jt h positions where they have ones. Therefore, we can imply that
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RV and RA can only choose one deterministic strategy at a time, i.e., they cannot choose
multiple strategies with different probabilities and dynamically switch among them.
Let Y ∗ denote RA ’s pure strategy solution to his/her maximin problem. Let X ∗ denote
RV ’s solution to his/her minimax problem. Based on the Minimax method [135], if Equation 6.15 holds, the strategy profile (V ∗ , A∗ ) that has the payoff G(V j∗ , Az∗ ) = Y ∗T × G × X ∗T ) )
is a pure NE strategy profile and the deterministic allocation strategy Az∗ optimally minimizes RV ’s W PC; where xz∗ = y j∗ = 1.
max

min

Y ∗T G X T =

min

max

Y T G X ∗T =

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ}

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}

(6.15)

Y ∗T × G × X ∗T = G(Vi∗ , Az∗ )
Therefore, to solve Problem 1, we have to find the solution vectors Y ∗ and X ∗ .

The attacker’s maximin solution
If RV uses a strategy X and RA uses a strategy Y , then RA ’s expected payoff given RV ’s
selected strategy is:
Σz=1 Σmj=1 y j × G jz × xz = Y T × G × X T
ζ

(6.16)

Let Fx denotes the (1 × ζ) vector that is all zeros except for a one in the z∗th position, i.e.,
a deterministic strategy. The inner optimization is given by:
min

∀z∈ {1,2,...,ζ}

Y T × G × XT =

min

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ}

Y T × G × FxT

(6.17)

Now, if we introduce a scalar variable ua representing the value of the inner minimization,
we can express the maximin problem of RA as an integer linear programming problem
given in Fig. 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: MP-based implementation of the attacker’s maximin problem

Figure 6.8: MP-based implementation of the provider’s minimax problem

The provider’s minimax problem
Using similar reasoning we see that RV selects the strategy X that leads to:
min

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}

Y T G XT

(6.18)

and the MP formulation of the Minimax method of RV is given in Fig. 6.8.
Where Fy denotes the vector that is all zeros except for a one in the j∗th position.
For example, let G=[0.375 , 0.530 ; 0.25 , 0.625; 0.156 , 0.756]. RA seeks maximizing
his/her minimum gain. The minimum potential gain of attacking any VM is the minimum
of each row, i.e. {min [0.375 , 0.530] ; min [0.25 , 0.625], min [0.156 , 0.756]} = {0.3750
; 0.2500 ; 0.1560}. Consequently, to maximize his/her minim potential gain, RA should
attack the first VM and thus Gain = max (min ({0.3750 ; 0.2500 ; 0.1560})) = 0.3750.
Similarly, RV wishes to minimize his/her maximum potential loss at each allocation strategy (column), i.e. {max {0.3750 ; 0.2500 ; 0.1560}, max {0.5300 ; 0.6250 ; 0.7560}}=
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{0.3750 , 0.7560}. As a result, RV should choose the first allocation strategy such that the
maximum loss is minimized, i.e. L = min (max {0.3750 , 0.7560})=0.3750. Therefore,
the strategy profile (x=1,y=1) in which RA attacks the first VM given that RV chooses the
first allocation is a pure NE strategy profile because none of the players can improve one’s
payoff by making a unitarily change to another strategy.
The Minimax method [135] returns a single NE strategy profile that optimally minimizes RV ’s W PC loss and solves Problem 1. However, this method only works with
zero-sum game models. Additionally, there might exist several pure NE strategy profiles
with the same W PC loss (e.g., multiple saddle points [186, 187]), and with different energy and operating costs. However, the Minimax method, unfortunately, cannot identify
all feasible solutions to choose the best among them (e.g., it does not solve Problem 2.).
Moreover, calculating the maximin and minimax values of RA and RV is done in a worstcase approach. Therefore, when the number of VMs increases, the sizes of the payoff
matrices quickly increase, and the algorithm cannot find the solution in a practically short
time.
We implement a general-sum NE search algorithm next. This algorithm is based on
searching the pure strategy support vectors of equal sizes to find the best responses of RA
to RV and vice versa [181].

6.5.2

MP-based implementation of the Support Testing and Enumerating (STE) algorithm

In this section, we use the MP approach to implement the Bimatrix best response (e.g.,
we call it in this chapter the Support Testing and Enumerating (STE) algorithm) [181] to
find RV ’s optimal VM allocation strategies that correspond to a pure NE strategy profile.
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Let the pure strategy support vectors of RA and RV be M = {V1 ,V2 , ...,V Mm } and
A = {A1 , A2 , ..., Aζ }, respectively. M comprises all possible attack strategies for RA , and
A enumerates all RV ’s different ways to allocate m distinguishable VMs to n identical
servers. Let (G, L=-G) be a Bimatrix game, where G and L are (m × ζ) matrices representing the payoffs of RA and RV , respectively (e.g., zero-sum game). Let the (1 × m)
column vector Y and the (1 × ζ) row vector X be the pure strategy vectors of for choosing
a single VM to attack and a unique VM allocation strategy by RA and RV , respectively.
The STE algorithm depends on the best response condition in finding all NE strategy
profiles. Lemma 6.1 restates the best response proposition presented in [181].
Lemma 6.1. A pure strategy X of RV is the best response to a pure strategy Y of RA if and
only if:
∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}; if r = Y T × G and Xz > 0 =⇒ r j = a = max∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} {r j }
and vice versa for RA .
For example, the best response to the pure strategy Y > 0 of RA is a pure strategy
X > 0 that minimizes RV ’s expected security loss (e.g., X × L ×Y T ). Similarly, the best
response to the pure strategy x > 0 of RV is a pure strategy Y > 0 that maximizes RA ’s
potential security gain (e.g., Y T × G × X).
According to the Lemma 6.1, a pure NE strategy profile is a strategy profile (Yi∗ , Xz∗ )
in which each of the strategies is the best response to the other strategy. According to
Nisan [181], Lemma 6.1 implies that if RV ’s payoff (X × L ×Y T ) is linear in X, and if it
is maximized on a face of the simplex of RV ’s mixed strategies, it is also optimized on
any vertex, i.e., pure strategy, of that face. Moreover, if it is optimized on a set of vertices,
then it is also maximized on any convex combination of them.
This implication is significant because it states a finite condition about finding all pure
strategies rather than using the infinite set of all mixed policies. Fig. 6.9 shows how to find

165

Figure 6.9: MP-based implementation of the STE algorithm

Figure 6.10: Calculating the provider’s best response uv

all pure NE strategy profiles for the security allocation game based on the best response
condition [181].
For only finding pure NE strategy profiles, we can set k to 1. For example, Xz∗ is the
best response to Y j∗ , and Y j∗ is the best response to Xz∗ if there exists uv = ua for the same
i∗ and z∗ , such that uv is the solution to the optimization program in Fig. 6.10.
For example, using the same payoff matrix from the previous example, L=-G=[-0.375
-0.530; -0.25 -0.625; -0.156 -0.756]. The best response to x1 = 1 or to X = (1, 0) is y1 = 1
or Y = {[1, 0, 0]T } because max∀i∈{1,2,3} {[100] ∗ G} = G11 = 3.75.
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Figure 6.11: Calculating the attacker’s best response ua

The pure strategy y j > 0 is the best response to Xz > 0 if and only if ua is the solution
to the optimization program given in Fig. 6.11.
Similarly, y1 is the best response to x1 because max∀z∈{1,2} G ∗ [10]T = G11 = 0.375.
Therefore, (x1 , y1 ) is a pure NE strategy profile.
The general-sum STE algorithm can find all the pure NE strategy profiles of our game
model which optimally solves Problem 1. Moreover, we can use RV ’s OLC instead of the
loss matrix L to solve Problem 2. Nonetheless, STE has a worst-case execution time as the
numbers of VMs and servers increase. Chen and Deng [188] proved that finding an NE
strategy profile is PPAD complete. PPAD problems are a class of hard decision problems,
but they are weaker than NP problems. However, according to Chen and Deng [188],
while the question of whether an optimal solution exists for a given game model cannot
be NP because the answer is always –yes–, the question of whether a second solution
exists is NP-hard.
One common approach to solve Problem 1 and Problem 2 with the manageable computational cost is to employ bin-packing algorithms [92, 131]. The problem is how to
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integrate the characteristics unique to the problem itself to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the bin-packing approach.
In what follows, we analyze the game model and present our interesting finding, based
on which, we then develop several effective and efficient allocation algorithms that outperform the commonly adopted allocation methods in cloud data centers.

6.6

Game theoretical analysis of the security-aware VM allocation
problems

In this section, we present some interesting properties of the security-aware VM allocation
problem and its game model. For ease of our presentation, we first introduce the following
definitions:
Definition 6.1. The allocation strategy Az is a Static Equilibrium (SE) allocation strategy
(e.g., A∗ ) if the strategy profile (V j , Az ) is a pure NE strategy profile (e.g., (V ∗ , A∗ )).
Definition 6.2. A VM (e.g., V ◦ = {c◦ , q◦ , `◦ }) is a Primary VM (e.g., PrV M) if it has the
highest potential cybersecurity loss when it is successfully and directly attacked. i.e.:
q◦ × `◦ ≥ q j × ` j ; ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}

(6.19)

Now we can present some interesting properties for the security-aware VM allocation
problems. We start by introducing Theorem 6.2 which studies how the number of VMs
or servers affects the RV ’s W PC loss in cloud clusters.
Theorem 6.2. Let A1 and A2 be two different allocation strategies with W PC losses (L1∗ )
and (L2∗ ), sets of VMs (M1 = {V j ; j = 1, 2, ..., m1 }) and (M2 = {V j ; j = 1, 2, ..., m1 , ...,
m2 }), and number of idle servers (n01 ≤ n1 ) and (n02 ≤ n2 ), respectively. (G∗1 ≤ G∗2 ) if one
of the following is true:
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1. M1 ⊆ M2 and n01 = n02 ;
2. n01 ≥ n02 and M1 = M2 ;
Proof. First, RV ’s worst potential cybersecurity losses are L1∗ = −G∗1 and L2∗ = −G∗2 under
A1 and A2 in which RA attacks V j and Vk when they are allocated to Si1 and Si2 . If M1 ⊆ M2
and n01 = n02 , we have m1 ≤ m2 . From Equations 6.2 and 6.4 we can write:
G∗1 =

max

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m1 }

G∗2 = max(G∗j1 ,

(6.20)

g j1

max

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m2 }

g j2 )

(6.21)

Therefore, G∗1 ≤ G∗2 , and consequently (1) is correct.
Second, if n01 ≥ n02 and M1 = M2 , the average number of VMs per server under A1 is
less than the number of VMs under A2 . Consequently from Equation 6.2
g j1 ≤ g j2 ; ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m1 = m2 }

(6.22)

From Equation 6.22 and Equation 6.4, we conclude that G∗1 ≤ G∗2 when n01 ≥ n02 and
M1 = M2
According to Theorem 6.2, the W PC loss increases as the number of VMs increases or
as the number of non-idle servers decreases. In the next Lemma, we identify RV ’s W PC
loss upper and lower bounds.
Lemma 6.2. The provider’s W PC losses (Lz∗ ∈ [LB,UB]; z = 1, 2, ..., ζ); where the LowerBound (LB) and Upper-Bound (UB) are RV ’s minimum and maximum WPC losses and
defined as follows.
LB = q◦ × `◦ ; where (V ◦ : {c◦ , q◦ , `◦ }) is a primary V M.
UB =

max

(q j × ` j + q j × qh × Σm
k=1,k6= j `k )

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}
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(6.23)
(6.24)

Proof. According to Theorem 6.2, the more the number of available servers is, the larger
RV ’s W PC loss. In other words, RV suffers the most loss under the allocation strategies
with the minimum number of non-empty servers and vice versa. That is:
LB = q◦ × `◦

(6.25)

where all the primary VMs (e.g., (V ◦ : {c◦ , q◦ , `◦ })) and all other non-primary VMs are
allocated alone to separate servers. Moreover, when all VMs are allocated to a single
server, RA directly attacks the VMs that maximizes his/her gain, i.e., Equation 6.24.
As mentioned before, it is important to investigate the existence of a pure NE strategy
profile in our game model before we develop efficient pure NE search algorithms. A
pure NE strategy profile [183] is a pair of allocation and attack Equilibrium strategies.
However, RV may or may not have a possible optimal VM allocation strategy [183]. In
this regard, Lemma 6.3 states that when the number of servers is larger than the number
of VMs, there always exists at least a single pure NE strategy profile.
Lemma 6.3. A strategy profile (V ∗ , A∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile if RA ’s selected
strategy is to attack a PrV M (e.g., V ∗ = V ◦ ) and if RV ’s selected allocation strategy (e.g.,
A∗ = Az∗ ) is to allocate each VM alone to a separate server when feasible.
Proof. If the allocation policy Az∗ , in which RV statically allocates a single VM to each
server, is feasible (e.g., (n ≥ m)), we find according to the Minimax method [135] that:
G∗ =

max

(

min

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ}

g jz ) =
(6.26)
T

max{g1z∗ , g2z∗ , ..., gmz∗ ] }
where Az∗ is RV ’s selected strategy in which RV allocates each VM separately.
Moreover, from Equations 6.4 and Equation 6.19, we can write:
G∗ = G∗z∗ = q◦ `◦
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(6.27)

where (V ◦ : {c◦ , q◦ , `◦ })) is one of the primary VMs. That is, RV ’s W PC loss (e.g., L∗ =
−G∗ ) is equal to the W PC loss under the allocation strategy Az∗ when RA ’s attacks a
PrV M (e.g., V ◦ ).
We have based on Equations 6.19:
min

(

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,..., j}

g jz ) = G∗z∗ = q◦ `◦

(6.28)

From Equations 6.19, Equation 6.26, and Equation 6.28, we see that:
G∗ =
=

min

(

max

(

min

g jz )

g jz ) = G∗z∗

◦ ◦

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ}

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,..., j}

(6.29)

=q `

From Equations 6.29 and Equation 6.28 and according to the Minimax method [135], the
strategy profile (V ◦ , Az∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile.
Note that there may be multiple pure NE strategy profiles, i.e. multiple SE allocation
strategies with the same minimum W PC loss for RV , [186, 187], even though not all VMs
are hosted separately. For example, when RV allocates each PrV M alone to a separate
server but multiplexes other non-primary VMs on the rest of servers (e.g., Az∗ ), and when
RA ’s gain from attacking any primary VM, i.e. V ◦ , is better than his/her gain from attacking other non-primary VMs, (V ◦ , Az∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile. This conclusion is
formulated in Lemma 6.4 as follows:
Lemma 6.4. A strategy profile (V ◦ , A∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile if:
1. RV ’s selected allocation strategy is (A∗ = Az∗ ) in which all PrV Ms are hosted alone
is feasible;
2. RA ’s strategy that maximizes his/her gain is to attack a PrV M (e.g., (V ◦ )); i.e.
(G∗z∗ = q◦ `◦ ) ≥ g jz ; ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}
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(6.30)

Proof. For a general two-player zero-sum game, a necessary and sufficient condition for
a Saddle Point, i.e. a pure NE strategy profile (V ∗ , Az∗ ), to exist is the presence of a payoff
value G∗z∗ so that: G∗z∗ = q j∗ ` j∗ which satisfies the following [186]:
max

min

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀zin{1,2,...,ζ}

min

max

∀zin{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}

g jz =
(6.31)

g jz = G∗z∗

Moreover, several saddle points may exist with the same worst potential loss [187].
First, if RV statically allocates all primary VMs alone to individual servers and if the
rest of the servers’ total capacity can accommodate the rest of the VMs, i.e.,:
Σmj=1; j6= j∗ (azij × c j ) ≤ Σni=1;i6=i∗ C
C=

Σmj=1; j6={k1 ,k2 ,...kψ } (azij × c j )
n−ψ

(6.32)
(6.33)

where {Vk◦ ; k ∈ {k1 , k2 , ...kψ }} is the set of all primary VMs.
Second, if Equation 6.33 and Equation 6.30 hold, we find that:
max

min

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ}

g jz =
(6.34)

G∗z0 = q j◦ ` j◦ ; z0 ∈ {1, 2, ..., ζ0 }; ζ0 < ζ
From Equations 6.30, we have:
min

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,..., j}

G∗z0

0

0

g jz =
(6.35)
0

= q j◦ ` j◦ ; z ∈ {1, 2, ..., ζ }; ζ < ζ

From Equations 6.34 and Equation 6.35 and according to the Minimax method [135], the
strategy profile (V ◦ , Az∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile.
When any PrV M is collocated with other VMs, Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.4 won’t
help to find the pure NE strategy profiles. Theorem 6.3, on the other hand, helps to
quickly identify the existence of a pure NE strategy profile by searching only a subset of
RV ’s strategy space.
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Theorem 6.3. Given our system model with m VMs and n servers (m ≥ n), assume that
there exists at least one SE allocation strategy (e.g., A∗ ), then there is at least one allocation strategy Az∗ = A∗ , such that all available servers are non-idle.
Proof. Let the augmented payoff matrices AugG be a sub-matrix from G,i.e., AugΓ =
{A10 , A20 , ..., Aζ0 ; ζ0 = S2nd (m, n)  ζ}, that only includes the allocation strategies which
has zero non-empty servers.
The sufficiency condition: If the game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, −AugG}) admits
(V j∗ , Az∗ ) as a pure NE strategy profile (e.g., the strategy Az∗ is an SE strategy), the game
({RA , RV }, {M, Γ}, {G, L = −G}) also admits (V j∗ , Az∗ ) as a a pure NE strategy profile.
If the game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, −AugG}) has a pure NE strategy profile
(V j∗ , Az∗ ), and according to the Minimax method [135]:
max

min

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ0 };ζ0 <ζ

min

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ0 };ζ0 <ζ ∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}

g jz =
(6.36)

g jz = G∗z∗

From Theorem 6.2, each row element in the augmented payoff matrix AugG is less than or
equal to any row element in the payoff matrix G because the number of servers utilized in
each of the allocation strategies in AugΓ = {A10 , A20 , ..., Aζ0 ; ζ0 = S2nd (m, n)  ζ is larger
than or equal to the number of servers used in each of the allocation strategies Γ = {Az ; z =
1, 2, ..., ζ}; where Γ is the set of RV ’s all possible allocation strategies of m VMs to n
server. Therefore:
max

min

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ0 };ζ0 <ζ

max

min

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ}

g jz
(6.37)

g jz = G∗z∗

and
min

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ0 };ζ0 <ζ ∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}

min

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}
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g jz =

g jz = G∗z∗

(6.38)

From Equation 6.37 and Equation 6.38 we see that if the strategy profile (V j∗ , Az∗ ) is a
pure NE strategy profile for game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, −AugG}) (e.g., the allocation strategy Az∗ is an SE), then based on the Minimax method [135], (V j∗ , Az∗ ) must
be a pure NE strategy profile as well for the game ({RA , RV }, {M, Γ}, {G, L}).

The necessity condition: If the game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, −AugG}) does
not admit a pure NE strategy profile (e.g., there is no SE strategy), the game ({RA , RV },
{M, Γ}, {G, L = −G}) also does not admit a a pure NE strategy profile.
Assume that the game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, AugL}) has no NE strategy
profile (e.g., SE) strategy profile. If the game ({RA , RV }, {M, Γ}, {G, L = −G}) has a
pure NE strategy profile (V j∗ , Az∗ ), according the Minimax method [135] we have:
max

min

∀ j∈{1,2,...,m} ∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ}

min

max

∀z∈{1,2,...,ζ} ∀ j∈{1,2,...,m}

g jz =
(6.39)

g jz = G∗z∗

From Theorem 6.2, each row element in the augmented payoff matrix AugG is less
than or equal to any row element in the payoff matrix G. Therefore, from Equation
6.39 and Theorem 6.2, we conclude that Az∗ ∈ AugΓ. Consequently, the payoff element G∗z∗ ∈ AugG and the strategy profile (V j∗ , Az∗ ) is a pure NE strategy profile (e.g.,
SE) to the game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, −AugG}). However, this contradicts
our assumption that the game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, −AugG}) has no pure NE
strategy profile. Consequently, when the game ({RA , RV }, {M, AugΓ}, {AugG, −AugG})
has no pure NE strategy profile (e.g., there exists no SE allocation strategy), the game
({RA , RV }, {M, Γ}, {G, L = −G}) also has no pure NE strategy profile.
Next, we propose two equilibrium-based VM allocation heuristics based on our analysis insight.
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6.7

Game theoretic approaches for security-aware VM allocation strategies

In this section, we present two game-base security-aware VM allocation algorithms. The
first approach, called Nash Equilibrium-based VM (NEV M) allocation algorithm, tries
to identify all the possible pure NE strategy profile and, thus, the optimal static VM allocation (e.g., SE) policies according to the game model presented in Section 6.6. The
second approach, called the Primary VM-based (PV M) bin-packing algorithm, is a variation of the vector bin-packing method centering around the allocation of the PrV Ms.
More details about these two approaches are described next.

6.7.1

Nash Equilibrium-based VM (NEVM) allocation algorithm

The key to the success of this approach is to identify the pure NE strategy profiles if they
exist. Recall that, as discussed in Section 6.6, even though the NE searching strategies
take polynomial time, the strategy space of RV exponentially increases with the increasing numbers of VMs and servers. In the meantime, the NE strategy profile properties
presented earlier make it possible to significantly reduce the strategy space for RV , and
may make it possible to find the optimal allocation strategies in a reasonable time frame.
Our first algorithm, i.e. NEV M, is illustrated in Fig. 6.16. First, NEV M identifies
all the primary VMs (e.g., line 1). According to Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.4, NEV M
should only search for SE policies among those allocations when all primary VMs are
hosted alone (e.g., lines [2-9]). This can significantly reduce the size of the strategy
space (e.g., (ζ0 = ST N(m − m0 , n − m0 ))). Note that NEV M uses the recursive function,
i.e. Equation 6.12 in Section 6.3, to reduce the space complexity when generating those
allocation strategies (e.g., lines [3-10]).
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Figure 6.12: Nash Equilibrium-based VM (NEVM) allocation algorithm

If it is not feasible to host all the primary VMs alone, based on Theorem 6.3, NEV M
constructs the (m × ζ1 ) payoff matrix G in which only the allocation strategies, i.e. Γ1 =
{Az ; z = 1, 2, ..., ζ1 }, that have no idle servers are generated (e.g., line 11). As a result, the
strategy space for RV can be significantly reduced (e.g., (ζ1 = ST N(m, n))). For example,
Fig. 6.4 shows that when the numbers of VMs and servers are n = m = 15, the number of
RV ’s pure strategies, based on Equation 6.12, is large (e.g., ζ = 1.3830e + 09). However,
NEV M can cut down the total number of those strategies to ζ1 = 190899322, which
is more than 85% reduction for RV ’s original pure strategy space. After RV ’s reduced
strategy space is generated, we can employ the existing NE search approaches (such as
the Minimax method [135] which take only computational complexity of O(mζ)) to find
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the pure NE strategy profiles, if they exist (e.g., line 12). If there exists any pure NE
with an optimal W PC loss (L∗ = −G∗ ), NEV M generates and returns its corresponding
allocation strategy in which the W PC loss is equal to G∗ (e.g., lines [13-14]). If a pure
NE strategy profile does not exist, NEV M returns empty set (e.g., Line 17).
Besides significantly reducing the size of RV ’s strategy space, one unique advantage
of using NEV M is that it can identify all possible pure NE strategy profiles (if they exist)
which share the same W PC loss and solve Problem 1. We can then further optimize the
allocation policies according to other criteria (e.g., energy costs and operating expenses)
to solve Problem 2. Nonetheless, NEV M has a computation complexity, i.e., time and
space, that increases exponentially with the increasing numbers of VMs and servers. Also,
as discussed before, there may exist no pure NE strategy profile at all for some game
models. In what follows, we develop another bin-packing-based approach, which can
work for more massive cloud clusters.

6.7.2

The Primary VM-based bin-packing (PVM) algorithm

The VM allocation problem we address here is, in general, a resource management problem with multiple optimization criteria, i.e., energy/operating expense and cybersecurity
loss. Traditionally, it is a common practice to transform this problem into a VBP problem. While typical VBP approaches (e.g., [131]) are available, the key to the success of
the solution is how to incorporate the problem properties into the bin-packing heuristics
to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. In Section 6.6, our research has shown the
significant role that PrV Ms may play in the security-aware VM allocation. In what follows, we discuss The Primary VM-based bin-packing (PV M) algorithm to identify the
optimized VM allocation policies, as shown in Fig 6.13.
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Figure 6.13: The Primary VM-based (PVM) bin-packing algorithm
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PV M in general consists of two phases, i.e., Phase I (lines [1-13]) and Phase II (e.g.,
lines [13-32]). During Phase I, PV M sorts VMs based on their W PC loss and individually
allocates each PrV M to a primary server, if possible, (e.g., lines 1-9). The rest of the VMs
are sorted and assigned, based on a variation of the FFD-based VBP methods [131], to
the rest of the servers with the most significant security loss no more than those when
directly attacking a PrV M, (e.g., lines 10-13). If all VMs are successfully allocated,
based on Lemma 6.4, the algorithm has identified a pure NE strategy profile that optimally
minimizes RV ’s W PC loss. If not, the algorithm enters the second phase in which primary
servers are allowed to host non-primary VMs as well.
Specifically, we sort the rest of VMs in M based on the number of servers, the
W PC loss, and capacity requirements of VMs (e.g., line 7). Specifically, for a VM
V j : {c j , q j , ` j , }, we define the scalar that combines both optimization criteria as W j such
that:

W j = (aL × q j × ` j ) + (ac × c j )

(6.40)

where aL and ac are the averaged sum of the cybersecurity loss and resource requirements
normalized to the total number of servers. They allow us to combine the demands of each
VM across both the security and resource dimensions according to the importance of each
VM’s demand. We calculate aL and ac as follows.
1
aL = Σmj=1 q j × ` j
n

(6.41)

1
ac = Σmj=1 c j
n

(6.42)

PV M sorts the servers by placing the servers hosting the primary VMs (e.g., primary
servers) at the end of the queue of servers (e.g., line 15). PV M then allocates the rest of
the non-primary VMs using FFD based on W j to the servers with no primary VMs, if it
is feasible, and if the W PC loss is always less than the Loss Capacity (LC) (e.g., lines
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[16-19]). The algorithm bounds the value of LC by the cybersecurity loss threshold, i.e.,
LC <= T hresh. When PV M is used to solve Problem 1, T hrsh can be set to the W PC
loss’s upper bound (e.g., T hrsh = UB, i.e. LB ≤ T hrsh ≤ UB). If there are no more
feasible servers with no existing primary VMs, PV M allocates a non-primary VM to one
of the primary servers, increases LC as long it does not exceed the value of T hrsh, and
moves that server to the end of the queue (e.g., lines [20-26]). This process judiciously
load-balances resource requirements and potential cybersecurity losses across all servers.
PV M continues until no VM can be further allocated, indicating that there is not enough
computing capacity to hold any of the rest VMs, or all VMs have been successfully allocated (e.g., lines [27-32]).
Algorithm PV M has a computational complexity of O(max(mn, m log m)) during Phase
I, and O(max(m2 n, m2 log m)) during Phase II, which is much smaller than NEV M. However, it is worth mentioning that NEV M returns all optimal solutions in terms of minimizing RV ’s W PC loss (if there exists any pure NE strategy profile). PV M, on the other
hand, returns only one solution, which may or may not be optimal.
In the next section, we use simulation to study the effectiveness and efficiency of our
proposed approaches.

6.8

Experimental validation

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the VM allocation approaches we proposed earlier in this chapter. First, we describe the simulation setup and the methods we
implemented, against which, to compare the performance of our proposed algorithms.
Second, we study the performance of the mathematical programs MPL and MPR, which
we developed in Section 6.4, under different numbers of VMs and servers and using different server’s capacity. Third, we analyze the performance of the NE-based allocation
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algorithm (e.g., NEV M). Finally, we evaluate the performance of our proposed heuristic
PV M under cloud clusters with small, moderate and large sizes.

6.8.1

Simulation setup

We randomly generated the numbers of servers and VMs. A server could have a processing rate capacity (C) in the range ([5, 25] × 103 MIPS). The operating expense Eopz of
the cluster under an allocation Az is calculated using Equation 6.5 where the operating
expense of each server ezi is randomly generated so that it is correlated to the server’s
capacity. The processing rate requirements of a VM were randomly generated out of
the five sizes {1, 2, ..., or, 5} × 103 MIPS. The following values were also generated
randomly and uniformly in the associated ranges: (q j ∈ [0.1, 0.9], qh ∈ [0.3, 0.5], and
` j ∈ [$10, $100] × 103 ).
We ran all experiments on an HP Workstation Z800 with two Intel Xeon Six-Core
E5645 2.40 GHz, 12 MB cache, 1333 MHz DDR3 memory of size 32 GB, and 1 TB disk
space.
We model the server’s power (Watt) usage Per Hour (W PH) as in Equation 6.7. The
maximum W PH for each server per hour is proportional to its capacity (e.g., between
[500, 2500] W PH).
Now, to calculate a cluster’s energy cost under an allocation Az over a year, we use
Equation 6.43:
Ez = (

Operating Hours(i.e., 24 × 365) × (Power Consumption W PH)
)
1000

(6.43)

× Electricity cost per KW H (i.e., 0.116 per KW H in FL)
The Total energy Cost and operating expense (TCz ) of RV under an allocation Az over a
year is then calculated using Equation 6.8. RV ’s Overall W PC Loss and total energy Cost
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and operating expense (OLCz ) under an allocation Az is then calculated using Equation
6.9.
We implemented the MPL and MPR approaches, described in Section 6.4, using the
package JuMP [189]. JuMP is a domain-specific modeling language for mathematical optimization embedded in Julia. JuMP uses a generic solver-independent interface provided
by the MathProgBase package [189]. JuMP allowed us to adopt the Gurobi Optimizer as
a solver [190]. We parallelized the run of the mathematical program instances over 12
cores.
We also implemented the Minimax method [135] and STE [181] discussed in Section
6.5.
Moreover, we implemented the following FFD-based VBP heuristics that are commonly used for VM placement in data centers and cloud clusters:
• AvgSum: This algorithm is an implementation of the FDD-based average sums of
the VM’s potential cybersecurity loss and cybersecurity [191]. The weight of a Vi
is calculated as follows:
W j = a1 × (` j × q j ) + a2 × c j ; j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}

(6.44)

and the weights of the demands are calculated as follows:
1 m
Σ `j ×qj
m j=1
1
a2 = Σmj=1 c j
m

a1 =

(6.45)
(6.46)

• Prod: This algorithm is a variant of the First Fit Decreasing based Production
(FFDProd) algorithm [131] that calculates the weight of a VM (e.g., V j ) by multiplying its potential cybersecurity value (e.g., ` j × q j ) by its processing rate requirement (e.g., c j ). That is:
W j = ` j × q j × c j ; j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}
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(6.47)

• Probabilistic Weighing with Norm-based FFD (PW N): This heuristic uses the Geometric DotProduct [133]. It sorts all VMs after each allocation according to the
FFD bin packing method and based on the weight of VMs that are defined as follows:
W j = a1 × (` j × qi × (T hrsh − g jz )) + a2 × c(i) × (C − Σm
k=1 ck )

(6.48)

where j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}; g jz is the potential cybersecurity loss given an attack on V j
(e.g., Equation 6.2).
1 m
Σ ` j × qi
m i=1
1
ci
a2 = Σm
m i=1

a1 =

(6.49)
(6.50)

When there are no security constraints (e.g., Problem 1), the value of T hrsh can be
set to the W PC loss’ upper bound given in Equation 6.24, i.e. T hrsh = UB.
In the next section, we study the performance of the mathematical programs MPL and
MPR, which we developed in Section 6.4, under different numbers of VMs and servers
and using different server’s capacity.

6.8.2

Studying the performance of the mathematical programs MPL
and MPR

In this section, we study the computation performance of the mathematical programs,
MPL, and MPR.

MPL and MPR computation performances under different number of servers and
VMs
First, we study the computation time performance of MPL and MPR. In Fig. 6.14(a), we
varied the number of servers and VMs from 25 servers and 50 VMs to 250 servers and
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500 VMs by increasing the number of VMs and servers two times at each run. We ran
MPL and MPR 10 times for each setting and averaged the results. Fig. 6.14(a) shows
the final results of both programs divided by two as both mathematical programs have
similar computation performances. We observe that the average computation time of
MPL and MPR exponentially increases when the number of VMs and servers increase.
For example, the average computation time when using 25 servers and 50 VMs increases
by roughly 8000 times when increasing the number of servers and VMs to 250 servers
and 500 VMs, respectively.
Fig. 6.14(c) shows RV ’s W PC performance using MPL under different server’s capacities. We set the number of VMs to a 100 VMs and the number of servers to 30 servers.
We varied the server’s capacities from 5 × 103 MIPS to 25 × 103 by adding 5000 MIPS
each time, ran the simulation a 100 times, and averaged the results. Fig. 6.14(c) shows
that as the server’s capacity increases, RV ’s W PC loss increases because the loss upper
bound UB increases (e.g., Equation 6.24). Moreover, a larger server’s capacity means
that more and more VMs can be possibly multiplexed together on a single server, which
decreases the average computation time of the MPL and MPR programs. For example,
Fig. 6.14 (b) shows that as the capacity increases by five times, the average computation
time of MPL and MPR decreases by almost 600%.
Next, we study the performance of the NEV M algorithm.

6.8.3

Studying the performance of the NEVM algorithm

In this section, we evaluate the performance of our NEV M algorithm in terms of minimizing RV ’s and RA ’ strategy spaces and in terms of optimizing the NE search time compared
to the Minimax and STE NE search methods.
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(a) Average computation time of MPL and MPR
under variable number of servers (n) and VMs
(m = 2 × n)

(b) Average computation time of MPL and MPR
under different server’s capacities

(c) The minimum worst potential cybersecurity
loss of MPL under different server’s capacities
Figure 6.14: The performance of the mathematical programs MPL and MPR

Fig. 6.15(b) illustrates the average performance for NEV M algorithm in minimizing
the size of RV ’s pure allocation strategy support-vector. The number of VMs (m) and
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(b) Computation time comparison of NEVM against the Minimax and STE algorithms
Figure 6.15: The performance of NEVM algorithm

servers (n) were randomly generated in the range [2, 20]. The capacity of the servers was
randomly generated in the range [5, 25] × 103 MIPS. Unlike the STE and Minimax methods that always search all the pure strategy spaces of RA and RV , NEV M only searches the
allocation strategies that are potentially optimal, as discussed in Lemma 6.4 and Theorem
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6.3. For example, based on Theorem 6.3, NEV M only searches 11% of RV ’s total possible
allocation strategies in order to identify all SE allocation strategies. Such minimization in
the total number of the allocation strategies significantly optimizes the computation time
of NEV M compared to the computation times of the Minimax and STE, as illustrated in
Fig. 6.15(b). The last figure compares the computation time of the NEV M and Minimax
normalized to the execution time consumed by the STE algorithm. We can see that as the
number of VMs increases from n = 2 to n = 8, the computation time ratio of Minimax
increases from almost 70% to 95 % of NEV M’s computation time.
Next, we evaluate the performance of our proposed heuristic PV M under small cloud
clusters.

6.8.4

Performance evaluation of PVM using clusters with small numbers of VMs and servers

One major limitation of the NEV M algorithm is the space complexity, i.e., O(mζ ), related
to generating the payoff matrices G and L. This complexity makes it infeasible to test
NEV M with large numbers of VMs and servers. Therefore, in Fig. 6.16(a), we test
the computation time performance of PV M compared to NEV M and other methods with
number of VMs ranging from (m = 2) VMs to (m = 8) VMs and with random number
of servers (n ≤ m). We assumed that T hrsh = UB, i.e., we used MPL instead of MPR.
Moreover, since PV M, AvgSum, Prod, PW N, and MPL returns a single solution, we used
Minimax method rather than the STE that returns all possible solutions to Problem 1. We
ran the simulation a 1000 times for each setting, averaged the results, and presented them
in Fig. 6.16(a).
As the figure shows, the NE search time of NEV M is roughly 50%, on average, better
than the search time of Minimax, but it is at least a thousand times smaller than the
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computation time of MPL. We observe that the search time exponentially increases for
Minimax and MPL algorithms with the increase of the numbers of VMs and servers, i.e.,
the computation times of Minimax and MPL increased by 18% and 93% as the number
of VMs increases from 2 to 8. On the other hand, NEV M’s computation time grows
at a much slower pace when increasing the number of VMs due to the minimization in
RV ’s and RA ’s strategy spaces (e.g., NEV M only increases 10% as the number of VMs
increases from 2 to 8).
It is unsurprising to notice that all the VBP-based heuristics have better computation
times than the NE search approaches and a much slower computation time increase rates
with the increase in the numbers of VMs and servers compared to NEV M, Minimax,
and MPL. It is also worth mentioning that the computation time performance of PV M
is the worst among AvgSum, Prod, and PW N because PV M consists of two phases in
which it may have to sort and allocate VMs twice compared to other VBP heuristics.
On the contrary, AvgSum has the best computation time performance compared to the
Prod and PW N which execute a larger number of operations at each run compared to
the AvgSum. Although PW N dynamically sorts all VMs every time it tries to allocate
a new VM, the sorting criteria PW N uses to maximize the loss and resource capacity
speeds up its allocation process compared to the offline sort and allocation of the Prod
method [131].
The feasibility performance of PV M under the same simulation setup is illustrated in
Fig. 6.16(b). We see that MPL can always obtain the optimal results when it can complete
its computation times in polynomial time. On the other hand, NEV M returns no pure NE
strategy profile solutions 26% of the time, i.e., when the available resources are tight as
explained in Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 6.3. Although the VBP-based heuristics have
better feasibility performances than NEV M, they are not guaranteed to return optimal
solutions. The worst feasibility performance is for PW N at 25% failure percentage in
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successfully allocating all VMs. Although AvgSum has a better average computation time
than Prod, the last method, in fact, exceeds AvgSum in the allocation feasibility by 2%.
The reason is that Prod outperforms AvgSum in terms of minimizing the total number
of allocated servers which in turn increases the allocation feasibility [131, 133, 191]. On
the other hand, having two phases of FFD bin packing based allocation allowed PV M to
outperform AvgSum, Prod, and PW N by 6%, 4%, and 22%, respectively.
We evaluate the performance of PV M under medium cloud clusters next.

6.8.5

Performance evaluation of PVM under clusters with moderate
numbers of VMs and servers

In this section, we study the performance of PV M under medium-sized cloud clusters
with no more than 500 VMs and no more than 250 servers. We excluded NEV M from
this simulation as it is infeasible to generate its payoff matrices with such numbers of
VMs and servers.
We first study the computation time performances of PV M and MPL under variable
numbers of VMs and servers ranging from a (m = 100) and (n = 50) to (m = 500) and
(n = 250) VMs and servers. We ran MPL and PV M 100 times for each configuration
and averaged the results. As shown in Fig. 6.17, the computation time of MPL is rapidly
increasing with the increasing numbers of VMs and servers. For example, the average
computation time of MPL, using a 100 VMs, increases by roughly 10000 times when
increasing the number of VMs to 500 VMs. On the other hand, the average computation
time of PV M slowly increases when increasing the number of VMs and servers which
justifies the need for using heuristics in the VM allocation problem with cybersecurity
awareness.
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(a) Computation time performance

11
(b) Feasibility performance
Figure 6.16: Performance evaluation of PVM with small number of VMs and servers
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00
Figure 6.17: Computation time performance of PVM with fair numbers of VMs and servers.
Vertical axis has logarithmic units in seconds

In Fig. 6.18, we study the performance of PV M in minimizing RV ’s W PC loss compared to the optimal solutions obtained by MPL. The number of VMs was randomly
generated in the range [50,100]. We varied the numbers of servers from n = 25% to
n = 50% of the total number of the randomly generated VMs. The server’s capacity was
randomly generated between 5 × 103 MIPS and 25 × 103 MIPS. The figure shows that
the worst approach in minimizing RV ’s W PC loss is the Prod VBP method which best
minimizes the number of servers [131]. Prod hence maximizes RV ’s W PC loss according
to Theorem 6.2. On the contrary, PV M either allocates the VMs so that an SE allocation
strategy is reached under the first phase, or averages the W PC loss, given a successful
attack on any VM, across all the servers which minimizes RV ’s W PC loss compared to
AvgSum, Prod, and PW N. For example, when the number of servers is bounded by 25%
of the total number of VMs, PV M is 4 times worse than the optimal solution obtained by
MPL, but is 0.2%, 100%, and 0.42%, better than AvgSum, Prod, and PW N, respectively.
Both AvgSum and PW N outperform Prod in minimizing RV ’s W PC because they both
load balance the W PC across the servers. However, PW N outperforms all other VBP
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Figure 6.18: The WPC loss performance of PVM with fair numbers of VMs and servers

heuristics for the two-dimensional case (e.g., cybersecurity loss and resource requirements) as concluded in [133].
When the number of servers increases to 50% of the total number of the randomly
generated VMs, RV ’s W PC loss decreases under all methods, as stated in Theorem 6.2.
Moreover, PV M is still the best after the mathematical program MPL since it increases the
chances of reaching a pure NE strategy profile according to Lemma 6.4. For example, the
W PC loss of PV M decreases by more than 100% when the number of servers increases
twice. Nonetheless, the MPL algorithm only reduces RV ’s W PC by less than 1% for the
same increase in the number of servers. The reason is that, in both cases, the number of
servers is relatively large enough to hosting all the primary VMs individually on separate
servers which increases the chances of reaching an SE allocation, according to Lemma
6.4. Moreover, from Theorem 6.3, RV ’s W PC under the first and second case is almost
the same as if the resource requirements of VMs are small enough.
Fig. 6.19(a) and Fig. 6.19(b) show the performance of the PV M in optimizing resource usage, under cybersecurity constraints, compared to the optimal solutions obtained
via MPR. The cybersecurity threshold was randomly generated between the lower and
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(a) Server’s capacity C =10000$ MIPS

(b) Server’s capacity C =25000$ MIPS
Figure 6.19: The overall loss and cost performance of PVM with fair number of servers under
different server’s capacities
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upper loss bounds (e.g., LB ≤ T hrsh ≤ UB). The number of VMs and servers were randomly generated in the ranges [50, 100] and [10%, 90%] of the total number of VMs. We
varied the server’s capacity from 15 × 103 MIPS to 25 × 103 MIPS, ran the simulation
1000 times for each configuration, and averaged the results.
There are several important observations one can draw from Fig. 6.19(a) and Fig.
6.19(b). Whereas PV M still outperforms other VBP-based heuristics in minimizing RV ’s
W PC loss via allocating the primary VMs to individual servers to reach a pure NE strategy profile, it has the worst performance among AvgSum, Prod, and PW N in optimizing
resource usage as it underutilizes those primary servers. Nonetheless, PV M’s overall performance in optimizing the W PC loss and energy and operating costs is the best since the
W PC loss usually is more critical than resource usage. For example, PV M outperforms
AvgSum, Prod, and PW N by 20%, 27%, and 10% when server’s capacity is 15 × 103
MIPS, and by 16%, 18%, and 5% when server’s capacity increases to 15 × 103 MIPS.
Increasing the capacity of servers allows RV to allocate more VMs to the same server,
which in turn increases the W PC loss for all heuristics by almost 10% compared to only
1% increase of MPR (e.g., Theorem 6.2).
It is also worth mentioning that PW N illustrates the best performance in terms of minimizing RV ’s total W PC loss, energy costs, and operating expense, compared to AvgSum
and Prod, which conforms with conclusions about PW N performance when considering
two dimensions in the FFD-based bin packing [133].
Next, we study the performance of PV M under cloud clusters with more than 500
VMs.
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6.8.6

Performance evaluation of PVM under clusters with a large
number of VMs

In this section, we first study the scalability, worst cybersecurity loss minimization, and
feasibility performances of PV M under clusters with a number of VMs ranging from 100
to 900 VMs. The capacity of the servers was randomly generated between 5 × 103 MIPS
and 25 × 103 MIPS. The total number of servers was randomly generated between (10%)
and (90%) of the total number of VMs. We repeated each run 1000 times and averaged
the results.
Fig. 6.20(a) shows PV M’s performance in minimizing the W PC loss of RV compared
to other VBP-based heuristics. Similar to what we observed in small and medium cloud
clusters, PV M outperforms AvgSum, Prod, and PW N, respectively. As we stated earlier
in Theorem 6.2, Fig. 6.20(a) shows that increasing the number of VMs increases RV ’s
W PC loss under all heuristics by at least 100 times when increasing the number of VMs
from 100 to 900 VMs. Moreover, according to Lemma 6.4, PV M allocates VMs in a way
that increases the chances of reaching a pure NE strategy profile to minimize RV ’s W PC
loss even with a large number of VMs. For example, RV ’s W PC loss using PV M is, on
average, 30%, 50%, and 26% better than the W PC loss obtained using AvgSum, Prod and
PW N.
On the other hand, Fig. 6.20(b) shows that PV M outperforms other heuristics in terms
of the allocation feasibility. We noticed that Prod performance is very close to PV M (e.g.,
less than 1% difference). The reason is that Prod uses the FFDProd which performs
better than other heuristics in minimizing the number of servers with a large number of
VMs, as discussed in [131]. On the other hand, PW N is on average 2%-3% less than the
first two methods. Further, we can see that increasing the number of VMs and servers
generally improves the feasibility performance of all approaches.
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(a) The WPC loss minimization performance of PVM

(b) Scheduling feasibility of PVM
Figure 6.20: The performance of PVM with large numbers of VMs and servers
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(a) Thrsh = 2× LB

(b) Thrsh = 6× LB
Figure 6.21: The performance of PVM in optimizing resource usage under different cybersecurity
thresholds

197

(a) Thrsh = 2× LB

(b) Thrsh = 6× LB
Figure 6.22: The feasibility performance of PVM when optimizing resource usage under different
cybersecurity thresholds
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Now, we move on to study the performance of PV M in maximizing the resource usage while guaranteeing that the W PC loss does not exceed a given cybersecurity loss
threshold (e.g., T hrsh). We compared the performance of PV M to the performances
of AvgSum, Prod, and PW N under several loss thresholds. In Fig. 6.21(a) and Fig.
6.21(b), we set the cybersecurity thresholds to (2 × LB) and (6 × LB), respectively; where
(LB = q∗ × L∗ ) is the Lower-Bound (LB) of RV ’s cybersecurity loss (e.g., Equation 6.23).
The server’s capacity, number of servers, and number of VMs were set to 15 × 103 MIPS,
200 servers, and 500 VMs. We ran the simulation 1000 times for each threshold setting
and averaged the results.
Fig. 6.21(a) shows that when T hrsh = 2 × LB, PV M, AvgSum, and Prod roughly have
the same W PC loss, whereas PW N outperforms all the rest in less than 1%. On the other
hand, PV M outperforms AvgSum, Prod, and PW N in minimizing RV ’s overall loss and
cost by 2%, 12%, and 9%, respectively. Moreover, PV M’s computation time is less than
AvgSum, Prod, and PW N by 1, 2, and 4 seconds. The reason is that the PV M allocates all
primary VMs within the first allocation phase which minimizes the allocation times for
the rest of the VM under a very strict cybersecurity threshold and improves its allocation
feasibility. For example, Fig. 6.22(a) shows that when T hrsh = 2 × LB, PV M allocation
feasibility is 9%, 24%, and 20% more than the feasibilities of AvgSum, Prod, and PW N.
Although increasing the cybersecurity threshold from T hrsh = 2 × LB to T hrsh =
6 × LB (e.g., Fig. 6.22(b)), improves the allocation feasibility of all approaches, PV M
still outperforms other approaches by at least 1% in the allocation feasibility. It is also
expected that PV M’s computation time performance is almost the same under different
cybersecurity threshold because PV M is bounded by the potential cybersecurity loss given
an attack on any primary VM (e.g., V ◦ ; where q◦ × `◦ = LB < T hrsh). Nonetheless, the
computation times of other approaches improve significantly, outperforming the compu-
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tation time of PV M by 6 seconds on average, when the cybersecurity threshold increases
from T hrsh = 2 × LB to T hrsh = 6 × LB.
Moreover, based on Theorem 6.2, the increase in the cybersecurity threshold causes all
methods to increase their W PC loss to maximize resource utilization and minimize RV ’s
overall loss and cost by almost 50%, compared to the first case in which T hrsh = 2 ×
LB. Although increasing the cybersecurity threshold improves RV ’s energy and operating
costs, it causes RV ’s overall loss and cost to increase by 27%, 32%, 29%, and 0.26% under
PV M, AvgSum, Prod, and PW N due to the decrease in the number of the allocated servers
(e.g., Theorem 6.2).

6.9

Summary

In this chapter, we address the problems of static VM allocation with resource and cybersecurity loss constraints that are well-known NP-hard problems. We first formulate
them as quadratic programming problems that are solvable only for small size cloud clusters. We then model the problems as a two-player zero-sum game. We showed that NE
search approaches (e.g., Minimax and STE) can be applied to solve our VM allocation
problems. For example, they take polynomial time concerning a given size of the strategy
spaces. Unfortunately, the computation complexities of those NE search approaches become non-polynomial as the strategy space of the provider grows exponentially with the
increase of the numbers of VMs and servers. This motivates us to study the characteristics
of the pure NE strategy profile and, based on which, to develop computationally efficient
heuristics. Intensive simulation results show that our proposed allocation algorithms outperform the commonly used VBP heuristics in solving similar allocation problems. Our
future work aims to investigate dynamic allocation strategies based on mixed-strategy NE
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strategy profiles considering several optimization criteria, such as performance, cybersecurity, and costs.

201

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we summarize the contributions that we present in this dissertation and
discuss the possible directions for our future research work.

7.1

Summary

As adopting cloud computing has recently become the dominant trend for continuously
delivering online services for individual and organizations over the internet, successful
and well-planned resource management policies supporting those services became a critical component for any agile, consolidated and dynamically scalable cloud data center that
provides valuable and high-quality cloud services with efficient power consumption.
In this dissertation, we study the research problem of developing efficient and effective
cloud resource management policies and techniques. Our goal is to help cloud service
providers optimize the trade-offs among several performance and cybersecurity criteria.
1. To facilitate our experiment and validation work, we first develop a cloud computing prototype that closely mirrors industry-compatible cloud platforms. Our prototype can provide cloud services as any middle-sized cloud service provider does.
The prototype generates and runs several general and cloud-specific benchmarks
under an isolated and well-controlled environment. We further incorporate new
workload scheduling, resource provisioning, and performance monitoring schemes
that we proposed in this dissertation into the platform.
2. Different from previous studies that employ separate VMs for hosting requests with
different QoS requirements, we develop a cloud service multiplexing method, based
on the queuing model with reneging, that enables requests of the same service type,
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but with different QoS constraints, to share the same VM. To our best knowledge,
this is the first approach by which different requests with different QoS requirements can be hosted on a single node to increase resource utilization. We also devise a novel methodology that correctly discards potential failure requests as soon as
possible to minimize processing rate demands, and to reduce total power consumption with statistically guaranteed QoS. We introduce a packing and consolidation
algorithm that statistically ensures the QoS requirements of cloud requests in terms
of deadline miss ratios. In addition to the analytical validation of our proposed
methods, we experimentally verify them, under general and cloud-specific workloads, using our cloud platform. For example, we use the Data Caching benchmark
that emulates the behavior of a Twitter caching server and assumes strict quality
of service guarantees, such as, 95% of the request must finish within 200 ms. Extensive experimentation results show that our proposed methods widely outperform
existing approaches in terms of QoS satisfaction, power consumption efficiency,
resource demand minimization, and electricity cost saving.
3. A major limitation of consolidating VMs of different security requirements onto
a single server is that it can result in VM-to-VM interdependent cybersecurity IC
risks. For example, the odds of successfully compromising a secure critical VM
are high when an attacker compromises the hosting hypervisor after a successful
direct attack on one of its less secured, non-critical VMs. Therefore, we formulate
the allocation problem with cybersecurity awareness into a non-cooperative, zerosum theoretical game model between an attacker and the service cloud provider.
We develop a set of new conditions to identify the existence of an equilibrium
allocation strategy quickly. We mean by an –equilibrium– allocation strategy that
the allocation policy in which neither the provider nor the attacker can benefit from
unitarily deviating from their allocation or attack decisions, respectively. We then
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incorporate several resource usage parameters into a non-zero-sum game model.
We identify the cases under which several static and dynamic equilibrium allocation
strategies exist. We also derive the lower-bound and upper-bound of the IC risks.
4. Finally, we extend our game models to include VMs with more general cybersecurity and resource requirements. We focus on the static VM allocation problem to
study how to (1) minimize the provider’s worst potential cybersecurity loss under
constrained resource usage and how to (2) optimize cloud resource usage while ensuring that the worst potential cybersecurity loss is always less than a given cybersecurity threshold. We show later in this dissertation that a constrained-allocation
problem is a typical NP-hard problem, and, thus, we formulate the security-constrained
and resource-constrained VM allocation problems using the Mathematical Programming (MP) approach to obtain the optimal solutions, which will be used as
a comparison baseline against other proposed approaches in this dissertation and
when the problem size is small. We formally model the resource and securityconstrained allocation problems as a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game.
We conduct a thorough analysis of the characteristics of the pure Nash Equilibrium
(NE) strategy profiles in our game model, which we formulate as a series of lemmas
and theorems. Based on the insights of our analysis, we develop several effective
and computationally efficient algorithms to allocate VMs, of different resource and
security requirements, with resource usage and security loss optimized. We have
implemented our algorithms and studied their efficiency and effectiveness. Our extensive simulation results show that our novel approaches are good trade-offs when
compared with the computational-intensive approaches, such as the ones based on
the MP approaches, the existing NE search methods, or the computationally efficient multi-dimensional bin-packing methods.
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7.2

Future work

In this dissertation, we primarily focus on developing static resource allocation mechanisms for time-sensitive cloud services and VMs under resource, quality, and cybersecurity constraints.Static resource allocation methods simplify the process of cloud resource
management. The study of static VM allocation not only has solid theoretical values but
is also useful and applicable in many practical scenarios. For instance, static VM allocation does not cause service interruption for cloud services and hosting VMs due to
the VM live migration, and, hence, it can provide time-related QoS guarantees. Furthermore, static allocation approaches are ideal for batch cloud workload during each epoch,
because batch cloud workloads are completed detailed and characterized by predictable
performance and intensive computation time.
Although static VM allocation has many unique advantages (e.g., low overhead and
reliable predictability), dynamic VM allocation methods are more flexible, adaptive, and
potentially more effective in a highly dynamic environment in terms of optimizing cloud
resource usage and performance. Therefore, dynamic resource allocation with performance and cybersecurity awareness will be the focus of our future research following the
work presented in this dissertation.
Specifically, in our future work, we plan to focus on the following problems.

7.3

Dynamic allocation strategies with QoS guarantee in heterogeneous cloud platforms

We can extend our set of static scheduling mechanisms, proposed in Chapter 4, for cloud
services with guaranteed QoS to include allocation strategies based on VM live migration.

205

Dynamic VM allocation maximizes resource utilization [92] and minimizes cybersecurity
risks resulted from colocation attacks [51].
However, VM migration comes with a migration overhead that results in service interruption, performance degradation, and consequently Service Level Agreements SLAs
violations [192]. The first challenge we have to address when adopting dynamic cloud
resource allocation methodologies is how to timely and efficiently adapt to the fluctuating cloud workloads while ensuring a guaranteed QoS for cloud users. It is consequently
crucial to study the timing and spatial characteristics of cloud workload to improve the
predictability of the dynamically changing cloud environments.
What makes dynamic allocation problems with guaranteed QoS even more complicated problem is that current cloud data centers host a large number of service types
with several resources, timing, and cybersecurity requirements. Moreover, those data
centers offer different implementation requirements and styles (e.g., varying degrees of
parallelism, as in Google data centers [82, 193].) For energy-efficient computing, different service types are allocated to servers with different architectures, i.e., heterogeneous
servers [194–197]. We also intend to extend our work in Chapter 4 to include timesensitive cloud services hosted on heterogeneous platforms with different power requirements, cybersecurity levels, and resource usage criteria (e.g., CPU, memory, storage, and
network) while ensuring the QoS of those cloud services. In other words, we are interested in identifying the minimum required multi-dimensional resource demand vector for
each service type when hosted alone and when hosted with different service types onto
heterogeneous servers with QoS constraints and cybersecurity requirements. We are also
interested in studying how to allocate cloud services with guaranteed QoS requirements
and cybersecurity conditions onto heterogeneous servers with power consumption and
operating expense constraints.
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7.4

Cloud workload modeling and analysis

Modeling and analyzing cloud workloads are vital when developing efficient and effective dynamic resource allocation policies that optimize resource usage while assuring an
adequate quality level for cloud users.
Although both industry and academia have developed several benchmarks and simulation tools to mimic actual cloud workloads [48,76,163], those tools are limited to specific
application or cloud platform types, such as EC2 low-level workloads [198] and scientific
workloads [199]. The limitation and inadequacy of workload studies and models are due
to the underlying complexity of cloud systems [200], variety in types of workloads [111],
and need for more cloud traces to be analyzed and studied [82, 193].
Studying the timing and spatial features of cloud workloads can help scholars predict
the timing performance and resource demands of cloud requests under different stress
levels and cloud platforms. We hope that our studies help accurately identify the factors
that contribute to optimize and degrade the performance of cloud service, and thereupon
provide vital insight to developing efficient and effective dynamic cloud resource allocations [166].

7.5

Game-theoretical based VM live migration in cloud clusters with
cybersecurity awareness

One major limitation of any server consolidation algorithm is the interdependent cybersecurity risks. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we proposed game-theoretical based static VM
allocation strategies to minimize the provider’s worst potential cybersecurity loss while
optimizing the cloud provider’s power consumption and operating costs. In the future,
we plan to consider the dynamic allocation case based on the mixed NE strategy profiles,
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in where VMs can migrate from one server to another to minimize the chances of a successful attack on any of the VMs. We assume that a successful attack requires more time
than the time between two successive migrations. The challenging question, nonetheless,
is – what is the minimum allowed number of migrations within a certain period and between predefined or random allocation strategies and what are the optimal time intervals
between every two consecutive migrations so that the cybersecurity risks, power consummation, and operating expense are minimized?–. Meanwhile, we also should guarantee
that the performance degradation and service interruption due to VM the live migration
are mitigated.
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